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1

LATIN AI^ERICA : ECPNOniC ANALYSIS

1 . 1 INTRODUCTION
In order to have a better understanding in regard
to what is coming at a later stage , I consider it
essential to give a general picture of the main
features comprised in the Latin American regional
growth and development from the political economy
judgement point of view , It is my willing to ex
plain firstly , the actual and present status of
macroeconomic variables included in such an econo
mic analysis of Latin America as a whole region ,
and secondly to go more deeply into the Argentinean
case within the frame of the maritime problematic
but never by splitting it into different subjects ,
since shipping as a whole is strongly linked to
macro and microeconomic variables , therefore , no
shipping analysis could be seriously carried out
by isolating it from the main leading concepts
found in both the domestic economies and the inter
national environment , wherein Argentina and the
whole Latin American region keep certain common
factors regarding econom.ic growth and development
under what I would call certain standards of econo
mic and political behavior ,
Before starting , I want to point out that in addi
tion to the fact that Latin America presents countries
with different productive structures and therefore not
very homogeneous degrees of development , it has the
very typical problems faced by a less developed area
during the industrialization process through quite
strict import substitution schemes • In other words f
the difference among those countries is mainly given
by the way the resource allocation is carried out and

T

by the degree of efficiency in the utilization and
optimization of those resources , so long as on the
other hand they keep aporoxinately the same national
and even regional targets for reaching higher indexes
of productivity , wider and more efficient resources
distribution , better income allocation , better
inter and intra-regional relationships , etc •
I consider these brief concepts-of top importance
in order to understand the methodology and extent
of my analysis ; thus shipping variables will find
their different sources in the master variables of
the national economies .
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1 . 2 ECOMOfviIC OUTLOOK

•

The arguments set out in this thesis , as far as develooment planning is concerned , are applicable to

<

developing countries , but more specifically to those
located in Latin America . Therefore , I consider it
necessary first of all to observe a series of restrictive or limiting features:
-- r^lost of the countries are on the way of getting
consolidated as nations . This means that not only
in physical and political terms but also in econo-
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mic and social terms , the national territories a.re
still not totally integrated .
Their social systems are still not well structured
not only on their organizational side but also re-
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garding their cal^egories or divisions . In real
life , even the systems called formally "federals"
■
are in fact highly , if not totally , centralized
structures regarding the decision making process .
-- Their economic systems are definitely less developed
and are crossing a period of transition toward in
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dustrialization , which in practical terms generates
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different changes and therefore different patterns
in the distribution of population and economic acti
vity ,
—

Countries are relatively poor and therefore they
lack of economic capacity so as to afford any sort
of waste or overlapping with respect to governmen

tal functions in its different levels .
— Countries have experimented a urbanization process
considerably faster than the processes related to
their own economic developments •
— Latin American countries are generally primary pro
duct exporters , excluding certain segments of pro
duction of a few regions , whereby they have to
face problems of demand limitation as well as down
ward movements in product unit price terms .
— Latin American countries are tied to operative
restrictions , informally set up into huge amounts
of foreign debt .
-- Countries have individually different productive
structures within the same domestic economy and a
very low integration degree or relationship among
—

those structures .
Very large shares of the public administration in
the GDP of each country , thus generating huge
figures in terms of fiscal deficits as a result
of mismanagement or lack of cost consciousness ,
among other topics , on the part of the public
officials .

The concepts above mentioned are , although not all ,
the main restrictions that are playing a decisive role
against development in this region of the world •
Now f if we check the existing national planning schemes
we can find the following similarities regarding natio
nal targets :

1 ) to increase the GNP at a rate which allows the im-

2)
3)
4)

5)

5)

7)

proupment of the income per capita . Such a goal
has the top priority in most of the countries ,
(A==!GEh'TINA - BRASIL - CHILE - PA^JAflA - VENEZUELA - PARAGUAY ) .
Further objectives must be taken into account in
the great majority of the cases , as restrictions :
to improve income distribution .
to reduce inflationary pressures .
to increase the economic autonomy , either by rais
ing exports and decreasing imports or by balancing
the foreign debt , 'dithin this context , it is normal
ly assumed that imports substitution and exports
diversification have a major role to play in the
achievement of this goal •
to increase the employment rate , Such a goal should
rather be understood in the way of creating new va
cancies instead of diminishing the firing rate •
to raise the standard of living so as to increase
consumption together with its multiplier effect ,
in order to reach educational and health standards
among many others,
national integration : elaborated and thought in
terms of economic access of all the subsystems or
regional markets to the master system or national
market , as well as in terms of the participation
of all available human resources in the develop
ment process. .

Now , if we take these national targets and translate
them in terms of regional objectives , it is possible
to examine to what extent the regional policies could
contribute to the creation of national policies and
goals •

1 ) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to increase GNP
IM REGIONAL TERP1S : a) to oromote investments to
wards areas where higher capital-product rates can
be obtained , without overlooking the concept of
economies of scale and cumulated capital in infra
structure .
b) to incorporate new regional
resources (human , natural , financial , etc) to the
development process •
2 ) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to improve income distribution
IN REGIONAL TERMS : a) to increase the income per
capita in those areas of lesser relative development
by means of assigning capital endowments and know-how
from outside the area concerned , and to encourage
the transference of population towards other areas .
3) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to reduce inflationary pressures
IN REGIONAL TERMS : a) to increase the endowment di
rectly productive of the total investment and to ca
nalize such an investment towards areas wherein the
existing infrastructure allows an additional expan
sion of those sectors directly productive ,
4 ) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to increase the economic autonomy
- REGIONAL TERMS : a) to assign importance , within
the framework of the regions involved , to the export
industries through a better utilization of the regio
nal resources . The multiplier effect arising out of
such a process , should contribute to the reduction
of regional imports within the context of their na
tional comparative advantages •
5 ) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to increase the employment rate
IN REGIONAL TERMS : a) to increase the geographical
mobility of capital and manpower endowments accor
ding to the potential resources allocation' ,
B) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : national integration
IN REGIONAL TERMS t a) economic aspect : to promote

inter end intra-regional links by improving the
access,between all the areas of nroduction and
consumption ,
b) social aspect : to improve
the access of all the inhabited areas to the capital
of social infrastructure •
c) political aspect : descentralization of the administrative and political struc
ture in order to integrate the regions to the deci
sion making process by spreading out the existing
powers •
And now , u'e can discuss how these global objectives for
Latin America can be influenced by shipping activities
and through the regional policies . Then , following
the same order we have :
1) The countries involved in development processes show
a great heterogeneity in this regard . Consequently
that is the reason whereby the positive return of the
investment depends to a great extent on the right
allocation of the available investment funds . In case
a country takes the decision to invest in shipping ,
we might say there are certain advantages , although
some drawbacks as well , to consider before starting
to think in terms of shipping investments , Let us
now look upon only the advantages and deal with the
disadvantages at a later stage .
t
Then we can state the typical favourable arguments
about shipping , advocated by any international or
ganization as well as by any succesful shipping
nation :
i

A - IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
B - FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVING

C - EFFCTS ON FREIGHT COST AND TRADE
D - EF.PLOYf'lENT
E - SHIPPING IN'JESTNENT AND'RELATED SECTORS
F - SECURITY AN NON-ECONON.IC FACTORS
a)

Nowadays , Latin American countries are engaged ,
as a whole , in ,a very strong import substitution
process with the purpose of accelerating domestic
industrialization , of creating employment oppor
tunities and specialization , of getting rid of
economic dependency as much as possible from the
industrialized centers , of saving foreign currency
by limiting imports , of being capable of exporting
manufactured products to get foreign currency ,

Such a nrocBss o'as and still continue being so
strong , that the substitution coefficients of the
main three countries (ARGENTINA - BRASIL - F.EXICO)
were even lower than those obtained by USA during
the crisis in the 30s , Import substitution is a
quite useful economio mean , whenever it is known
how to make good outcomes out of it ; but on the
other hand , it could perfectly lead to shortage
of capital goods and industry inputs within the
scope of economic stagnation if it is not well
understood and run , In such a case , investments
in shipping for a country's foreign trade , provided
such a country counts with specialized and skillful
people , can initially be looked upon as the avoided
import cost or freight payment , and th.e cost of
imported goods and services and national resources
used so as to provide the shipping service , taking
into account shadow prices where appropiate .
B) The potential for avoiding substantial foreign
exchange payments for maritime freights is often
given by LDC's as one important reason for invest-

ments in ocean-going shipping ,
Although the total freight paid to national flag
lines in a country's foreign trade is a gross
foreign exchange saving , the net saving from the
national point of view mill be significantly less
depending on a number of factors , including :
(l ) the type of vessels involved and their age and
cost structures under national anf foreign flag ;
(2) the extent to which the vessel is acquired from
abroad and the financing arrangements ; (3) the
extent to which the national resources are used in
its operation (crew , management , repair facilities,
etc ) ; (a) the operating efficiency and profitabi
lity level ; (5) the impact on freight rates ; (6)
the general conditions on the oarticular trade
routes in Question ,
The relative savings might be greater if , apart
from crew and management costs , a significant part
of the repair costs , insurance and some other items
could also be procured nationally • In this regard,
Argentina together with Brasil , are in a better
position than the rest of the Latin American coun
tries . Therefore , there is no reason for believing
that the infrastructure owned by these two countries
could not help to achieve this goal , either natio
nally or even regionally , However , foreign currency
savings do not come up so easily , but with a good
and experienced management and with the necessary
knowledge to carry out actions connected with the
real needs of the balance of payments . In addition
to that , it should be noticed that in some other
nations of this area , shipping management may
initially have to be partly obtained abroad and
would therefore , in part , involve a foreign ex
change cost , While crew costs might largely be a

national currency cost, there could be partly
offsetting foreign currency losses if the employ
ment of notional crews of national flag vessels
meant a transfer of such crews from foreign flag
vessels to national flag vessels rather than the
employment of previously unemployed people or
persons locally employed in other national in
dustries . Once again , both the Argentinean and
Brazilian vessels have their own officers and crews
whereby such a trabsference of human resources is
not required . Therefore , this could be another
argument in favour of shipping investment with
the aim of saving foreign currency « In the case
the national currency is overvalued , like the one

C)

in Argentina , the value of the net foreign currency
savings would be understated if the official ex
change is used without adjustment , which actually
is not a big constraint if we bear in mind the
fact that such a gap in the Argentinean case is
only of 1 0% and belongs to a special economic pro
gram with a finite extent . Then , we could state
that , although significant gross foreign exchange
earnings or savings may be obtained from invest
ments in shipping , the net savings will be smaller,
although still potentially interesting , This would,
however , have to be considered on a case-by-case
basis by the relevant candidates «
The chance of bringing down freight charges and to
improve services is often cited as reasons for LDC's
investing in merchant marines . Such a statement ,
might be true or not , strictly depending on two
fundamental issues so far not very well understood
in this region of the earth :
-- mANAGEflENT CRITERION
-- FREEDOIV! OF UPJDERTAKING
These concepts are supposed to be apolicable to the

same extent to both , the public and private sectors,
subjects to which I will refer later on during the
strategic planning stage . But anyway , I consider
it necessary to mention the mein guidelines whereby
trades and their costs could be directly affected
and therefore probable generators of indirect posi
tive effects on both the domestic economy and the
foreign sector , and always bearing in mind their
results on the balance of payments .
Firstly , an important cost is labor , covering
both crew and management , This would be particularly
significant and generally favourable for the LDC's
in liner shipping and could become increasingly im
portant in bulk shipping if open registry shipping
were curtailed through international agreements,It
should , however , be noted that in the case of some
LDC's , the potential advantages in terms of lower
units wage rates may be partly offset by larger crew
sizes •
Notwithstanding , the River Plate market is presently
dominated by those ships enjoying lower crew costs
like container ships and others built under high-tech
standards , which brings about comparative advantages
in real terms .
Secondly we have the ghost of the economies of scale.
According to the universally accepted theory , we have
the economies of scale associated with vessel size ,
and economies associated with number of vessels opera
ted by a single company , In principle , there are
considerable economies of scale in bulk shipping from
increased vessel sizes , particularly in the long-dis— '
tance and large volume trades ; however , the extent
to which increasing vessel sizes can be economically
used in particular trades , depends , apart from
vessels costs , on the trade volumes involved and

the caoacity of the existing port and storage facil
ities or the cost of new facilities . These factors
are even more important for liner vessels . For both
liner and bulk vessels there may be a trade-off
between decreasing ship operating costs per ton-mile
from fully used larger vessels and increasing port,'
and storage costs . It is , however , likely that
increasing^bunker orices and the reduced bunker
costs per ton of cargo for larger vessels may gra
dually result in increased vess'el sizes , particu
larly in the average size of bulk vessels . In liner
trades , this could also increase the use of larger
container vessels for main,line port trades y sup
plemented by feeder services as in the case of US
LINES , EVERGREEN and others . But in fact , in most
of the Latin __American traffic systems , two barriers
seem to come up before the argument of economies of
scale ;
-- no port is efficiently outfitted , neither from
the safety nor from the operations o^int of view,
as to receive vessels aimed at achieving economies
of scale •
-- no volume of trade is available as to reasonably
serve those vessels , unless the existing traffic
structures were eliminated by law , which frankly
speaking is not very likely to occur •
Furthermore , there are many examples of succesful ship
ping undertakings carried out by ^ certain number of
small companies operating in the range of one to four
ships and in those markets where economies of scale are
perfectly feasible for those interested owners . This
could be the case of several shipping lines operating in
the Scandinavean markets as well as in the North Atlantic,
Therefore , I do not foresee any reasons for believing
that operations carried out with a reasonable dosis of

managerial common sense under market freedom terms ,
and without taking the scale concept , would not
lead to a more competitiue liner market together with
all the direct and indirect effects on the domestic
and foreign sector of the country's economy ,
Specifically speaking , I think that the Riuer Plate
market and its .deep hinterland , would largely benefit
from any positive effect caused on its trade provided
that both the foreign trade and the shipping field
do not get divorced before getting married .
D) Although investments by LDC's in shipping may increase
the employment opportunities both on board and on
shore , they generally cannot be justified solely
in terms of employment created ; shipping is ,
despite large variations , a relatively capital
intensive industry in terms of capital cost per job.
But the conoept of employment oreation must not be
looked upon in domestic terms only , but also in
foreign market terms .
Shioping requires certain skills which , although
available in some LDC's , are unlikely to be readily
available in many others without considerable expen
ditures on training and , in the ease of offioers ,
considerable time as well ,
According to an IMO estimate , the cost of training
a radio cadet is some 7/80D0 us dollars and that of
a navigator or engineering officer 11/l3000 us dollars.
These are very good reasons for thinking in terms of
the international market for employing nationals in
foreign flag vessels , and specially in those of LDC's
by means of bilateral or regional agreements as far
as the supply of officers is concerned , Argentina y
once again , seems to have all the suitable conditions
for fulfilling the requirements of marine personnel
set out by those LDC's suffering from shortage on a
regional basis .

Let us tako the example of South Korea , whose sea
farers have increasingly been employed by foreign
flags in recent years , which nocmially represents
an income of 120 million us dollars per year ,
Another example is giv/en by the Philippines , where
foreign exchange earnings from seamen employed in
foreign vessels presently means 160 million us dollars
per annum , Of course , it would be dangerous to think
in professionalizing this career in such a way that
hundreds of people should get their diplomas every
year without chances of signing on national flag
vessels and with the only viable way out of leaving
far sway in order to find jobs • But if we take the
Latin American market , we can identify a certain
market that in itself lacks of seamen and comes re
presented by most of these nations • Therefore , such
a shortage could be matched with the assistance of
Argentinean seamen under any sort of regional agree
ment
a'nd thus representing more people employed and
a better resources allocation in manpower terms ,
I'.’hich could always be absorbed once again by the na
tional fleet ) provided there is a demand reactivation
in any liner trade segment ,
E) Investment in shipping may , in appropiate cases ,
create further employment and output in related sec
tors • The extent of these economic likages will de
pend largely on how far shipping is planned as an in
tegral part of the economy and can draw on f and pro
vide service for , other sectors of the economy , The
main economic linkages between shipping and other sec
tors of the economy , apart from employment of crew
and onshore personnel , could be shiprepair*and ship
building and their supply industries as well as many
other support industries such as insurance | comunica—
tions , financing , etc , Within this context , it is

known that Arnantina has kept and developed during rrany
years an acceptable naval industry and repair yards
from a technical paint of view , although many times
overpuoted as regards to newbuilding prices . Therefore
I wonder why , if this country has got the key installa
tions to produce and expand employment either directly
or indirectly , has not taken the necessary steps for
doing so • Obviously , the answer leads by itself to
the governmental shipping policy which was never aware
of such matters and consequently , neither of maritime
planning • I should add that all these secondary activi
ties tend to be more labor-intensive than modern ship
ping , Ideally , therefore , the existence or possible
development of such related Industries should be evalu
ated in connection with any consideration of major
investments in shipoing , taking into account the eco
nomies of scale which might be involved ,
A clear , although possibly unique , example of this
approach appears to have been Korea • In S, Korea ,
shipping forms an integral part of the national eco
nomy and planning since the country's export-led
development pattern depends both on the imports of
large volumes of raw materials for the steel industry,
particularly shipbuilding , and on the export of manu
factured products to many different markets . Shipping,
particularly bulk shipping , provides the transport
for these essential imports and is , itself , a cus
tomer of the shipbuilding industry • As exports have
increased , investments have been made in liner
vessels to meet part of the transport requirements •
Korean shipping , by focusing initially on bulk ship
ping , has been different from that of most LDC's ,
which have focused , at least initially , on liner
shipping ,
A second example where the development of shioping

seems to have been expanded as an integral part of
the country's economy is Brazil • It has developed
a liner fleet to serve its foreign trade in liner
goods , partly through cargo reservation measures
as well as with economic growth and development
acting as driving axis for tonnage expansion purp
oses •
F) The availability of shipping services to meet part
of a country's foreign trade needs in case of war
or other emergencies , has been in consideration in
connection with the development of many national mer
chant marines . At periods of high worldwide demand
for shipping services and high freight rates (not
necessarily related to wars) LDC's with small trade
volumes might find the availability of shipping ser
vices greatly reduced , This might be particularly so
for essential imports when vessels are transferred
to large volume trade routes and chartered vessels
might only be available et higher rates , if at all .
The question of security of service , for instance ,
seems to have been a major consideration , once again,
in the development of Korean shipping , given the
country's geographical position , its dependence on
imports of large volumes of raw materials for its
industry , as well as the growing importance of ex
ports to many different countries • While defense
considerations fall outside the normal economic eva
luation , they have been very convincing arguments
to carry out fleet expansions of not few merchant
marines (USA - ISRAEL - KOREA - BRAZIL) .
Other non-economic considerations could include ,
according to some theorists , the concept of national
prestige or identity , which in my opinion could be
totally overlooked for representing old fashion
arguments orobably used a couple of centuries ago ,

snd far being ignorant of the present econorric end
social reality of the internetional society ,
?) In this case , human resources which are going to
be used together with other production factors are
not going to be transfered , strictly from one area
to another as the theory sets out , but they will be
absorbed by a region which before was not considered
as an area ; i.e, the sea and its related factors .
Therefore , whenev/er we do not look upon the sea as
an integral area of the country to be regionalized
and developed , employing people by investing in
liner shipping as a wey of increasing the income oer
capita and fostering the transference of human re
sources from one area to another , is by no means,
justifiable . But if we assume that the sea is other
area that needs to be developed within an integral
regional development program , ue can saV that invest
ments in liner shipping together with a strategic
planning of shipbuilding and a ship repairing industry,
it could be a valuable source of employment and special
ization with all the economic components therein
soecified . Employment in shipping , even if of limited
importance , may have , however , somewhat greater
regional importance as the seamen may come from
coastal areas with few employment alternatives .
Employment in the national shipping administration or
directly related service industries increases the total
employment opportunities • International shipping is
generally considered a relatively capital intensive
industry although the capital invested per employee
differs markedly for different types of shipping , and
also on whether new or second hand vessels are used .
The capital invested per employee is also affected by
vessels crewing patterns , national labor policies ,

r

onshore-onboard ratio , among others •
Onshore employment for instance , is normally signi
ficantly higher for liners than for bulk services ,
and specially in LDCs . To give an example , the in
vestment per employee in shipping in the UK increased
between 197D and 1980 by 89^ at constant 1975 prices ;
the investment per employee in shipoing in 1975 was
slightly less than in electricity , gas and water but
substantially higher than in other major industries ,
Another example could be the net (unrevalued) fixed
assets per employee of the Shipping Corporation of
India , which was about 58.000 us dollars in 1978 as
compared with an average of 5,000 us dollars per
employee for 22 other major Government of India
undertakings in the same year . While on the other
side we can see that the real capital per employee
in ocean-going shipping in Norway was 150,000 us
dollars in 197A , and therefore largely superior to
the 70,000 us dollars per employee used for five major
industrial concerns • From, this , we can notice that
in the Norwegian case , even when capital/labor ratios
have been obtained four years before , they ere much
higher than those belonging to India , which obviously
means that such a ratio may differ according to the
technological needs of the traffic concerned as well
as the degree of specialization desired by the owner ,
In the case of South America , I would say there is
no need for investing huge amounts of money to acquire
high-tech vessels , even when markets of developed
countries are involved , but to operate what they own
with structural shifts regarding managerial procedures
and manpower allocation ,
3) Normally , the large investments in infrastructure
represent important sources of inflationary pressure
in LDCs ) since those undertakings are generally in

the hands of the governments who usually run out of
liquid resources , thus incurring large fiscal defi
cits with endless inflationary effects f unless they
count on foreign capital resources for offsetting
their internal negative balances by increasing foreign
debt amounts , which in other words means purchasing
hard currency without chances of letting such capital
get self-amortized • But if we consider a port and its
equipment such as a railway , a container terminal and
others y as basic infrastructure to serve not only li
ner shipping but also bulk activities , tramp and
many other segments which could eventually come up
later , the likelihood of self-amortizing such a
capital input in the long run , increases significan
tly even when inflation is still present therein .
Mery basically we could say thaf^the better the harbour
is outfitted and run , the more exports and imports
will take place and therefore more ships will come
with the consequent advantages for the balance of paymants .
Besides the fact the better the traffic as a whole is
managed , the more are the chances to reduce inflatio
nary sources arising out of the national resources in
terms of currency . In connection to this issue , ship
ping could have an outstanding role to play if govern
ments should allow it ^ and provided that fiscal deficits
are not going to be entirely financed by taxing and by
getting foreign loans but by improving efficiency and
effectiveness as regards infrastructure creation without
inflationary effects .
a

) Economic independency does not come only with shipping,
but what we can say in this context is that shipping ,
certainly is an important link in the orocess of diminish
ing dependency from the international economic centers
by means of the utilization of national units .
Nevertheless , it can be said that the two fundamental

pillars as to reduce economic deoendency , are gi
ven by the following oolicies :
-- IFIPORTS SUBSTITUTION : it has the aim of producing
locally what before uas imported from abroad , with
the consecuent expected advantages in the domestic
economy regarding employment and industrialization
at different levels , as long as on the foreign
sector such advantages are given by foreign cu
rrency savings and by what I consider very relevant^
lesser economic dependency which can also be looketi
upon in terms of strategic value , This system
has its advantages and drawbacks , to which I am
not going to refer right now since it deserves a
separate analysis related to liner shipping ,
-- PLANNED EXPORTS : it means that all foreign loans
obtained by one country , are supposed to be alloc
ated , in very broad terms , to the existing local
activities or starting local industries wherein
such a current of money may reactivate the industry
concerned , in such a way that its products will
be exported leading to the generation of sufficient
foreign currency as to refund the whole fund and
generate profits as well in the medium , although
preferably short run . Of course , I should point
out that such a foreign currency drain might well
be allocated among infant industries , which unless
they are quite technologically advanced , could
achieve the same goals other than the already
existing or just starting ones .
Then the Question is , how liner shipping and to
what extent could help in achieving those targets?
Evidently , liner shipping could be of great help when
ever maritime policy-makers keep close links with the
national economic planners with respect to the foreign
sector of the economy , This is to say that national

liner shipping could follow and support ,either
profitably or interms of expected earnings , the
markets wherein national products are being gradually
introduced ; it could positively influence the export
operation by increasing frequency together with fiscal
or freight reimbursements for using national flag
vessels , or by avoiding a general rate increase
assuming a strong position in a conference through
its share , or by fostering the participation of nat
ional outsiders and by discouraging foreign outsiders
to operate therein , by getting those inbound goods
on national flag vessels but exclusively those that
are going to be used in some manufacturing processes
capable of generating cash in hard currency terms ,
and which has still not been fit into a substitution
process . Like these examples , we can find a long
list , but it is up to the governments to lay down
the regulations in order to have a shipping policy
coincident with the main aims of the foreign sector
of the national economy , u'hich usually works out
many models and trends but without getting any positive
balance in real terms owing to the existing lack of
understanding and coordination between the different
governmental spheres -»
5)B) Regarding these points I have already stated the
miain guidelines included in the previous items •
However , I would like to highlight the fact that in
Latin American countries , larger mobility of man
power is of top importance owing to the capital
scarcity and to the traditional migratory trend of
the countries comprised in such an area . Shipping
could make its own contribution for the transference
and mobility of human resources as well as capital
endowments • But for doing so , countries involved
in this area should first of all think of integrat
ing themselves internally and afterwards , at a

later stage , of becoming a production and trade unit
in regional terms , I'.'hich could eventually be carried
out only in the shipping field , but certainly uith
not so promising results as if it mere done in actual
regional terms bearing in mind both concepts , the
social and economic environments in all their stages
of development and interaction •
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ECONOfllC AND FINANCIAL COflPARATIUE ANALYSIS
LATIN AMERICA - EAST ASIA

In order to have a better understanding of the relation
ship between shipping policy matters and economic growth
and development strategies , I consider it extremely
useful to go into further detail in a brief but quite
demonstrative comparative analysis between two areas
perfectly differenciated from each other , regarding
their productive structures and management styles , but
with quite a big potentiality in common , which is
represented by natural and non-natural resources . These
two areas are represented by East Asia and Latin America
and this comparative study could be looked upon as a
tale of Asian winners and Latin losers • Then , anyone
might wonder why did Latin America fare so much worse
in the early 1980s than East Asia ? In this context ,
there is a recent study by a special team from Harvard
University , which refute some popular answers , and
offers a not-so-obvious one instead ,
Some Latin American economies grew fast enough in the
1970s to rival Asia's best . But between 1981 and 198A ,
the six Latin American countries considered in this stu
dy saw their economies shrink , on average , Meanwhile ,
the four East Asian countries grew almost as quickly as
in the 1970s , at an average rate of 5,8 % a year , Then,
why the difference ? We can look at several plausible-

-seeming reasons as to exolain such a situation , but
ue can better focus our attention to those areas which
are qualified as suspicious of being grounds :
fl) EXTERNAL ECDt'OfllC SHOCKS : many economists maintain
that swings in interest rates and commodity prices
hit Latin America with greater force than East Asia,
Column 1 on the next page summarises the economic
impact of both kinds of shock - changing prices and
changing interest rates . Let us take Brazil , main
ly because of the rise in the price of oil . Its
import orices rose much faster than its export prices
after 1979 , So in 1979—83 , its terms of trade were
on average 29 % lower than in 1975-78 , Translated
into loss of income , the annual cost was 2,3^ of
GDP a year , Altogether then , external shocks cut
Brazil's potential annual income by 5^ of GDP after
1979 . Evidently , all this can be translated in
terms of lower traffic volumes to be carried by nat
ional flag ships and a sort of impasse for carrying
out any kind of investment in this field ,
Obviously , the greater the economic stagnation of
a country or region is , the more difficult it is
to realize and to be aware of the multiplier effect
of shipping and its incidence on a market economy
structure .
The rest of column 1 , though , shows that these
shocks can not account for Latin America's poorer
economic performance • True ^ the Asian countries
made , on average , a small gain (l,l/C of GDP) ,
while Latin America came out roughly even (a loss
of Q f l % of GDP) • But averages can mislead , The
shocks left l/enezuela , an oil exporter , well on
top ; its GDP still declined by 2,2^ a year in
1981-1984 • South Korea meanwhile suffered a relat-

iue loss of 3,8^ of GDP from the shock , and Thailand
of 3,3% , yet both still grew rapidly •
Now , if we compare economic development with the ship
ping evolution of these three countries , we could easily
realize that lack of awareness is not of exclusive Latin
American property , represented by Venezuela in this case,
but also of an apparent economically successful country
like Thailand . The outstanding one is South Korea , which
seems to gather everything the others do not ; i.e, eco
nomic development and growth together with shipping
conciousness that comes represented through investm.ents
in shipbuilding and in maritime trade among other things .
From this statement , it would seem to leave clear that
no shipping policy can be successfully carried out in the
practical field by shuting out the behavior of the eco
nomic variables of the domestic economy in all its branches,
or by giving up any investment project in the maritime
field , specially those related to the liner buisness
during periods of reactivation and economic expansion •
COLUTN 1

% change in GDP
average
1970-81
876-

average
1981-84

(+) external economic
shocks

C
l}
(2)

54321□123-

-

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

0)
(2 )
(3)
(4)

S,Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia

- 3,8
4,8

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Brasil
Argentina
nexico
Venezuela

- 5,0
1,6

(4) Peru
(4) Chile

- 3,3
6,2

1,2
16,2
- 4,2
- 6,2

yEIGHTED AVERAGES
7,8
5,8
5,6

- 0,A

EAST ASIA
L. APIERICA

1,1
-

0,1

(+) average annual change in income as a percentage of
GDP comparing 1976-78 with 1979-83 *
B) DEBT : column 1 already takes into account part of
the harm from over-borrouiing caused by higher interest
charges . Some say that bigger debts can also be a
drag on grouth in their own right . Column 2 , belou,
confirms that by 1981 the Latin Americans had a
higher average ratio of debt to GDP . Yet the difference
(31,3!^ compared with 25,91^) does not seem big enough
to explain the growth-rate gap between the two regions.
During the 1970s all of the Asian countries had run
up debt-GDP ratios that were about as high as Brazil's,
COLUMN 2

Debt/GDP ratio 1981

S, Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia

27,6
27,8

Brazil
Argentina
Mexico

26,1
31,6
30,9

Venezuela
Peru

42,1
44,7
47,6

Chile

25,7
24,1

EAST ASIA

25,9

LATIN AMERICA

31 ,3

So , even u.'hen there is greater constraint in such a
ratio for Latin Amarica , it is not so big as to
justify such an imbalanced economic growth and so
heterogeneous shipping policies between both regions ,
and sometimes among the member nations in the same
region ,
C) TAXES : it is commonly accepted that when govern
ments overtax , not only in liner shipping but also
in most activities , growth can suffer ; that much
is uncontroversial • The figures in column 3 , how
ever , suggest than in 1982 Latin American countries
were no more highly taxed than their East Asian
counterparts .Latin America's average share of taxes
in GDP was 22, 2% , compared’with 2D , 5 % in East Asia,
Argentina , Brazil , Mexico end Peru all had lower
tax shares than Malaysia .
CPLUMN 3

Taxes as %> of GDP (l 982)

S, Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia

19.1

Brazil

26,1

Argentina
Mexico

16,5
17.0
29,3
16,8

Venezuela
Peru
Chile

EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA

29.2
13,9
22.2

32.0

20,6
22,2

Obviously , high taxes can brake and conseguently
delay , if-not refute , economic development . But
the key concept in this context , is not hou much a
country is going to get from taxes or how many dif
ferent kinds and shapes of taxes a country could
applicate , but the, way they are allocated .
In the specific case of liner traffic , taxes could
be higher for foreign flag ships which use a certain
kind of technology which obliges national ports to
invest in equipment and infrastructure to serve them.
Taxes could very according to the number of containers
utilized on each voyage , or might be sased on the
freight paid , or in other words on the value of the
commodities , ^^tc , Evidently , national vessels
would benefit in the short and medium run because of
the existing structure of the market , which is normal
ly more favourable for foreign flags than for national
ones . Of course , many people would start speaking
about subsidies and so on , although I believe in such
a case it would be more a commercial tool than what
many academics call indirect subsidy . Anyway , taxes
are supposed to keep a certain relationship with the
market orospects and the needs of liner buisness evol
ution ,
D) GO'JERMriENT SP EM PI MG : the four column shows the share
of government spending in GDP in 1982 . Again the average
is higher for Latin America than for East Asia , but not
much . Government spending in Malaysia was higher than
in any of the Latin American countries . In Peru , was
lower than in any of the East Asian nations . Bits and
pieces of other evidence also suggest that Latin America's,
governments are no more economically intrusive than Asia's,
and perhaps less so ,
Ue can consider the following figures for public invest-

ment as a oroportion of total investrent in order to
have a better idea of this item : 25°? in South Korea
in 197A-77 , 32^ in Taiwan in 1978-80 , 1 3^ in Chile
in 1978-80 , 15^ in Peru ini 978-79 .
Excluding Brazil , from the Latin American group , and
South Korea from the East Asian group , all public
investments ere normally made up of any kind of projects
in many fields except transport , or more specifically
we might say excluding shipping ,
CObUriN A

Government spending in GDP 1982 (%)

S, Korea
Maalaysia
Thailand
Indonesia

Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
V/enezuela
Peru
Chile

EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA

19,5
A1 ,0
19,9
23,5

.

21,8
21,B
31 ,7
29.6
18,0
37.6

23.7
25.8

I'lost of these countries , due to the fact "that they
have never had a clearly identified shipping policy ,
believe that by making a feu investments for port
maintenance and acquisition of harbour outfittings
they reach an implied target , which is generally
comprised in the development program of other field ,
like public works , communications and so forth , and

consequently without bearing in mind the concept of
specialization by breaking doun the main pillarsinto
many independent undertakings f which do not even keep
certain links between them ,
E) exports as % OF GDP : columns 5 and B show the
largest difference between the two regions • In Latin
American countries ^ the share of exports in GDP
increased from 11^ in 1965 to 15^ in 1983 ; in East
Asia , the increase was from 1Z% to 32^ • In relation
to total output , Latin America had not borrowed much
more than Asia , and higher interest rate cost both
regions roughly the same , but when the crunch came ,
Latin America had far less foreign exchenge to use for
repayment ,
exports as % of GDP
CDLUnN.............. .........
5
B
S, Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia

9
4A
18
5

Brazil
Argentina
flexico

8
8
9

Venezuela
Peru
Chile

31
1B
14

EAST ASIA

13

LATIN AMERICA

11

37
54
22
25

8
13
20
26
21
24

32
15

Such a scarcity of foreign exchange is represented by

the non-existence of undertakings regarding the develop
ment of the foreign sector of the national or regional
economies , or in other words the lack of undertakings
from the domestic economies towards the international
markets in all their branches : international trade ,
international capital market , international transport
and so on ,
Without the output of foreign currency , not only a
single country but also a whole region , like South
America , is obliged to face serious problems in the
long runand to suffer wider economic cycles of depen
dency from the centers and as members of the so called
periferia •
Column 7 shows that its ratio of debt service to ex
ports averaged 1 5 3 % between 1980 and 1983 , compared
with 61,7^ in East Asia • To find that foreign exchange,
the region had to slash imports , and in doing so brought
on the recession of the early 1980s •
COLUfir^J 7
S, Korea
Malaysia
Thailand

debt service ratio / average 80-83
90.1
1 6,9
58.1

Indonesia

BRAZIL
ARGENTINA
P"EXICO
VENEZUELA
PERU
CHILE

1 32,6
214,9
161 ,8
117,8

EAST ASIA
LATIN AF-IERICA

81 ,7
1 53,8

122,2
1 53,3

I'lost Latin American countries denied themselves rapid
export growth in the 1970s because they kept their ex
change rates too high , In 1982-83 , the black market
discount on the currencies of the Latin American nations
in our table averaged 4 0 , compared with 6,9^ for East
Asia . But this begs for a question : why did the East
Asian countries try so much harder to make exports
competitive ? In the short term , currency devaluations
in poor countries usually helps rural workers and hurts
urban workers : farmers get more (in local-currency terms)
for the crops they export , but imported goods (which
urban workers consume in greater amounts) become more
expensive , In 1980 , 1 2% of the people in our six
Latin American countries lived in towns ; the figure
for East Asia was only 32^ . Inthis case , we can say
that the strnght of rural interest in East Asia may
deserve much of the credit for the region's triumph as
an exporter of manufactures .
CnLUflN 8

I

pi
I

urban population ratio -1 980-

S. Korea
('lalaysia
Thailand
Indonesia

55
29
14
20

Brazil

68

Argentina
Mexico

82
67

Venezuela
Peru
Chile

83
67
80

EAST ASIA

32

LATIN Af-IERICA

72

In addition to ths still low existing urban population
ratio in East Asia , I should highlight that this region
was on the one hand , deeply involved in a strong import
substitution process , 'and on the other hand , the foreign
currency amount this region borrowed from abroad , was
mainly allocated rim those activities capable of generat
ing again foreign currency by exporting , as to get selfamortized such an undertaking . ; this is to say , by
founding new feeding domestic sources with foreign oriented
outputs,
Both facts were constantly joined and supported by a cer
tain and quite defined shipping policy in the case of S,
Korea , wherein , and differently from other countries
of the same region , gave its first steps in the bulk
shipping , and afterwards in liner business • Of course ,
once more I should stress that a coherent shipping policy
is not such , without a relevant support and logical
connection with the foreign sector of the national economy.
Even though national economies seem to grow up and to
quickly become developed thanks to different policies ■
externally oriented , like Thailand and Malaysia for
instance , does not mean that shipping is going to grow
and exoand by itself , as if it were a consequence of a
possible economic boom . The kind of activities which can
be expected to get , to a great extent , a positive
starting and promising perforti]ance , are those called
collaterals : banking and capital markets , domestic
transport (railway and trucks) , general services
(storing , packing , stevedoring , surveillance , etc).
But shipping will never come up by itself due to the fact
that it gathers all the characteristics comprised in a
quite capitalistic industry and all the aspects related
to strategic functions subject to high degrees of state
regulations and interventionism ,
Andthis is what actually happened in East Asia with the

honourable exception of South Korea .
■Uith resoect to Latin Ac,erica , its growth and develop
ment was f as this reports shows , much lesser with the
exception of Brazil , In these countries , economic
innovation and progress were rather poor , so long as
shipping , as a whole , was usually an isolated island
within the inmensity of the economic universe . In this
case f a real and strong foreign trade did not exist
so as to support the idea of developing the already
existing maritime infrastructure and fleet , and
neither could they have thought of going beyond their
own market limits to compete as cross traders in a
buisness where the uncertainty and fierce competition
were even greater than the existing competition in the
international trade of goods •
That is why I advocate the idea of developing the
foreign sector of the economy first of ell , but not
only for carrying their own exports or imports a
country could eventually get in a greater dimension as
to multiply the existing tonnage several times , but
also to increase in importance and to improve in quality
the capacity and actual extent of governmental negotia
tions as regards to several and well differenciated
markets , specially in the liner and dry bulk fields •
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STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN LATIN AKiERiCA

The figures stated in table 1 represent total disbursed
debt , debt owed by the public sector , private sector ,
and short term debt , end-year (US million dollars)
ARGENTINA
Total
Public
Private
Short-term

1975
6026
3121
1193
1712

1979
19668
8557
5439
5672

1980
27065
10187
6593
10285

1981
32276
10506
12166
9604

1982
36680
16587
12311
7782

1983
40718
18590
12353
9775

TABLE 1
1975

1979

1980

1981

Total
Public
Private
Short-term

233A4
13755

51482
35618

9593
—

15864
—

64631
39151
16580
8900

74051
43829
19622
10500

I'lEXICD

1975
5700D
1262
995
3443

1979

1980
27500
10873
3853
12774

1981
29300

BBAZIL

Total
Public
Private
Short-term

23700
9805
2515
11380

1982
83206
45013
24640
13533

1983
91613
54312
24700
12602

1982
31800
12000
13800
5000

1983
32804
12000
13810
6994

11352
6588
9360

TABLE 2
LATIM AT'^ERTCA 1975
Total
Public
Private
Short-term

1979

1980

1981

75393 184193 229054 279697
44955 112096 125940 144791
19340 41796 46975 69658
11097 30328 55139 65238

1983
1982
314630 335230
166521 204871
79251 80265
68588 51094

source : Inter-american Development Bank
From the huge amounts of money set out on tables 1 and
2 , no money was allocated neither for shipping nor for
collateral or ancillary industries or services . L'ot
even the private sector was interested in investing in
the shipping field , mainly owing to the non-existence
of support and definition on the part of the government
heads • But it is also true that there is a substantial
gap between Brazil and the rest of debtors as regards
the final beneficiaries of those money loans . This
country became differenciated from the others due to
the fact that most of the loans obtained in hard cur
rency terms »
, were allocated with the planned purpose

of producing and exporting manufactures as to get such
loans self-amortized , and not just like internally
oriented industries aiming to serve local needs , which
actually could have been met as well from the amortiza
tion point of view , This is how Brazilian shipping
received a valuable support from the foreign sector of
its domestic economy with respect to cargo volumes to
be carried on board national vessels under certain
agreements or without them , and under clear definitions
about what is truly called shipping policy or in other
words , strategic planning of maritime targets .
Regarding the foreign debt problem , the shortage of
liquid funds with which to service its debt was the
immediate cause of Latin America's debt crisis in the
summer of 1982 . But there was a second , and longer-term , asoect to the problem , A number of structural
features of the big Latin American economies contribu
ted to the heavy indebtedness . At the risk of over-simplifying , we shall touch on four of the most
important areas . First is the pattern of industrializa
tion ,
The major Latin American countries present a sharp
contrast with the other big borrowers in the interna
tional capital markets (South and East Asian countries,
such as South Korea and the Philippines) . The industria
lization programs of these countries have been export-oriented as I mentioned before , ensuring specializa
tion in goods and services on which they were interna
tionally competitive . This has forced them to generate
the maximum amount of foreign exchange per dollar of
foreign borrowing • Hence although South Korea's gross
external debt stood at about AO billion US dollars not far from Argentina's - its debt service ratio in
1983 was only 2A^ , against 1A9^ for Argentina . In
the larger Latin American countries , export orientation

has been a secondary consideration . They hav/e favoured
the import-substitution model which , although not
necessarily unworkable , was made so by distorted
domestic prices caused by government subsidies and
high tariff barriers . Many new industries in Latin
America have recuired substantial protection in order
to get by . Easy foreign bank loans made it possible
to undertake projects whose priorities were primarily
political rather than economic - Argentina's paper
industry , Venezuela's steel mills , Peru's huge
irrigation schemes and Brazil's nuclear oower sta
tion (to give just a few examples) - and they were
all motivated largely by prestige or employment
considerations , neglecting the vital fact that the
output they generated would not be sufficient to
reoay the capital cost , Shipping fits perfectly into
these considerations and mainly into the political
side , without considering at all , subjects such as
balance of payments , manpower employment , spreading
effect and so forth • Such tendencies have been ex
acerbated by a second factor : the importance of the
public sector .
With the exception of Chile and Brazil (where public
spending declined and remained roughly stable ), pu
blic sector spending increased sharply as a proportion
of GDP in Latin America during the 1970s f with reve
nues failing to match expenditures , public sector
deficits also grew , Brazil's public sector deficit
rose from 2,4 per cent to 6,1 per cent , Mexico from
1,9 to 16,9 per cent , Peru's from 0,B to 8,2 per cent
We can say that inefficiently and sometimes corruptly
managed , state enterprises were a major reason ; and
obviously within the concept of state enterprise , we
should include national shipping lines which , in
in real life were and still are contributing to the

public deficits of their governments to a considera
ble extent due to the already known high degree of
capital intensive of those companies and for all
the huge investments they require to operate at a
minimum level of entreoreneurial criteria , without
considering of course the managerial and strategic
matters which will be looked upon at a later stage •
In Mexico , for instance ) the public-enterprise
deficit alone stood at around 10^ of GDP in 1982 «
Spending by public enterprises was often subject to
little central control , and their revenues were de
pressed by policies to hold down prices of their out
put as part of government efforts to combat inflation.
The consequence of this uncontrolled expansion of the
public sector was a crowding-out of private investment
and esoecially in those countries with poorly-deve
loped domestic capital markets . The deficits were
financed not just by external debt but also by loans
coming from the central bank , which simply Increased
the rate of monetary growth ,
In many cases public enterprises , including national
shipping lines , had direct access to both sources of
finance without even having to seek the permission
from the treasury or economy ministry , The result
was an explosive buil-up of both public-sector debt
and of inflation cauded by rapid expansion of the
money supply . The third factor is the political
prejudice against direct foreign investment , Poli
ticians appear to believe that loans create less deoendency than investments , which Latin American
countries have encouraged , Direct investment in La
tin America dropped from 30^ of capital inflows in
the 1960s to 20^ by the end of the 1970s • This lack
of encouragement for attracting direct investments
had its impact on shipping by avoiding and shutting
out any sort of policy related to the creation and

exnansion of the national flags by means of either
the existing transnationals in Latin America or those
from Latin America with liquid assets abroad . Further
more , and as I stated before , the feu investments
this area received during the last two decades were
sent to the wrong areas whenever we should accept .
that every investment has a certain tangible priority
and opportunity cost which is supposed to be taken
into account for the decision making process .
But normally , investments in activities related to
the sea-borne traffic were unconventionally put off
and even many times , not even spelt out . Eventually
there has been a substantial build-up of overseas
assets (much of it the result of capital flight) held
by residents of the debtor countries • Overvalue in
exchange rates in many countries not only worsened
their trader-deficits but also encouraged local resi
dents to borrow abroad . The distorted exchange rates
and artificially low domestic interest rates (often
negative in real terms) made foreign currency denomi
nated assets seem artificially attractive . And the
fact that domestic residents clearly believed such
policies were unsustainable provided a further incent
ive to capital to move abroad •
Despite the serious policy errors , it would be a mis
take to conclude that all of Latin America's external
borrowing was frittered away • Gross domestic invest
ment increased significantly as a proportion of GDP
during the 197Ds for the major Latin American debtor
countries , much of it financed by the external bor
rowing . Nevertheless the present problems would not
have been nearly so acute if the policy errors had
been avoided .

TABLE 3 : external debt service as a oercentage of
■export of goods and services
1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

42, A
16,5

43,4

38,3

43,8

59,0

19,2

21,2

26,4

34,3

64,6
37,8

41,7

22,9

9,5

12,7

43,5
71,8

53,3
32,0

59,3
24,1

55,6
31,5

53,8

62,8

34,1

65,3

74,8

39,8

23,3 --*24,2

service/exp,
interest/exp.

21,5
13,4

PERU
service/exp,
interest/exp

40,3

LATIN Ar'lERICA
service/exp.
interest/exp.
ARGENTINA
service/exp.
interest/exD,

113,0 149,4
56, 9
56,9

BRAZIL
service/exp.
interest/exp.

35,5

78,2
4 5,4

82,4
40,7

23,2

44,7
28,8

65,4
37,4

59,3
42,4

25,6
16,0

26,4
17,1

28,2
18,5

32,3
19,4

32,2
25,0

29,5
14,7

39,5

58,2
20,5

49,8
21,7

66,2
31,8

MEXICO
srrvice/exp.
interest/exp.
VENEZUELA

18,8

16,5

source : Inter-american Development Bank
Although this ratio gives a crude indication of the
debt burden , it does not reflect developments which
may be critical to the long term manageability of the
debt , Such developments include the level of import
prices , the amount of official development assistance

and foreign direct investment inflows and the rate of
economic growth in the debtor country , Undoubtedly ,
by focussing an integral olanning on shipping activi
ties , those ratios could be lowered in the short run,
further the other positive outcomes for the domestic
area such as emoloyraeCit , services and so on , Obvious
ly , onoe more we can affirm that it is a matter of
maritime conciousness and managerial undertaking by
the corresponding governments in mutual and regional
cooperation . In other words , a change in attitudes •
But we can also state in macroeconomic terms , that a
delicate combination of domestic economic adjustments,
fresh financing , and external economic growth is ne
cessary , if the crisis is to be overcome ; and certain
ly shipping might be of great help regarding the last
of these three concepts , whenever looked upon as an
integral industry capable of generating foreign ex-^
change , technology and employment , and not as a mere
service with political targets •
So far , the easiest part of the adjustment process
has been completed - a turn-round in Latin America's
balance of payments achieved almost entirely through
a severe contraction in imports . In 1983 Latin Ame
rica's imports dropped by 21^ following a 22^ contrac
tion the orevious year , But the most difficult part
of the adjustment process., restoring economic growth
through increased exports , is still to come .
Despite some encouraging signs such as a 20^ rise in
Brazil's exports in the first half of 1985 , it remains
questionable how far this can be achieved , The criti
cal factor will be the rate of economic growth in
the industrial countries • Although the economy of the
United States displayedwa strong performance in 1984
and 1985 , growing at
per annum , with a 5% real
growth rate predicted for 1987 , as long as''the

European economies hav/e been slow to respond •
There are •justifiable fears that the recovery will
prove to be only weak and therefore such an outcome
would clearly jeopardize Latin America's export prosp
ects with the already known consequences on shipping ,
Finally , we might set out that in order to avoid-such
a step , economic policies in the industrial countries
will have to be shifted away from the simple focus of
inflation-fighting towards promoting steady and non-inflationary growth , Fiscal deficits in the developed
countries , specially in the USA , should be reduced
in order to lower interest rates , which of course is
not going to be an easy task , But shipping growth
does not necessarily depend on said oolicies as the
only way out , Opposite to this , I might say without
any doubt , that every event which came up in the
international environment as a restrictive variable ,
can be overcome in very different clever ways whenever
those affected by them , make the best use of their
available resources within the framework of strategic
administration and high degree of cohesiveness of the
participating sectors and heads of the domestic eco
nomies .

2

LINER SHIPPING POLICY TRENDS

2 . 1 INTRODUCTION
If ue pay attention to the different types of regular
traffic in Latin America , and mainly in Argentina , ue
can notice seueral kinds of maritime traffic systems
with different levels of protection on the part of the
Freight Conferences and also uith different degrees of
intervention on the part of the National State through
its legislation , Thus , uithin the limits of the same
country ue can see that , even though there is a govern
mental and therefore official institution to deal with
maritime affairs and shipping topics , the shipping
policy does not seem to be uniform or of the same
magnitude for all the regular trades concerning the
foreign sector of this South American country •
Such a uay or philosophy for defining and laying down
the maritime policy of a country , which could readily
depend upon its maritime resources to a great extent ,
would seem to be rather misleading and what is even
worse , contradictory and incomprehensible .
This lack of legal criterion not only affects the nor
mal development of the maritime sector but also has a
negative impact on the day-to-day perform.ance of the
various freight conferences to which the country is
commited .
In spite of the worsening of the commercial relation
ships of Argentina with the rest of the world , as a
consequence of the world recession which has taken
place in recent years , this country has kept alive
a relatively old shipping tradition as regards freight
conferences and pooling agreements with foreign govern
ments and orivate lines . Among such deals and as I
have mentioned before , several types of conferences

can be seen at the same time operating in the same
country or maritime area . Then , what I intend to do
is to analyse each class of freight conference and to
carry out a quick but not shallow comparison of the
advantages and drawbacks of the main trades . Thus f
we presently have ;
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note : most conferences have pooling agreements
As can be noticed , these are just some of the Argentinean
trades showing different criterisnfor sharing cargoes .
But in fact , uihat is really important for creating and
dav/eloping a given maritime trade are not only the shares
but also the actual conditions of each market whecein
each conference has been set up . This is' to say that in
the practical life of the market economy, it does not
really matter whether the conference concerned is close
or open , or whether the share allocation is higher or
lower than it should be • Actually , what does matter
is whether such a conference operates in an open market
or in a close one '• This is extremely important to point
out , because regardless of whether we are considering a
developed country or a LDC , the pricing mechanism

opsretas to I-'-- benefit of the foreign trade of the
country inuolued , provided thet it has been well
understood . But in Argentina , es uell ae in s.any oth
Latin American countries , the opening degree and the
firmness of the entry barriers in the different liner
markets are due more to the traditional practices and
customs coming from the very begining ,of shipping than
to oriented maritime policy , elaborated and laid doun
in governmental spheres , Therefore ue can set out that
every segment of the maritime market in this country
hoE found its grouth and development based on uhat I
would call the trade inertia or in other ucrds , ace
phalous self-development . And of course , such a ship
ping growth and development , framed into a great var
iety of commercial yardsticks (open market - close con
ference / close market - close conference / close mar
ket - open conference / open market - ocen conference ),
never joined the real needs of the country neither knew
how to get the advantages from many foreign shipping
markets during booming periods . But since this state
ment has much to do with the political side of this
global analysis , I would prefer to go straight through
a brief comparison of the two typical prevailing regu
lar systems in Argentina : Freight Conferences and Out
sider Liners ,
2 . 2 -

THE ARGEWTINFAM CA5F

Regarding this subject there are many opinions or post
ures on the part of the many exporters and importers
who make up the Argentinean foreign sector , as well as
on the part^of national and foreign shipping companies ;
1 - A certain current of opinion advocates that conferenc
ed shipping lines , usually get involved inhard tariff
battles in order to be able to gradually get rid of out-

siders from the market , end thus to remain uithout
any interference coming from outsiders .
2 - Other people support the idea that , euen if the
competition exercised by outsiders represents an actual
competition for a conference made up within a market
aconomy or within a market of imperfect competence , it
is to a great extent a complementary activity ,
3- Finally , the last current of ideas sets out that
outsider services are entirely complementary to those
served by the conference , thus giving up the chance
of considering certain rivalry relationship between
both organizations •
Mow , bearing in mind the opinions just mentioned and
paying attention to the historical trend and behavior
of the shipping market strenghts , we could affirm that
not only in this South American country but also in any
other liner markets , there is always a relationship of
complement between those organizations , and therefore
there is also a certain level of participation for each
of them in the liner trade concerned •
Mevertheless , I should point out that because of orga
nizational end , obviously , commercial grounds , a
freight conference is normally going to get the largest
share in a given market , mainly due to a larger number
of lines , a more periodical frequency , a more solid
and reliable strategic planning , a better image given
by its entrepreneurial organization and so forth ,
It would be quite misleading to think thaf'in a given
segment of the sea trade , the same number or even more
outsider lines could come up than the already existing
lines operating under the control of the conference ,
since if it were so , the conference would drastically
loose sense and its members , either ordinary or asso
ciated f would run away from the conference so as to
become free and remain subject to the free game of

supply and demand , In such a case , as soon as the
conference has been literally erased from the map ,
some fluctuations in the freight rates are likely to
haopen . fleny theorists state that once such a market
condition is reached , there are big chances of creating
a sort of chaos owing to the irreversible competition
among the existing lines and during the short run . In
other words they alleged rate fluctuations would be so
sharp that instead of having the normal share of risk
any market has , the status of total uncertainty will
take over the trade with all the dreadful derivations
som.eone could think of .
However , in real life , rate movements are going to
happen only in the short run due to the establishment
of a new conference during the seme period of time ,
end made up of old and new partners , this is to say
by those who were already outsiders before the confer
ence should break down into independent members , by
those which i-'ere members of such, a conference and
remoined operating in the market after the breakdown
should occur and prob-tly by newcomers who could intend
to exoloit the same critical market but with technical
and management innovations •
Obviously , the composition of this new conference will
differ from the previous as regards the members and
consepuently the shares , capacities , allotments ,
and so on , At the same time , outsiders will find
changes in the market with new and old partners ,
although in fact , they are more competitors than part
ners . But anyhow , this is an aspect I would like to
highlight later on when explaining , in more detail f
its effects on a specific and traditional Argentinean
liner market : East Coast and Gulf of the United States,
I think it is worthwhile to stress that , despite the
several drawbacks and advantages the running of a conf
erence could cause the different sectors of the domestic

economy , it is hirbly beneficiel on a macroeconomical
basis or simply for the foreign sector of the economy
concerned , From this statement we can pick up certain
concepts in order to give an idea about the main strong
points of a conference system in Argentina , which for
the time being and in order to follow the methodology of
this research , will not differ very much from the gene
ral model used all over the world :
—

—
—

—
—

it organizes and regulates the liner sea trade by
means of its internal structure , share allocation ,
rights , duties and so on .
it avoids orice wars and consecuently any kind of
shortage in the tonnage supply ,
it guarantees a minimum revenue exploitation level
net only for the member companies but also for the
country wherein it operates , whenever we consider
that these lines have to oay taxes based on general
revenues , port dues and general services •
it solits up the freight according to the several
flags and through the pobling agreement ,
it constitutes cn element of pressure in the diffe
rent international negotiations .

The above mentioned , ere just five advantages from the
macroeconomic point of view , as long as at a micro
economic level there are a few others , which are alrea
dy quite popular such as a more periodical frequency
with more number of departures , regular service , loyal
ty agreements , reliability and so forth , Nevertheless,
it would be quite misleading to think that the conference
was founded for the exclusive benefit of exporters and
importers and that its function lacks buroeracy and over
flows efficiency •
In a country like Argentina , where during recent periods

the rate of inflation reached one of the highest levels
of the whole world , and with it f production costs and
financing expenses permanently grew up to unexolainable
levels , where also the national currency was exposed to
monthly devaluations in order to let the main sectors of
the economy breathe , where there were all sorts of rules
and regulations to bother and restrict the foreign trade,
a small degree of cooperation and understanding to be held
by the conference system would have been of extreme uti
lity . However , even though the conference was aware
of the global crisis and of the high degree of elasticity
of demand for shipping , it did not react accordingly to
the present needs at that time and therefore , it had
its negative output spread over many market segments ,
This was what happened in a close conference run in a
close market , end ccnseruently acting with monopolist
power during a long period cf time and depriving many
commodities to be placed in foreign markets with all the
advantages comprised for a balance of payments •
Specifically speaking , this was the case of the Argenti
na / US East Coast and Gulf traffic , to which I am going
to refer later on in more detail . On the other hand ,
we have other types of traffic which in my opinion are
fairly shared with regular and quite reliable outsiders,
such as the Argentina / Europe traffic and the Argentina /
flediterranean traffic among others . In these open markets
outsiders play the role of moderators between supply and
demand , or what in other words may be called the price
setting mechanism . So , let us make a brief analysis of
the role outsiders play within the above mechanism ,
When there is an open market with a certain conference
operating in it , whenever the traffic in terms of cargo
tonnage is interesting , outsiders will come up by their
own means to compete with the already established confe
rence . If the traffic is not so attractive so as to

being shared with outsiders , the latter uill come to
this traffic as soon as it gets interesting in tonnage .
Obviously , in such a rase , the one who should be in
charged of promoting the cargo flow is the government
through its different departments , secretariats , bil
ateral or multilateral chambers or whatever be the'entity,
in order to foster its foreign trade and conseruently its
movement of cargo by sea . But only when such a cargo
flow is large enough so as to encourage outsiders to come
and compete under open matket rules , many shippers ,
either exporters or 'importers , will feel tempted to give
up the conference in order to join a new outsider , thus
'^aving in some cases a substantial amount of freight ,
which is euite significant in times of very elastic de
mand for ^hipping services .
What I intend to do is just to leave clear the influence
of outsiders in the open market mechanism , but without
considering any kind of strategic planning policy for the
time being , with which I will deal at a leter stage ,
Hence , we could set out that the possible choice in the
hands of the shipper may be called outsider and may pro
bably have the following advantages :
—

LOWER RATE LEVEL

—
—

NO LONGER IRREGULAR SERVICES
BETTER WILLINGNESS FDR NEGOTIATING

—
—
—

BETTER POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING AN AGREE|V!ENT
SERVICE TO CONFERENCED AND NON-CONFERENCED PORTS
AVAILABILITY OF lAEDIUn AND LONG TERM AGREEMENTS

Evidently , from the point of view of the outsider ship
owner , we could say that the essential requisite for
success or for up-keep of its market share in the buisness,
it can be split into two orientations ; one is more
technical oriented while the other one deals more with

the managErial side • Assuming that the ou’ner involved
in this example is a small or medium size operator , he
should :
1 ) operate ships of smtaller dead weight tonnage than
thoseowned by the conference , whereby it could
be possible to run ships with lower daily running
costs and consequently with more competitive rates.
At this point , some theorists could raise some
objections and to affirm that the concept of eco
nomies of scale can never be overlooked ; but to
those people I would reply that such a concept in
South American liner trades , is as far as the
moon from the earth of being realized , since the
possibilities of reaching economies of scale I
would say is a privilege of those shipping compa
nies engaged in huge trade volumes on one hand ,
and on the other one in very advanced degrees of
capital intensive , which actually are not the
representative variables of thr market structure
neither in Argentina , nor in South America as a
whole .
2 ) draw an intensive and well planned strategy with
regard to marketing and canvassing activities ,
thus giving to the import-export sector a quite
finished knowledge of the advantages and marginal
savings they could get with a service of such a
nature .
But let us for the moment pay attention to the ex»
port-import sector and its relationship with confe
rences and outsiders : there are large firms which
because of their huge volumes of cargo during periods
of one year , either imports or exports , they are
bound in one way to make use of conferenced ships
since the turnover of such companies is so high in
number that they must load a stated tonnage in a

riven period of tirr.e , which could be every week end
even more frequently , And as we know , the only one
able of placing ships in a given port with a very high
frequency and acceptable schedule performance , is the
conference
Usually , the latter gets a higher number
of ships f higher number of sailings and therefore is
capable of providing better scheduling for huge cargo
flow firms , than outsiders do . Also we can notice
there are firms that in spite of having a very import
ant cargo flow and need of space as frequently as those
before mentioned , are bound to' share their shipments
with both conferences and outsiders .
This is the case of multinational companies or binatio
nal groups , wherein import and export operations are
carried out almost everyday , and with it , the neces
sity of quick hold space availability becomes of ex
treme importance in order to avoid :
—

STORAGE EXPENSES

—
—

ADDITIONAL INSURANCE COSTS
SLOUi ALLOCATION OF OUTPUTS WITH OPERATIVE KNOTS OR
BOTTLE NECKS IN STOREHOUSING OPERATIONS
SLOW INPUT FEEDER SYSTEM AND SUBSECL'ENT SUBUTILIZA
TION IN THE FANUFACTURING PROCESS
WORSENING OF STOCKS BELOW THE MINIMUM OR SECURITY
LEVEL

—
—

For this kind of firms , outsiders become a binding alternaitve and subsequently , a more expensive choice ,
which regardless of the freight rate level , they have
to use to avoid some drawbacks such as those recently
stated •
Normally , although not always , companies of this size
and structure can be found in almost all liner markets
representing therefore a sort of fixed incom.e for out-

siders provided that the liner trade , uhich is framed
into an open market , finds only one outsider competing
uiith the conference , and a kind of variable income
u-'ith very slight fluctuations during the year for those
outsiders competing between themselves and with the
conference in a given open market . Therefore , while
the income for outsiders can be forecasted withi,relative
accuracy in this case , and therefore decisions based
on trade forecasting can be taken under conditions of
risk , conference members can forecast and adopt deci
sions under safer terms , since priority for shipping
will be given to them , Subsequently , knowing in
advance what is going to be the income , the decision
making process is carried out far from conditions of
risk and uncertainty , 'Ihat we can see so far , is that
even though there are many differences between these two
entities , there still are certain segments of the mar
ket whose trends may be foreseen and their demands met
accordingly ,
In addition to this , I should poin-t out that neither
the structure nor the targets of any conference f al
low them to compete face to face with outsider freight
rates on their own . However , this lets the conference
have a few commercial tools of relative efficiency such
as fidelity bonus to be credited to exporters and imp
orters . As we already know , such a bonus in its several
shapes , normally varies according to the class of com
modity and kind of traffic , but in the Argentinean case
we can take an average of 10^ discount on the net rate
to be paid out cash and six months after shipment . In
my opinion , the fidelity bonus system , in real life ,
is partially and not totally efficient since its actual
power of tying up importers and exporters to the conf
erence to a great extent , depends on several topics
deeply linked with the following items , to which I am

obliged to refer to leter on :
1) OUTSIDER COi'';Pf!ERCIAL F!AWAGEHENT
?) OUTSIDER TECHNICAL flAMAGETENT
3) MARKET RESTRICTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES
The reason for which the effectiveness of such a com
mercial tool differs from country to country and there
fore from conference to conference is that every market
is unique in itself and cannot be gene*ralized or
gathered in the same group under the same critical eye .
Besides this , the fidelity bonus system does not have
equal outcomes in developed countries as in LDCs ,
and it gives different results according to the real
strengths , uses and practices of the market in a given
period of time , including the degree of elasticity of
demand •
In one of the reports which was published by UNCTAD and
based on opinions coming from both shippers and confer
ences about the loyalty arrangements , I consider it
relevant to oay attention to what has been argued by
one conference regarding the need for such a loyalty
system ;
.....as distinct from the tramp operator , the cargoliner owner builds complex ships equipped to carry
many types of cargo , operating them on regular services
because this is what most exporters want ; he keeps
large shore staffs and installations to meet and coordi
nate exporter needs . He commits large capital sums
months ahead on regular voyages , and indeed , years
ahead by building to serve a particular trade's require
ment • He is not like a tramp , taking cargoes where
the best profit is available and laying up his ship
if times are specially lean

;

he provides a service in

good and bed times without uhich much internetional
trade cou-ld not continue , But uh^t can he do if a
tramp vessel , oerheps prepared to operate at a tempo
rary loss uhile waiting for better employment , makes
an isolated raid on his trade and removes a lot of his
cargo ? . He tries to protect himself by saying to his
customers that , if they confine their support to him
and his conference colleagues , then he will give them
special terms or deferred rebated on the rates •
What has been stated by this conference , although
perhaps too dramatic , is what happens on the practical
side of the buisness . However , what clearly comes out
of this statement is the incompetence shown by such a
conference in facing the aggressiveness of a trade under
competence rules by granting a fidelity bonus , and what
is even worse , by relying entirely on its effects •
There is no doubt this bonus is just a tactic like many
others and nothing else ; in addition to this , it has
the same very relative results in accordance with the
existing opening degree of a given liner market • In
the case of Latin America , bonuses always had a rather
limited scope for producing positive figures since any
action or strategy undertaken by the conference side ,
deserved its corresponding countermeasures laid down
from the very top of the managerial teams of outsider
operators • Besides this , an item an exporter or impor
ter should carefully evaluate is the freight rate quoted
by the conference for a special commodity , as well as
to what extent such a rate influences its international
price .
There are plenty of cases and examples where a long list
of Argentinean products of the same FOB value as their
similars from com,petitor countries , could not be expor-i='
ted due to the overvalue the freight rate got in compa-

rison with other exporter countries and its excessiv/e
value and subsequent negative implication in the final
cost of the product , This is neither very encouraging
nor very easy to swallow if we consider that the oroduction cost of such goods are framed within interna
tional standards and even some of them enjoy the -prin
ciple of comparative advantage •
In such a case , one might think that somewhere through
out the manufacturing process or within the cost struct
ure of the manufacturing chain , there should be an
adjusting variable so as to let the goods involved fit
into a more suitable international price , but in fact
the most common variable ~nd one of the easiest to
identify in the cost analysis , usually comes out of
the transport chain wherein shipping plays a fundamental
role most of the times ; this is tc say that during
times of economic stagnation and high elasticity of
demand for shipping in the domestic market , the inflex
ible rates set up by conferences lead to compress even
more the chances of exporting in fair domestic conditions
in order to get access to a certain market . This is the
typical case of those goods with a specific item or voice
in the tariff which did not get a detailed or at least
serious study as regards the setting up of the freight
rate , The theory indicates that an acceptable rate of
incidence ranges from 10 to 20 % of the FOB value ,
although at the same time states that each product
deserves, a particular and updated treatment , Even
though the incidence of the rates were commercially
acceptable , still it would let the possibility of
improving either the profit margin or of reducing the
final cost by means of ^he utilization of an outsider ,
whereby a quite simple market appraisal on the part of
the interested exporter is required •
Logically , all this depends on the existing commitment

r

degree between the exncrt5.no firm and the conference ,
as well as on the chances such a company has , to get
rid of the conferenced mechanisms and to manage itself
within a market economy scheme •
Regarding the importing sector there are some differen
ces • On one hand there is a law of cargo reservation
known as the law 18.250 , whereby in general terms , it
is laid down that all commodities destined to official
entities , as well as those financed through official
banks , are bound to be transported on Argentinean flag
vessels ; and on the other hand , the imports are pre
sently mostly made up of raw materials for the industry
as well as capital goods » with normally are required
with a certain degree of urgency since , as everybody
knows , they ere not final consumption goods but of
intermediate production stages , and therefore are
shipped on the first available vessel regardless of the
rate level . Even so , part of the importer sector is in
conditions of negotiating and dealing with shipowners ,
thus reducing considerably its import costs •
In such a case , importers or southbound shippers
should be clever enough not to get any kind of commit
ment with any conference , or to get it but with certain
limits which obviously will differ greatly according to
the bargaining power of -^he firm in particular .
Finally , I should point out that in the South American
liner market , the cargoes picked up by regular out
siders , are bigger year after year and not only in
tonnage terms but also in volume terms , thus producing
more profitable freight tons provided that the relevant
government allows the establishment and functioning of
I

open markets • Nowadays , this trend clearly indicates
that subject to the fulfilment of the minimum technical
and commercial requirements demanded by shippers , on
the cart of the outsiders , conferencial systems are to

a great extent being obliged to share its old fashion
dominating position with the growing hold capacity of
outsiders , which as well as the conference structure,
has its own limits , advantages and drawbacks «
As an examole I could mention the flexibility found in
many European liner markets and specifically in the
trade between Germany and the Scandinavian countries •
In such a trade there is neither conference nor out
sider , but an intermediate position between both sys
tems under the shape of the so called "Freight Arrange
ment" or "Gentlemen's Agreement" , Actually , such a
position looks like the conference as regards the struct
ure , but is quite more flexible , if there is any
flexible conference , and more buisness minded mixed
up with a certain dosis of economic and market reali
ties . But on the other hand it might be a big mistake
to believe that such a system is all flexibility ,
comprehension and managerial tenderness . What really
makes the difference between them is a better and fastex
reaction to any market eventuality arising out of a
competitor's innovation , any kind of specialization ,
strategic administration or whatever other cause .
As I have just said , the GERMAN Y/SCAI\!QI!\! A\/IA liner
m.arket , which is supposed to be a very advanced and
technological one , is run under the above mentioned
conditions and without an actual regular competition
but with a non-regular and very spontaneous one •
Regarding this topic I should point out that in this
market there’ is no need for setting up either a conf
erence or a pooling agreement . Although difficult to
believe , this is the pure reality and it works owing
to the simple fact that all the shipowners operating
therein have homogenous vessels , with similar outfittings and with what I consider of extreme importance,
the same average costs although with seme existing

gaps uith resoect to handling costs , which obviously
differ substantially according to the cargo specifi
cations and volumes to be carried .
We could very well say that such a system is likely,
to be the most moderate within the range of different
classes of market dominations , and that it is based
on anconferencial structure , partially at least ,
and on competition from non-regular outsiders who on
the other hand , would like from time to time to be
come regulars in such traffic , what logically is not
even possible in the medium run due to the fast rate
adaptation strategy undertaken by the members of this
almost informal understanding ,
If we have a quick look at the Argentinean liner mar
kets as well as at the South American liner trades as
a whole , we can mainly notice two trends :

I

1 ) whenever and wherever there are certain types of
freight arrangements j member shipowners are of so
different magnitude , distinct technology , speed
and capacity , that those freight arrangements are
very often broken by those members who are not able
to get by in the trade by joining such an organiza
tion , and therefore can not succesfully compete with
their partners , who on the other hand operate with
higher technology or perhaps even with the same
degree of technology , but with more suitable ships
in size , in operations and in technical characte
ristics , required by a particular liner traffic .
2 ) vi/henever there is neither a freight arrangement nor
any other kind of jointundertaking ,'but a few out
siders competing for the cargo , it is very likely
to happen what was set out above on the previous
item • This is to say that again every owner enga
ged in such traffic is likely to have bis own and

particulsr technology , which actunlly is substantia
lly 'different from the rest . In this esse each owner
will do his best and the ones in better competitive
position will not even think about the chance of rea
ching a settlement by means of a rate agreement with
other existing outsiders •
Obviously , the facts stated on these two points , sim
ply represent the lack of capital for investing in new
technology and equipment and the consequent disadvantage
of having to deal with a market which in fact , is-very
heterogeneous on the part of the supply , But on the
other hand one may wonder why a shipowner should invest
in new technology if his market share is not going to
grow up as it theoretically should , In this context
it is normally said that through specialization an
owner is likely to increase his share on either a cartainsegment of the market or on the whole market , but
provided there is a market to increase and. keeping a
given relationship in reasonable proportions with the
capital invested to acouire such technology , Normally,
such a relationship is definitely not feasible in eco
nomic terms in the great majority of developing count
ries but excluding those which are oil exporters and
consequently submerged into overwhelming import pro
cesses . Then I am personally convinced that in LDC's,
where the growth and development of liner trades is
many times non-existant or directly negative , shipping
investments are totally useless , unless reactivation
indexes can be locally foreseen so as to allow certain
projects to"come up , with the purpose of being run in
the long run ,
However , in the markets where positive growth and ex
pansion figures still can be found , investments in
technology become necessary to keep at least a normal

capital-labour ratio . Of course , excessive cash
flows oriented to the acquisition of ship technology
in a market whose output does not keep a normal or
lineal growth regarding cargoes development f means
a wasted overflow of money unable of providing useful
specialization due to the very simple fact that there
is nothing to obtain from such a specialization . As
we have seen in the previous chapter , economic growth
and development in Latin America is crossing a not
very stable stage on average as we have already demons
trated by means of different indexes such as GNP , for
eign debt , import coefficients , debt service , ex
ports Find some other ratios • Then , if we look-back
and bear in mind these ratios just for a while , it
appears very clear that no booming period is to come
in the next few years to allow or encourage investments
in the liner buisness or to speculate with an eventual
reactivation in the long run ,
Of course , exceptions to the rule can always be found
since as I said before , each market is unique in it
self and can not be put in a common basket ; but still
what remains perfectly clear is that economic growth
is very unlikely to take place and with it , liner
trade booming , thus producing a ouite big technologi
cal gap between the present technology
which takes
over the upkeep of ^he capital-labour ratio in its min
I

imum expression , and the existing one in the industrial
centers of ^he northern hemisphere •
What I want to clarify is that shipping'investment and
shipping trade can not be separated from the domestic
economies of the member countries to the relevant traf
fic , since this- is , and not any other reasons , the
top reason for the present shipping crisis not only in
LDC's but also in the whole world , then leaving the
problems of international overtonnaging and subsidize-

tion in the category of consequences and not causes .
The econornies considered in terms of domestic ones ,
either regional or nationals , represent the actual
knot of the problem and should be understood as what
they really are : the source of the problem •
3 . 3 -

TRAFFIC ^ISCRIf!I^■'ATID^J

From the foreign trade firm point of view , it can be
noticed , for instance , that when an Argentinean ex
porter carries out a simple traffic comparison , and
pays attention to the different existing freight rate
levels in the particular traffic systems ,
spells out possibilities of negotiation or
getting certain commercial advantages , he
realizes there are quite considerable gaps

and when he
chances of
suddendly
between one

traffic and another .
These gaps are mainly given by heterogeneous freight
levels y which at the same time are directly connected
with general handling and port expenses , bunker costs,
running cost of the operative units , capital costs ,
cargo flows and a long list of variables whose final
numbers are generally figured out by the shipowners ,
as long as its outcomes are made public through the
respective freight cxinferences as in any other country
and under standard procedures previously set up for
this purpode • But ihere are some other differences ,
which in my opinion are much less logical and accept
able than the previous one and that are related to
the functioning itself of a certain traffic system
compared with others •
This example is specifically given by the north bound
seaborne trade to both coasts of the United States ,
where , and according to the resolution number 519
laid down by the relevant maritime authorities , the

participation of any outsider regarding both lines is
forbidden , as long as trades of ^he same importance
and even of greater influence on the domestic ecbnomy ,
enjoy the participation of not only one outsider for
a given traffic , but also of several outsiders operat
ing in the same line ,
Once more I shoul stress the fact that there is no doubt
about the importance of ^he role to be played by a
conference system , such as the one existing between
Argentina and the Gulf and East Coast of the United
States . However , neither can be denied the role to
be played by outsider liners as a complementary service
to the conferences . Now , if we look for actual grounds
for having laid down such a resolution t'e can find two
main arguments advocated and defended by the maritime
authority , which was inspired on two fundamental
aspects according to what they considered "necessary
and basic for the national interest" :
1 ) The need of securing suitable frequency and efficien

cy of .the maritime transport services , in such a
way as to become a real auxiliar of t*he trade ex
change .
2 ) The need of reaching a poPling agreement among the
different shipowning companies belonging to the north
bound traffic towards the USA ,
Regarding the first point , I should clear up the fact
that both efficiency and frequency , are terms that
have nothing to do with a possible inclusion of an out
sider , since the latter would operate in such a way
that would be more complementary than actually compet
itive f as has been manifested historically in other
shared trades in the Argentinean market . The only case
where such a statement migh be accepted , would come

up in the hypothesis that , suddenly and without
human explanation , the same number or even more out
siders should apoear than the conferenced ships wil
ling to compete with , and willing to challenge all
the existing laws of the market , In such a fantastic
eventuality , the conference and its pooling agreement
would run the risk of breaking down into many indeoendents or new outsiders . But as I said before , even if
such hypothesis should materialize , it would not run
so much time before a new conferencial organization
should take place with old and new partners whenever
allowed by the cargo flow level existing at that time ,
Obviously , this is not likely to happen owing to a
simple cost restriction , since the Pacific line as
well as the East Coast and Gulf line have a relative
yield sharply lower than other trades , and its cargo
flow is insufficient incentive so as to motivate the
commercial exploitation on the part of the non-conferenced line •
Therefore , there are no grounds for the belief that a
liner shipping market open towards the United States ,
means serious consequences for the conference or nat
ional exporters •
An excessive protectionism , normally tends not only
to hinder the achievement of a right liner market ex
ploitation but also to hamper the export process in
itself of a long list of national products , due to
reasons we are going to observe afterwards •
Regarding the second item , the hazard that a pool
agreement may not be reached at a given stage , arises
out of rather internal policy matters of commercial
orientation belonging to conferenced enterprises f
and not of the possible competition of an outsider
whose traffic , owing to development and growth
limitations , could only have a minimum influence on

ths pool agreement - ,
In order to demonstrate ii'hot I have just set cut , I
will only mention a practical example such as the nor
mal management other pool agreements have : the one in
the North Atlantic and the one in the Mediterranean traf
fic , counting in its structures uith the pressure
coming from the permanent and regulatory competition
of one or several outsiders freely acceeding to tfie
cargo end competing with the conference and even betueen themselves . Thus , this is the way of granting
the import-export sector an additional alternative
without negatively influencing the freight market and
without hampering the normal unfolding of the pooling
agreement ,
Therefore , I find myself in the academic obligation of
saying that not only the soirit but also the basis of
such a resolution , does not even have a minimum back
ground or practical orofile for being as presently it
is •
On the other hand , I should recognize that the InterAmerican Freight Conference counts uith a very high
relative effioiency uithin ths River Plate market ;
but this doss not mean that one has to guess that such
an organization spells out , analyses and works out
problems in a reasonable way , speoially those related
to project rates • I can highlight such unefficiency
once more , by stating that once shippers send their
applications for lowering rates , based on the fact that
many times the rates have a too high impact on the FOB
value of ^he product , are commonly rejected without
even considering the elasticity of those products in
the international markets • Thus , and without having
another shipping way out , shippers are bound to over
quote in the foreign markets and consequently to loose
competitive position in a very dynamic market such as

the international one • This situation brings about the
fact that shippers prefer to underquote in the foreign
markets and therefore to underearn instead of giving up
their commercial networks . This obviously can be clas
sified as 3 short term strategy to keep the clients
tied up , but as all short term policies , they need
to be adjusted and properly oriented through the fol
lowing periods • This is to say that such a strategy
is only feasible in the short run , and normally is
done when there is no other way out and by those
internationally integrated companies owning such a
large structure and enough capital endowments so as
to bear the burden of the capital d'osts involved in
such a strategy ,
Anyway , this is not the most representative case ,
since if it were so , this liner market would be cond
emned to fail and go bankrupt , thus leading to an
aceohalous trade , probably full of constraints and
negative outoomes.
Exoorters are , like most activities placed in private
hands , profit oriented and just a few are willing to
export without immediate earnings , which normally
leads to uncertain conditions in the case a shipoer
decides to run the risk of doing it without a reliable
trade forecast or freight negotiation prosoects on the
part of the conference •
Once more I insist on the fact that the make up and
functioning of a conference as a commercial entity ,
is of top importance for the growth and"development
of a marine trade in harmony , or at least in what
could be called a civilized manner , However , by
jealously protecting such traffic and therefore trans
forming it in a very strong oligolpoly , the only
coming out of that is one side the negative pressure on
the foreign sector of the economy followed up and

monitored by rrocroeconomic indexes , and other side ,
a permanent stop and go policy as regards the starting
and continuation of export ooerations •
If the conferenced v/essels are run at a certain daily
running cost level , and at the same time recuire a
wider profit margin to maintain the pool agreement ,
it is quite comprehensible that those owners tend to
UD date or adjust their rates to their real needs .
But to deny a good part of the Argentinean exporters
the right of using the principle of
free choice
of carrier in order to choose the mors suitable avail
able service , shows us the low quality and under
standing of the maritime authority , In addition , it
gives us a rather finished idea about the lack of
confidence a conference can have in itself to overcome
market innovations coming out of outsider strategies •
If the authorities at that time had evaluated in a
proper and detailed way the cost structure of those
trades , they would have reached the conclusion that ,
as a consequence of high cost and low average of an
existing cargo flow , only the participation of one
outsider operator would have been possible . In addit
ion , such outsider , would have found itself bound to
operate with smaller OUT vessels , lower operative
costs and therefore with lesser cargo capacity , where
by its share in the trade would be insignificant •
Then , we could affirm that the inclusion of one or
more outsiders , by no means would sharply affect
the conferencial structure , but on the contrary , it
would tend to normalize or to balance the free game of
supply and demand strengths , which for the time being
are quite unaccustomed to suffer displacements and
fluctuations as they should • In this special case ,
it would be desirable to put off such a regulation
which in other words would lead to a greater freedom

in choosing the best shipping alternative by shippers

f

with the only aim of bringing down export costs and all
the ^existing constraints therein comprised . This would
lead as well , to a greater growth and development of
the domestic side through a greater number of exports
and consequently more production factor endowments
coming up together with several other variables in
volved in such a process • Summing up , we could say
that by granting a certain level of freedom to the
north bound traffic under consideration , the liner
shipping field as a whole and as a service , will pro
bably become more efficient and flexible than it was
before , and what is in my opinion much more important,
export curves will tend to move upwards as a typical
characteristic of the existing high market elasticity
of such traffic . Of course , the u:ay such a trade
opening is going to occur will depend on the marine
policy adopted by the government and subsequently on
how much interest it has in having balance of paym.ents
earnings by means of the utilization of national flag
ships , either outsiders or conferenced , and through
relevant national legislation encouraging trade ex
ploitation by different means , to which I will refer
to later on •

2 . 4 CQNCLIJSIOM

From uihei: has bssn prsviously set out throughout ohis
chapter , there is a certain number of key points which
I would like to bear in mind so as to reach a partial
conclusion • These key points ere closely related each
other and all of them lead to a final thought ^ the key
points are :
-- COrOPLEnENTARY CHARACTER
—
CCIV1PETITI0^'
-- r a t i o n a l IZATIOM
-- TECHNOLOGY
-- FLEXIBILITY
-- (V'ARKET GRO'JTH
According to whet we have seen so far , these items are
the six key points to be looked upon when developing a
kind of opening with respect to the different liner
markets . We might well say that a gradual liberalizat
ion of the different liner trades , would involve a sort
of relationship of com.plement and competition among the
conferences and the outsiders • The extent to what the
com.petition degree exercised by the outsiders against
the conferences is going to be kept under the actual
level of complement between both organizations , will
entirely depend upon the existing elasticity of demand
by the time such an opening takes place , and upon the
competitive attitude undertaken by both the conferences
and the outsiders •
The more competitive and commercially aggressive a conf
erence is f the more complementary the character of the
outsider service will be , as regards the types of
goods to be carried , The opposite reasoning is valid
in order to understand the increase of the competitive

cheracter of ths outsiders •
In this case , ths outsiders would ■^ulfill ths role of
rates moderators provided that the Government does not
intervene ; which would fastly lead to imerove ths over
all efficiency of the trade •
In addition to that , we have the concepts of ration
alization and technology , The former leads to avoid
a breakdown or inefficient functioning on any conf
erence due to the existing incompatibility among the
members , as long as the latter pretends to settle a
kind of logical ratio between the actual demand or
market growth and what should be the most suitable
technological devices so as to serve efficiently the
particular trade . Both concepts , besides being close
ly related each other , maintain a certain relation
ship with the comiolementary and competitive characters
since if any kind of unbalance between them should
occur , it could oertainly originate other unbalance
between the complementary and competitive character
with resoect to conferences and outsiders •
In such a case , the market opening process would
slope again towards one of the two characters just
mentioned , thus becoming such a process void •
The concept of flexibility must be borne in mind
throughout the whole opening process , and even
regarding the planning of the process in itself .
Not only the national shipping policy must be rather
flexible but also the market opening process so as to
make possible the reallocation of the strengths of
the different markets and together with it , the
adoption of the relevant adjustments •
Finally , we have the concept of the market growth ,
without which , any intent of opening the market would
lead to even sharper disadjustments within the already
existing rigidity of the market . Then , it goes with-

out saying that these six key points are closely
connected each other and are of fundamental import
ance whenever a structural shift towards a greduel
trade opening is sought •
I'loreover , such an opening plan is very likely to
succeed ,, provided that said key concepts are not
overlooked or underestimated on importance .
Then , what I wanted to stress is that both the
conferences and the outsiders are essential to 'foster
and expand any liner trade in South America , and thad;
such a development must be difinitely carried out on
the basis of free competition or at least , something
similar to it , Otheruise , the liner shipping trades
will never develop in harmony end as a consequence of
that , the expansion process would be seriously
threatened .

3

PTOMOTIO'.'AL TRAFFIC SYSTFFIS

3 . 1 AFFFS3 TO FJE" LINZR FHID'^IA'G r'-’AFKZTS
Generally speaking , many exporters hav/e receiv/ed
during the last feu years , in one uay or another ,
offers for placing their products in non-traditional
markets , as the recuired goods uere of primary and
also industrial origin
Normally , the pursuit of
these exDort operations became frustrated mainly cuing
to the scarcity and more often to the non-existence of
any kind of regular service to destinations such as
the i'est and Fast Coast of Africa , Arabic countries
and even Central America • This case is typical of
countries such as Argentina , Chile , Peru , Brazil
to some extent and others , but it specially acplies
to Argentina •
If ue take the example of Argentina , I should point
out the fact that all these destinations above ment
ioned together uith all those destinations that are
clearly defined as non-tracitional trades , uere and
still are nouadays unprofitable traffic systems from
the point of vieu of a private operator or ouner ,
Even so , uhen there uas the possibility of exporting
large volumes of bulk c-rgoes , uhere regular lines uere
not needed but instead an available ship uhenever
should exist a charter party in betueen , The operat
ion used to get complicated very quickly due to the
fact that most of the ports applied as destinations
uere part of the long list of dirty ports or non-operative places • Obviously in this case , the
fact of considering a dirty port as final destinat
ion of any export business y meant and still means for
the shipouner concerned a certain number of delayed
days t ® greater daily running cost , and consecuently

rlso a greater final technical cost , additional creu
costs , scarce chances of picking up neu cargoes -t
the oort of destination as to avoid balElast trips ,
and several other noints which are common in the daily
running of a fleet under the commercial and economic
oressures- . Thus , the Argentinean products were and
ere still disolaced by those foreign competitors , who
despite of being ouoting the same and sometimes higher
international prices than the Argentineans did in FOB
terms , are capable of reducing such equality or dif
ference by im.proving the CTF cost and therefore by
using the already existing liners in the trade , and
consequently by bringing down the final cost through
the adjusting variable in this case : the freight rete.
Evidently such a gap is not cossible to match unless this
country decides once fcr all to foster the growth and
development of liner shipping as we u'ill see later on ,
This is a common characteristic which can be found in
Latin American countries , specially if we bear in mind
both coasts of Africa , as far as traffic systems are
concerned .
I consider is important to point out the fact that if
there are no linking services between national ports
in Argentina and non-traditional ports , it is because
the maritime transport is directly related to the ex
portable supply of Argentina , and its demand for imports,
which together with exports find their respective
destinations and origins spread in the industrial
centers of the USA and the EEC mostly , and therefore
without having developed a higher degree of commercial
diversification , provided that we only look upon trans
port by sea and not others •
This clearly means that no private shipowner is going
to be interested in investing , cooperating or promot
ing the establishment of any regular line >, as long as

does not exist a real end tangible foreign trade policy
oriented towards these non-traditionel trades , which
only could be done with the relevant analysis and putting
into practice of a service , either in the hands of the
State or in the hands of. private undertakers with the
corresponding exceptions , or counting with direct/indirect state subsidies under degressive clauses laid down
according to the growth and diversification degree of
the components of each segment , It should not be for
gotten that regular service does not mean to appoint
just a vessel to a certain traffic to carry out its
round trip after an estimated number of days , but that
comprises the service starting with at least three ves
sels in direct connection with the time at sea and the
time at port or port operations , This is to say that an
acceptable cargo-flow cannot be expected if such a serv
ice means a vessel every 50 or 70 days f specially in the
case of Argentina which is a country quite far away from
the industrial centers as well as from its South American
partners with the logical exception of its bordering
countries , and where the implementation of any traffic
means , because of the long distances , to always think
in terms of at least three vessels for a promotional
traffic without existing services of any sort •
Nevertheless , a certain progressive development might
be expected if a vessel were placed every 25 days approx
imately , From this statement it can be readily deducted
that such a trial could be succesfully carried out when
ever the National State should adopt a coherent and
aggressive expansion policy of exports to non-traditional
markets , wherein the answer to the transportation problem,
although crutial , is only part of it ,
Regarding liner transport , the State counts with the
right tool for covering or working out the promotional
trades : Empresa de tineas Hlaritimas Argentinas . This
state-owned shipping company is the only one that in my

opinion , could take over those promotional zones and
hence to carry out the implementation and exploitation
at the first stage uiithout profits but with losses
coming out of the non-regular trades . It can be said
as well , that this is the way the different traffic
systems in the uorld got the solid structure of regular
lines , and this happened after having been just non-regular-trade lines as they are right now ,
Besides this , and basing my opinions on u/hat is clearly
stated in any book of Political Economy , I am strongly
convinced that' the main goal of a public services enter
prise is not to maximize profits but to achieve such a
service . In most of the developing countries I uould say
that in real life none of these ideas are carried out ^
thus giving place to a new entrepreunerial style : to
maximize losses and without leaving any evidence of them.
But coming back to the central body of the idea , we can
set out that that is the way all traffic without regula
rity I'lill continue getting shape , end simply because this
is how it is demanded by the market economy strengths ,
In other words and to put it clearer , there is no other
way out or feasible alternative .
3 . 2 PRESENT POLICY
Before such an uncertain environment , as far as state
shipping policy is concerned , quite a large number of
exporters whose commodities uiere subject to be container
ized , looked for -^he chance of reaching those non-tradition^Miestinations by means of transhipments made in ports
such as Hamburg , Rotterdam , Marseille , Genoa , Singapore
etc , so as to reach areas such as the Middle and Far East,
West and East Coast of Africa and many others • But this
procedure , in spite of being the unique viable alternat
ive , sometimes pr'esentod the following constraints :

1 ) A very high impact of the rste on the FOB velue of
the oroduct •, whereby generally only those products
with a greater endowment of added value other than the
common average y were allowed to be exported owing to
a better and greater capacity to bear such a burden •
2) The almost non-existent movement of containers in
the port of destination , which means that every cont
ainer had to be unstripped , unstuffed and therefore
its cargo moved thereafter as if it were break-bulk ,
with all the risks and economic burdens involved in
such an operation •
3 ) An excessive transit time and loss of control in the
follow-up of the units .
4) Quantitative restrictions to the number of containers
to be received in those ports , due to the very scarce
likelihood leasing companies assign to theseunits of
getting outbound cargo so as to take them back in the
industrial centers without having to gat worried about
huoe amounts of sleeping capital and operative headaches
among other things •
Desoite these drawbacks , which might perfectly be
called traffic restrictions , some exporters had the
privilege of exporting , although not necessarily with
an optimum profit margin but with losses , that in the
best case were only financial lasses expressed in real
terms • This was and still is the case of a certain cargo,
to give just an example , which is usually shipped in
Buenos Aires towards the city of Basrah , located in
Irak , and through two ports of transhipment :
Marseille in France and Mersin in Turkey , to finally
have to make a land transit from nersin to the final
destination . If we sum up the different on-carriages ,
handlings , movements , times , and the fact that such a
service was done in a middle of a war (IRAW-IRAK) , we

cannot allege that these exporters lacked courage and
imagination regarding transport alternatives . But
such an imagination is the one that nowadays is stag
nated in the public sector , specially with respect to
transport planning and infrastructure development • The
proof of this is given by the fact that even today ,
combined services continue being the only alternative •
GRAPH 3.2.1
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for liner goods , fundamentally thanks to the consti
tution and implementation of joint uontures between
several shipowners and ship agencies around almost
all the world •
3 . 3 EXPANSlOk' STRATEGY
As UB said before , vessels of a certain regular ser
vice would have a limited cargo capacity and also
operative restrictions with respect to technical spec
ifications of those commodities to be carried , which
obviously would hinder meeting the transport demand
reouirements for superior tonnages , such as dry bulk
cargoes , liquid bulk cargoes , fruits , frozen m.eat
and fish ,
A regular liner service in the liner market of the
River Plate is supposed to operate either with full
container vessels or with a kind of multipurpose ships,
thus combining several technical aptitudes based on
what this market can eventually offer , It is very un
likely or almost impossible to believe that a private
shipowner would invest in a. traffic which is not based
on traditional liner goods and during times of recession,
as in the River Plate traffic , where the outbound cargo
flow that is supposed to be regular but is not , is
presently threatening the structure of old conferences
and not so old gentlemen agreements of any kind •
This happens to inbound cargoes as well , and even with
deeper fluctuations • But the situation gets even worse
when we analyse the large volumes of cargo and their
degree of attractiveness to potential investors • At
present , this segment is strogly influenced by two
topics quite independent from each other : seasonal
peaks and political framework •
I wonder who would be willing of investing before such

an uncertsin scheme < Anyi';ey j for expansion aids , sea
sonal peaks are one of the rr.cin constraints since no
shipowner is going to be uilling to become that capit
alist just for season • And no shipowner is gping to
be willing to work out different strategies under a
kind of business that depends largely on governmental
decisions of political identity .
Then , it is right here where the State should inter
vene once more through its foreign trade secretariats
and organisms j with the aim of overcoming delays which
occured in ports of destination by means of bilateral
meetings with those countries engaged in the relevant
traffic • For instance u/e can set out soma T'lediterranean ports of ['•'orth Africa such as Benghazi f Tripoli ,
Lattakia , Aqaba and so on , were ships usually suffer
from delays ranging from ?D to ED days and even m.ore ,
due to the fact that these countries , as many others ,
grant berthing priorities and soon discharge to those
vessels whose cargoes ere internally recuired accord
ing to the dcm.and and supply fluctuations in the
domestic economy , Such '-'iscriminaticn is normally
avoided 'chen the commodity on bo'^rd has an official
organism or institution as consignee ; in such a esse
the cargo is usually either cischarged immediai-ely ai <-Br
having berthed the vessel , or remain on board without
being unloaded but with the corresoonding payment of
such a waste of working time • But of course , most
cargoes do not fit into this category ^ and therefore
it represents a high operative and also commercial
barrier fos shipping expansion in this promising market.
In other .words y the only thing that can be done to
avoid such a limitation , is to insist on negotiations
undertaken by the State through its departments special
ized in shipping and foreign trade , and without leaving
aside the pattern of bilateralism ,

Uithin this context , it might happen that from the
said bilateral negotiations there will be no positive
outcome because of ^he political restrictions or simply
because they have to deal with a government holding a
political system completely incompatible , thus leading
to situations of very low productivity , But anyway ,
it becomes quite clear that if an action plan is under
taken in this regard , and even when the results of the
corresponding negotiations are not of the same degree
of reciprocity , considerable advantages would be
obtained from several countries , specially with those
far located from the industrial centers . At the same
time , such a policy , although not totally liable ,
would help to achieve fleet expansion targets by
dynamizing the export process to non-traditional markets,
which nowadays is overborne and self directed by the
heavy burden of the inefficiency and by what is even
worse , the absence of planning and undertaking .
Before analysing the behavior of the promotional traffic
systems , I should point out a statement whereby ship
ping is commonly accepted as a derived demand of the
international trade , Although nothing is more true than
this , it should admit a small shift regarding oromotional trades , wherein at the very beginning or short run,
the foreign trade becomes a derivedsdemand of shipping ,
and then afterwards , once the development of the rele
vant trade gets the medium run or even the final stage
of the short one , shipping becomes again a derived
demand of the trade •
Between promotional traffic and a regular starting ser
vice there are a number of similarities as well as dif
ferences regarding the seatrade growth and fleet develop
ment , Before beginning to spell out each case , I should
leave clearly differenciated the promotional traffic from
that of the regular • The first traffic system is related

and therefore i-herein the upkeep and exnansion of such
traffic depends to a great extent uoon the nouernrrental
support , since the above traffic is not profitable in
itself so as to foster private exploitation , as long
as the latter generally means a sufficient volume of
existing cargo carried by any available flag in the
market , uherein such a freedom is decided to be rest
ricted end controlled by setting up regular traffic with
cargo allocations and commercial exploitation purposes •
GRAPH 3,3.1
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On the graph 3,3»1 , 're can see represented one prcmotlonel traffic split into three periods of time of ex
treme importence in order to echievs expansion goals •
^'ormally , during the short run of a traffic like thi$,
the space tonnage is likely to increase much more than
proportionally to the foreign trade euailable , until
the level shipouners decide that it is uorthrhile to
invest (a ) , and thus to generate a certain impact or
influence on such a foreign trade grouth , From point
A to point B , the whole medium run period is comprised,
this is to say where shioowners are supposed to become
at least such a trade relatively developed , unless they
want to keep themselves on swimming into subsidies and
without positive prospects . This is a key period of
time , whcrp shipowners and government will know whether
the investment project helps the foreign trade to net
gradually developed end whether it fosters the fleet
expansion by itself . I'Je can notice that these two last
variables are not independent but rc-ther interrelated ,
and furthermore despite the fact that they belong to a
unicue master project , each of them represents a
project by itself , this is to say that by investing
without stop-and-DO cash flow policies during the short
and medium run , shipping expansion and foreign trade
growth is very likely to occur , From point B and provided
that the cargo and fleet reactivation has taken place
during the medium run , space tonnage and foreign trade are
likely to grow up rather proportionally on average ,
although not exactly proportionally , since ship tonnage
supply always suffers from a certain delay in answering
the market requirements regardless of the traffic looked
upon , Ue can also notice that in this special case ,
the foreign trade becomes undoubtedly a derived demand of
the space tonnage during the first stage ; and that is
because it previously was a non-existing traffic without

the "inimum possibility of setting its goods corried i^’ithcut
considering on-carriages end risky triangulations under
very high cost terns , uhich generally tends to drastica
lly reduce the export cargo flou . But once the foreign
trade gets gradually expanded , then shipping again becornes a derived demand of the international trade , uhich
uould be a very promising symptom in order to foresee a
healthy fleet and trade expansion , Houever , such a
strategy is condemned to fail whenever shipping , uhen
becoming again the derived demand of the international
trade so as to play the role of maritime transport and
ally to the foreign trade , it does not get the support
from the governmental spheres to achieve both targets ,
the fleet end trade excansion ,
In such a case , the planned space tonnage overcapacity
will have no sense , thus negatively affecting every
period of the project , which obviously would lead as
I saidbefore , to a total and complete failure and
additional stagnation of the sector of services and
foreign trade to non-traditional markets •
Finally , I uould li!;e to add that , once this model has
been worked out and its outcomes have proved to be even
tually acceptables , the ideal situation uould be to get
a nroportional growth or similar expansion rate of both
variables as in the shadowed surface "Z” and ”z'*' ,
wherein both variables should preferably keep a certain
coorelation between them , although an equal rate would
not be of extreme priority •
Anyway , this is how a starting traffic system is supposed
to face scarcity and economic development matters in a geo
graphical area where the prevailing features are given by
tonnage overcapacity , decreasing rate of cargo flows in
every segment , imports substitution , economic stagnation
and consequent isolation , among several others • Now ,
if we have a look at the graph of the establishment of a

raguler service , i-hich before starting being regular
was just a free rrarket with interesting , although not
huge , volumes of csrgo and with clear signs of growth .
Some similarities as well as fundamental differences
uith the promotional traffic can be noticed ,
GRAPH 3 «3.2
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On this scheme we can also notice that even though there
is alrecdy ?n existing volume of cargo which was carried
before without any kind of traffic regulation and which
is going to be carried within this regular regulation

system , there is else certrin overcapacity that is
represented by the initial investment c^^rried out by
shipowners during the first stage or short run , until
such an overtonnage is matched by the increase of the
cargo-flouj , This increase is likely to take place
after the short run is finished and when the cargo-flou is supposed to be driven by such a regulation .
During the medium run , the cargo-flou normally
suffers several fluctuations owing to the existing
overtonnage and the bargaining power of shippers f
thus causing different curve trends . In addition to
this , fluctuations on the cargo-flow and hold space
utilization are also generated by problems of adequa
cy of the market to the new regulation system , Such
a system can take many shapes such as conferencial
organizations with or without pooling agreements ,
gentler.en agreements , point ventures with state
participation and many other sorts of regulations
cperating under conditions of either open or close
market . Undoubtedly , this could eventually deter
mine the difference between an expansionist strategy
of fleet end foreign trade , and a market shaking up
due t,o an excessive regulation and protectionism
arising from the State and oriented towards uihat is
known as an infant industry .
Coming back to the third graph , we can notice that
investment in shipping tal<es place during the short
run and it gets a certain level of overtonnage (Xl X2) throughout the same period with the only purpose
of placing regular vessels , preferably of national
flag , in those places where foreign flag and non-regular units were operating . By regulating traffic,
such a current of money is expected to come up and
consequently to generate a certain overcapacity at
an initial stage , and with the aim and hope of get-

ting it relatively mctched throughout the second
stage or medium run , Of course , such an ovortonnage
uill be gradually offset by the increase of the for
eign trade of this traffic , which is supposed to link
industrial centers with developing areas under market
economy terms .
But the development of the cargo-flow should not have
opposite targets to the regulation system : this is
to say that by controlling traffic with an internat
ional organism such as a Freight Conference , the
governmental authorities or whoever might be in charged
of such an organizational undertaking , should be
aware of the fact that the overcapacity problem has
solutions of a very different nature than that offered
by the regulation scheme . Dveftonnage might be reduced
by increasing the cargo-flow , provided that such a
regulating organism is flexible , cooperative , profesionally integrated , and not so rigid in the decision
making process , which in my opinion is extremely
essential to respect and bear in mind throughout the
first stage of any shipping market in its childhood .
Unless the relevant Freight Conference understands
and properly assumes its regulating role as it should ,
ship overtonnage will remain as it began and the cargo-flow , if not totally detained , will never find the
way out in order to reach higher rates of growth and
diversification so as to bring down dead freights •
Therefore , in this case we might say that by adopting
a very strong regulation process , shipping could act
as a negative variable and thus , giving place to what
is called the law of diminishing returns ,
Then , in order to get rid of det/elopiment barriers , re
gulation schemes and cargo-flow must be treated in such
a way that even the most unsignificant resolution be
laid down and adopted under the point of view of the
market interdependencies , and its potential outcomes

analysed and spelt out li'ithin the managerial concept of
atrategic planning of both the liner shipping field and
the foreign trade ,
As soon as the initial im/estment in tonnage has been
made and the short run has finished , the curve tends
normally to become almost stabilized for shipping ,
and continuosly growing for cargo-flows (X2 - X3) ,
This period is characterized by the fact that owing to
structural problems of organization , entrepreunerial
philosophy and pressure coming from quite recent grown
trade segments , shipping tonnage and cargo-flows are
directly and indirectly related to market fluctuations,
thus producing a kind of lag in erasing the still ex
isting gap between available tonnage and available
goods . But anyway , flucturtions will not take place
forever and its real impact on the functioning of the
interdependency of these two segments is not very
worrying ,
We can state that fluctuations depend on to what ex
tent the regulation scheme is aware of its influence
on the other market variables ; in other words , it
depends on one hand , upon the existing degree of inte
gration between the Freight Conference or whatever ,
and the foreign trade , and on the other one , on the
sort of human resources they use to achieve control and
regulation objectives , All this normally happens
during the medium run of the project and when the cargo
flow is
alive ,
stage ,
account

expected to grow up in order to keep the project
After point X3 and at the beginning of the final
there are some possibilities to be taken into
: curves X , Y , Z , Z' and Z ",

Curve X , clearly shows a recovery if compared to X2-X3,
due to the final driving obtained by the cargo-flow and
by a logical relationship of growth , kept thereafter
by the shipping tonnage and cargo expansion , which

usually leads to a small but necessary permanent ouertonnage so as to m^'ximize the operational productivity
of spaces , either at a 7 0 ^ or as much as 8 0% of
utilization . As a prolongation of curve X2-X3 , we
have curve Y , whereby the trend of sharp cargo growth
would"seem not to have a counterbalance of hold space
capacity , leading consequently to an excess of demand
of difficult satisfaction on the part of the shipowners,
unless they should decide to charter-in some vessels .
But normally , although not always , any regulating
organism that is proud of itself and of its operational
effectiveness would never acceed to charter-in and there
fore , an excess of demand would appear to be unavoidable.
Such a situation used to occur in those organizations
lacking statistics , planning and of overall , strategic
planning , Anyway , such an excess , unless otherwise
solved , leads to the disconformity between exporters
end importers , thus encouraging even mors the presence
either of new outsiders or of old outsiders which at
the time of the said excess were absent , but decided
to come up again and to compete in a market where they
still keep a worthy knowledge of its commercial possi
bilities ,
Then , if we assume that what I have set out happens in
an open market and involves an Open Conference , for
instance , it is vary likely that such an organization
gets troubles regarding competitive strategies to be
followed , as well as operational structure problems
with respect to pooling shares , sailings , low and
high value freight tons and others • That is why an
open market , which is supposed to provide most of the
necessary elements to reach positive expansion rates of
cargo and tonnage , may become a negative tool to reach
those rates if the control over such a decrease ,
exercised by the regulating organism , is excessively

interventionist . Such interventionism c?n even hinder
the performance of the orinciple of free undertekino
end hamper a ruick decision making process , thet is
supposed to take actions at the right time and at the
right celerity . Unfortunately , I would say that the
concept of close control is one of the most common
arguments rais-ed by governmental authorities , whereby
an open market is considered as if it were a dangerous
and strange organizational cobweb set up by pressures
coming from the transnational companies , but without
really knowing that the actual danger is born from the
very beginning the public sector nlays an excessive
role by establishing a sort of feed-back system that
durino the short run makes nothing else than controlling
too much and adopting incoherent resolutions without
receiving oositive outcom.es , thus getting overgrown
much beyond whet might be advisable ,
Finally , there is an important ooint I want to raise ,
and it is given by the fret that by constantly expand
ing the cargo-flow without its corresponding counter
balance and by excessively trusting the overtonnage
reached during the short run , the only outcome likely
to come up , sooner or later y has the name of shortage
joined by all its negative effects on the organizational
structure of the regulating scheme , es well as on the
commercial functioning in itself . Before going on , I
would like to clarify that scarcity is a concept that
many times , more than a barrier
helpful and fostering element of
those which might be framed into
gic administration y competition

or a problem , is a
new actions y like
the concept of strate
y development and ex

pansion policies •
Fallowing the other alternatives , we can see three
curves left , which ere nothing else than different
trends of cargo/tonnage expansion , and are showing

different levels or volumes of foreign trade for the
same level,of liner tonnage .In other words , it
shows three levels of missing traffic planning ,
whereby an excess of demand or a shortage of supply
is much easier to reach than in the case of curve Y ,
The traffic recovery , once these curves are brought
down , would .necessary have to deal with the structu
ral restrictions before mentioned • In this case ,
where liner tonnage seems to come down , the answer
to such a decrease could be found in the gradual and
growing weakness of the regulation system owing to
the increasing of non-regulated competition , which
on the other hand is a kind of self regulatory inst
rument between liberalism and protectionism in their
corresponding extremes •
Finally what we can see is that in an already existing
regular traffic system , shipping'-is a derived demand
of the international trade whose growth or expansion
is not subject to liner shipping planning during a
first stage , as for promotional traffic , wherein
shipping investment plays the major part of the role
in the short run , to afterwards become with perman
ent character the traditional derived dem.end before
set out .
As I mentioned before , an open market can become by
itself a source of sharp problems for the correspond
ing country , when such a market gets either excessive
participation and surveillance on the part of the State,
or when such controlling function does not exist at all.
Both extremes are harmful positions if what we look for
is the upkeep of an open market • However , nowadays
practically no government allows the existence of a
market of those characteristics without any control
over its operational asoects • Then , it would seem to
be clear that what one should look for is a middle
point between two extremes , since it has already been

cleared

ud

that neither the firet extrere or position

'jould be of -some usefulness to reach cargo and tonnage
positive exoansion rabes . h'evsrthelses , excerience
shous that the position of the public sector regarding
the interventionism degree , is expected to be quite
nearer to the liberal extreme than to the other one •
Obviously , it- does not mean that such a market in its
several segments , is almost totally free from the
GRAPH 3.3.3

CT : cargo/tonnage
CTI : existing volume of cargo/tonnage
TD : traffic development
PSI : public sector interference
A ; B : excess of PSI at different levels
— « • — right PSI curve

TD : traffic development
PSI : public sector interference

GRAPH 3.3.5

TD

3

2

1
0

0

1

2

3

PSI

st^te t=nt?cles , but that a seaond niddla acint
should be sought betueen the first sguidistant point
and the liberal thought , The only one uho is lastly
entitled to determine the right level of interference,
is the sensibility shown by the traffic development
curve once the said traffic is already ooereting .
The graph 3.3.3 shows the self-defeating effect a
wrong TD/PSI relationship could have , whereby , as
scon as the traffic development increases owing to
the fact that the market conditions for doing so are
given , the public sector interference increases as
well with the same tendency in the short run , but
in order to reach higher scales in the coming period •
Normally , a curve reoresenting a public sector ex
cessively jealous of its incumbencies , tends to
COmorise not only the whole area embraced by the
trajectory of the traffic development curve , hut
also new oossible cx"^ansions .
In addition to the Tr,ct that an interventionist oolicy
with extremist features in it , runs cpposits to the
concept of expansion in an open market , traffic deve
lopment is drastically stopped together with any
sign of grovith , producing thus a solid tra'^^fic
stagnation characterized by diminished variables end
increased bureaucratic measures , which in real terms
and from a macrceconomic standpoint is a loss of
quite difficult recovery , and with clear symptoms
of negative impact on the foreign trade and balance
of payments among other effects •
Generally , the PSI means a certain cost to be borne by
the foreign sector of the domestic economy , and there
fore such a cost usually plays against the traffic
development curve in the long run and also orobably
before the final stage , wherein the TD curve might
continue to be stable in the best case j although

ths reality normrlly condemns such a trend to be even
ucrse by gradually bringing it down until touching
inadmissible levels of exploitation , whereby the
relevant regulating organism would loose control and
credibility on its members and means • In this case ,
the traffic and its regulating scheme are very likely
to be broken down into many segments of different
nature end.without interconnection between them ,
This is the same as saying a black traffic future is
coming unless the relevant authorities realize in
time ths vital need for a share of freedom in order
to let any market grow up and get developed in accor
dance with the strength of the market and together
with some oublic sector orientations as well as clear
and precise guidelines . In other words , a promising
and recently created ':aritime trade under ooen market
rules can achieve positive rates of cargo and fleet
exoension , whenever the State interference does not
go beyond the admissible limits an economic openning
strategy can propose . Otherwise , and as it has been
seen before , cargo and tonnage growth and development
will find its way simply blocked by barriers of legal
and operative nature of very difficult avoidance . The
rain oroblem within this context is given by the fact
that most of the governments belonging to LDC's y
although aware of the overwhelming sizes of their
administrations and of the existing sub-capacity to
carry out their tasks regularly well , believe that
when national cargoes are picked up by foreign flag
vessels and when an open market tends to go straight
against the national policy interests , which is like
this just because of the existing shortage of national
legislation for protection of the local markets from
the derk shadows of the external imperialism ; when in
fact , the actual and only source or knot of the

problem is born in an excess of State intervention by
laying down tons end tons of rules , regulations ,
decrees , laws , and by creating committees and special
deoartments to carry out tasks of rather doubtful use
fulness and to achieve old fashion goals with outdated
managerial style and understanding of the present
reality ,
As the reader can realize , I am not necessarily in
love with the public sector but rather I feel a very
limited respect for the public servants in LDC's ,
and at all levels of responsibility , since I am
completely convinced that , if not all , most of the
liability of stagnation and underdevelopment in most
fields , falls on their heads , owing to m.any reasons
I am not going to set out right here , since it could
perfectly be the subject of not only one , but of
several theses .
Following the graph 3.3.4 , we can see an interesting
relationship between the functions TD and PSI . The
first one is made up of cargo volumes and liner ship
ping tonnage as longas the other one reoresents the
state intervention through its different means . As
long as the public sector interference increases , the
traffic development sees its expansion diminished , as
it is shown on the graph by the decreasing positions
of TD : TDI , TD2 , TD3 . Obviously , the opposite
reasoning is valid as well . Once more , this graph
would appear to demonstrate that a search of a right
point of interaction is of top importance for the
harmonious upkeep of both functions the TD and PSI ,
but always keeping in mind that to have expansion
aims , it is always better to be closer to the market
economy principles than to the regulating extreme .

FULL REGULATION

niDDLE POINT

TOTAL FREEDOM

TRAFFIC REGULATING
ORGANiSn

^ ^ ^ T h e area i.'herein , in my opinion , oublio sector
intervention should be located , thus leaving to the
orivp.te sector enough manocuvering space so as to
produce the expected expansion ,
Lastly ue h^’ve the graph 3,3.5 representing a sort of
ideal tendency betu/een such functions . Such a rela
tionship presupposes a kind of louj elasticity on the
nart of the state intervention regarding traffic
changes , and reflected on its development ,
As a general guideline ue could say that the more the
state interference is , the heavier are the burdens to
be borne by the trade , as long as'the wider the tasks
of the public sector are , the smaller the cargo/tonnage expansion rate will be , due to the implied
consequences in such a strategy of unjustified overexpansion that keeps it totally untied from the targets
before mentioned.
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4 CDK'CLUSION

As ue can see , uh?t would epoear to refrain clear is
the fact that through interuensionist measures adopted
by the governments , the final results are very likely
to be of low performance and of void projection .
For examole , -if we look at the international liner
markets and try to identify the liner markets whose
growth and development let them to be classified as
the m.ost dynamic and promising trades in terms of car
go and technology , we are going to observe that those
trades do not have to face any major official inter
vention com.inc from their local governm.ents .
Neither the EEC nor the USA deal with an excessive
governmental interference , unless the traffic concerned
falls into the category of "promotional trade" or it
is guided by strategic reasons . On the other hand ,
we can see that both the liner markets and the liner
fleets of centrally planned economy countries have
never been-so far classified as competitive and pro
mising under international standards t In fact , the
only fleet uihich is competing in the 'destern _markets
with relative success is the Soviet one ; but nobody
can deny that the Soviet penotration into the ''Jestern
liner trades is mainly given by its preferential
domestic bunker costs and low crew costs rather than
by the success of the interventionist system in it
self , We might well affirm that the full public
intervention system worked out by the socialist count
ries f is definitely widening the existing gap between
them and the Western liner trades • floreover , I do
not intend to set down that the success of the Western
European liner trades is entirely due to the'lack of
official interference , but to leave clear that such
a low intervention draws a suitable framework into
which , together with strategic management and free

cc^petition , cny u''.dertaking can lead

o the festering

cf both the cargo levels and the liner tonnage .
Then , if we apply these concepts in a Latin Arrerican
context , we should focus our attention on the two
market structures which were oreviously set out :
regular and promotional trades .
Regarding the first one , it is highly advisable to
follow the principle of free competition together with
a gradual decrease of the state participation in the
decision making process until reaching timely levels
at which the public intervention can be no longer
considered as needless • In this regard , the opening
orocess of the rrcrkst is something that should not be
overlooked , since thanks to it , the particular trade
will slowly regain competitive character and get a
profile of growth and expansion , provided that such
en opening process is joined by a decreasing state
perticin-^tion.
Regarding the promotional trades , both the state
intervention and the close character of the relevant
markets are of fundamental importance to fulfill
throughout the short run ; but as soon as the short
run is over and whenever the trade has grown enough
so as to allow a slow opening of the marl<et , the
state participation must be prepared to leave the
floor to newcomers and to reach a settlement with
private owners as regards the future exploitation
throughout the medium and long run • Otherwise ,
instead of having today a promotional trade expecting
to develop and to be served by different technologies,
we have an everlasting undertaking leading to the
utilization of inadequate means and subsequently to
the permanent decrease of the overall efficiency •
In such a case , even if the promotional trade gets
gradually developed during the m.edium run in such a

way that shippinQ becomes once more the derived
demend of the intcrnetionel trade , the potential
prospects of commereid diversification and develop
ment will be considerably diminished mainly owing
to the lack of competition and to the utilization
of inadequate technology .
Therefore , we can say that despite the fact fehgt
an excessive PSI tends to block the way towards the
liner business expansion , it is necessary to keep
a certain PSI level , although with different ex
tents , in both a oromotional trade end a regular
traffic .
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A , 1 INTRO-AUCTION
Ue can start by saying that from a theoretical point
of v/ieu; liners carry the world's trade in manufactures
and high value units , and that their services meet
trader's needs for regular scheduled services world>
wide , for quantities large or small and at a known
and specified tariff rates • It has been accepted for
a hundred years that these characteristics require a
degree of stability only produced by orderly trading
at which end shipping conferences were evolved .
Personr-lly I guess that since the system has lasted a
century , it will probably last another 20 years , al
though on bad days it may look as though it might not
last that number of months . But anyway , we can affirm
there are alternative ways of getting stability , One
would be through an oligopoly structure - the few ship
ping lines selling to the many shippers , in conditions
of short-run stability and long-run competition ,
The economies of scale achievable by large container
ships have changed the structure of the liner industry
in ways that make an oligopoly set-up possible . The
shipping companies are bigger than they used to be and
a series of joint fleets , providing even larger
organizations ^ has been formed • In the industrial
west such a set-up might be tolerated without conf-^
erences , provided shippers and their councils, could
talk to the consortia .
However , in the Thirld World such a system does not
seem to be acceptable politically . Alternatively ,
stability of a kind might be achieved through a system
of state-owned fleets , highly regulated as to routes f
rates and shares «
f^ost people uould probably believe that such a system

would bs inflexible and lead to diseconories and high
costs , to. which I would reply they are totally right
and that such diseconomies usually take place regard
less of whether the management and staff personnel
belong to an Industrial country or a less developed
one . The most likely long term situation may be that
the West , for its intra-western bloc trade , will
continue to use a Conference system , disapplying the
cargo-sharing orovisions of the UN Liner Code ; second,
that the West's trade with the Third World will apply
the Code end be more protected as well as less efficient
and third , it remains an open question whether the USA
will have to move to close conferences , despite there
are no clear grounds today for saying it will •
Overcapacity will thus still condition economies in
important areas , certainly through much of the 1990s .
Anyway , we might well forecast an increase , but net
a marked increase , in protection of one kind or another
which could be the best interpretation of the future .
Another pressure cf the 19SGs was end still is ovartonnaging , due partly to already known political press
ures , in part the aftermath of the oil crisis of the
mid 1970s , and in part the result of the rapid penetra
tion of the liner market by container ships , All this
could be expected to settle down somewhat towards the
end of tha 1990s , but if it were to continue as des
tructive competition , the further innovation would be
prejudiced and protective forces would tend to increase
as a form of counter-action .
Nevertheless , a degree of flag protection in Third
World trades is likely to persist , with 40-40-20 arrangements under close conferences and market rules
as well as with bilateral 50-50 arrangements . It is
also relevant to look upon the degree to which trade
will become further regionalized , because greater em
phasis on trade within rather than between regional

blocs would reduce the distance goods have to be moved,
and so reduce the dcmsnd for shipping ■services • The
Dost-wer oeriod has seen the emergence of regionel
groups like the EEC , COI^IECOW , the ANDEAW PACT ,
CARICOPI , ALADI (ex ALALC) and so forth . These groups
have been successful enough to endure , end it is a
tenable thesis to consider their future expansion to
larger groupings , such as the Far East , incorporating
Australasia and China j Europe , incorporating the
Mediterranean and k'orth Africa ; Latin America as a
whole ; and the Middle East with the Indian sub-cont
inent , Lower.distribution costs would be the fundamen
tal reason for the emergence of such groupings . It is
oerfectly known the fret that the existing blocs work
far from perfectly and that many weak developing areas
have not been able to build up an aderuate industry
behind a wall of regional protection as to avoid the
need of exporting to other major international markets
to bolster their economies . Many stronger developing
countries (NIC's) have sei.aed opportunities in the
large markets of Europe and North America .
Indeed , regionalization doss not seem to be a major
force intrade growth . Even if the countries of the
EEC , the strongest new free trade area , have retained
and developed strong third market connections all over
the world • The most likely assumption over the long
term is that balance of payments stranglings , parti
cularly because of the existing imbalance , will force
nations to seek markets for their exports wherever they
can , This is not to say that the pattern of the trade
will be static , merely that opportunism will require
nations to continue to incur the cost of worldwide
distribution ’,
Therefore , regionalization is likely to have a stronger
influence on shipping than it had before , transfering

then resources

to other means of transportation such as

rood and railL"ay devices , end dirinshing the seaborne
trade mainly cu/ing to the present status of the different
world shipping markets together with a very low index of
economic opening from the industrial world towards the
developing south •
The above is* therefore oerhaps a rather long disgression
to establish a neutral point for the future of liner shiprping , but the implications of regionalization seem too
important to ignore , specially when it might lead to
deep changes in regional and inter-regional shipping
evolution in the long run .
li

. 2 IFIPO^T SLRSTITLTIOM ; I[Yipo.CT DP LIWER SHIPPING

The objective of this analysis is not to carry out an
isolated study of each component of the balance of pay
ments , but spalling out the limitations and constraints
of the foreign sector of the economy as a whole , accord
ing to how the shipping demand and supply will behave •
Absolutely in all countries of the developing world ,
it highlights the existing contrast between the import
and export tendencies . The sharing of these countries
in the world exports has suffered a orogressive reduction
and it is even more noteworthy to point out that such
a participation also decreases in the trade of primary
oroducts , justly wherein presumably they would enjoy
comparative advantages . However , regarding imports ,
the coefficient of these countries seem to show a
raising trend in the long run , Although such a gap
between the components of the commercial balance is not
so keen as in other areas y Latin America does not get
rid of such a .tendency .
This different evolution of the exports and imports are
totally related to two kinds of structural phenomenoms :

a)

tha existing incompatibility in the structure of the

tuio variables of the foreign trade , uhich could techni
cally be called UPS , or unbalanced productive structures,
B) the existing lag shown by these countries in the pro
cess of technological penetration and development •
If we should pay attention to both concepts just for a
while , we might notice that during the present century,
the international trade developed certain items more
intensively than others , specially machinery and
equipment , Then , it would seem to confirm the fact
that in' recent years the contrast between the trade
growth rates became wider for different kind of goods .
Wow , if we look upon the trends of the international
trade , ue can appreciate that rates are high in pro
ducts imported by Latin America , and relatively low
in those exoorted by it ,
As long as the higher rates are related to products of
modern technology , the unequal allocation of the tech
nical progress and specieliration is clearly set out .
Obviously , the situation creat:ed by such technical
orogres.s comes out in the imports of developing coun
tries , so long as their exports join very weakly the
technological participation in the manufacturing pro
cess . Therefore , the foreign trade structure of these
countries leads to a desequilibrium of dynamic consequen
ces : there is a primary sector of greater relative effic
iency thanks to the existing comparative advantages com
prised into it f but of a lesser relative dynamism if
we compare it with the industrial sector , wherein the
relative efficiency is of quite lesser dimension as
long as its dynamism is greater than the primary sector.
This leads to a problem of relative speed with respect
to the input and output of foreign currency , owing to

the unbelpnced rtructural conditions of both sectors ,
In other t'ords , it leads to the exoort of products
whose world trade grows slowly and import of products
whose world trade grows quickly , and thus brings about
an external desecuilibrium given by the different exist
ing productivities of the primary and industrial sectors
together with.a slump in unit crices and export volumes.
Experience shows , that shipping has during the last two
decades in Latin America been , one of so many activities
directly affected by such economic phenomenon •
Obviously , the bigger the gap of productivity between
both sectors is , tbs higher will the barriers to get
?n acceptable ratio of input/output of foreign currency
be f L''ith all the implied consequences it could have in
order to boom the foreign trade of the area concerned •
’
Je can set out that as long as foreign loans received
in hard currency are net allocated to those industries
Capable themselves of again generating foreign currency
by exporting what was manufactured internally and phys
ically as Liell as financially fed from abroad , the
process of self-emortization will become void and with
it , the industrialization chain will get a perfectly
determined end inside of the domestic economy and not
outside ; thus limiting'not only the economic viability
of the whole economic region from the industrialization
point of view , but also restricting the liner shipping
utilization to excessively low levels as a secondary
effect ,
One OT the main reasons f if not the top one | whereby
liner shipping in the industrialized world developed
considerably in lesser time , is given by the fact that
in these countries y even when there was a certain gap
of productivity between said sectors y a strong degree
of homogeneity was and still is kept between the two
pillars of the economy as far es foreign currency ere-

ption is concerned . Bottle necks of balance of oeyments
ere practically non-existing or perfectly maneagsble .
Liner shicping , despite the present international re
cession , kept itself carrying cargoes coming from both
sectors and gron'ing volumes day after day . Then , since
low , medium and high value cargo permanently grows in
relative terms compared with markets belonging to LDCs ,
liner shipping in developed markets was fostered and
encouraged from the very beginning such a gap was matched
in the now known industrial world . The role to be played
by the foreign sectors in the economic development of a
whole region made up of several develop'ing nations , is
closely related to the basic strategy each country
undertakes •
Such a strategy can be stated in terms of yrcrdsticks
containing its outlines and setting out the role to be
played by the foreign trade . Furthermore , these models
can be useful for differenciating stages either in the
internal develooment of a country or between different
countries .
In international economic spheres , it has been high
lighted by CEPAL (Latin American Economic Commission)
that the growth and development of Latin America as a
whole can be split
into two stages : towards the
outside and towards the inside • The first one is re
lated to the period wherein exports prevailed as the
driving engine of economic growth and development ,
as long as in the second one the motive axis constit
uted the import substitution process , with quite large
amounts of effects on liner shipping , I should clarify
that these two situations were just partial outcomes
coming out of deliberate strategies followed by the
countries of origin , since they also to a great ex
tent obeyed special circumstances leading to follow a
determined behavior line in their economies • For

instance , during the stage of econornic growth towards
the inside , several programs of manufactured export
promotions quickly became frustrated mainly owing to
a combination of causes inherent to their own economies
and to restrictive or deppresive conditions of the
international market ^ including the international
liner shipping -markets •
As I stated before , an important characteristic of the
modality adopted by LDCs regarding the first growth
scheme , is that the exports of these countries still
keep on showing a decisive shortage of technological
mix-up along their manufacturing processes , thus limit
ing more sharply yet their chances of being succesfully
exported , and uidening even more the already existing
productivity gap between the primary and industrial
sectors .
Obviously , what might come out of ;^his statement is
that all this , inevitably leads to an external
strangling of the economies of LDCs together with a
negative collateral effect on liner space utilization,
its tonnage , its tendency to achieve economies of scale
through capitalization , its tendency towards high-tech
acquisitions , its trend towards the functioning of
liner markets under market economy rules , its capabili
ty of getting expanded and developed pushed by its own
market and so forth .
As we can readily notice , the market is the bible for
a liner company , so long as the domestic and foreign
sectors of the national economy are the main pillars
for national development and progress ; but far from
being isolated concepts or areas , they are rather
connected between themselves in a sort of market inter
dependency , wherein any upward or downward movement of
a variable may mean very different changes in those
interrelated areas , and wherein , unfortunately , eco-

nornists seem not to realize that by treating uihat is
uariable es something constant , tliey are bringing
about rcny and different sorts of mistaixes of difficult
corrective adjustment , and creating the source of most
of the fallacies in political economy , In business
most of the fallacies have their cause in a sticking
to means and methods which doss not have a lasting ,
but a temporary virtue •
Summing up , ue could state that by speeding up the GDP
growth rate of the region , imports would increase as
well and with it the commercial imbalance would rise
even more •
Such a desequilibrium could be brought down in the short
and medium run either by refraining or by substituting
imports in such a way that a structural change is oossibly achieved through a better reallocation of factor
sndowm.ents •
However , although the Latin American GDP growth rate
during the decade of the 70's was in average 5,6^ , im
ports increased but at a lesser rate than the GDP , This
obviously leads to only one conclusion , and that is that
import substitution was carried out with relative success,
and with it , shipping and specially the liner market ,
was once again strongly influenced by the economic policy
adopted by this region ,
When analysing the substitution process , the import stop
ping process as a disturbing element , also comes up ,
which sometimes is closely related to such a substitution
scheme and others as a prevailing topic , An extreme case
of import stopping of the region was the sharp reduction
born by the import coefficients coming out of the 1930
crisis . From 1929 to 1932 , such a coefficient was
brought down 50^ in Argentina and Mexico , B5^ in Brasil
and Colombia , and almost 80^ in Chile , Such a stopping
trend was a fundamental factor in driving the substitutive

process , tonether
the Ipck of capacity for import
ing , high custom barriers and several kind of control
devices were set up , leading to compress the supply
and demand , Subsequently , the internal increase of
prices together with the imports reduction brought
about the necessary conditions for undertaking the
manufacturing process of similar products in geogra
phically internal terms •
After the 1930 crisis , the stopping policy was adopted
more or less regularly by the economic programs of these
countries , and that is the main reason whereby in fact
it is quite difficult Sometimes to identify its actual
effects end to distinguish it from the substitution
effects . Owing to changes in the price setting struct
ure and other circumstances connected with the supply ,
demand trend for consumption and investment as well as
the beh-vior of the productive system is modified , and
consequently certain imported goods are much less
utilized than what is the case in more open economies .
Now , if we pay attention to the substitution process ,
we can well set out that such a process , which has
deep implications on liner shipping , has a meaning
much wider than simple shifts in the import coefficient,
A batter way of spelling out the imports structure in
more detail would be by classifying three large groups
by economic destination : consumption goods , interme
diate goods and capital goods • Thus , a graphic draw
ing can be carried out to show the comparative advance
degree of each country regarding the substitution process.
This can be done by means of equilateral triangles
wherein each side , with a longitude of 100^ , represents
the total in imports of consumption , capital and
intermediate goods •
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(source ; CEP.AL - Latin Am, Economic Commission)
It can be noticed that , although uith exceotions , im
ports of most of the countries are mads up of a quite
l o w ratio for consumption goods (less than 30'?) , a
ratio for intermediate goods oscillating between 30f?!
and 50? , and the same oscillation regarding capital
goods • The same graph shows that Argentina , Brazil
and Mexico have achieved a wide substitution of
consumption goods , while Central America seems to re
present the exception to the rule since consumption goods
seem to comprise more than 40? , more than 20? of
capital goods and more than 30? for the intermediate
ones • When export fluctuations are likely to take place,
normally there are two options to choose in order to
match their effects : either to reduce intermediate
imports or to restrict the income of capital goods •

If the first ones ere reduced , the level of internel
economic activity uill be affected uith immediate
symptoms . On the other hand , if capital goods ere
limited or restricted , the capitalization process
can be seriously uounded ,
Obviously , such en effect uill undoubtedly rebound ,
sooner or later , not only on the level of internal
economic activity but also in the development of the
economy , The consequences end difficulties of keeping
on practicing the substitution model , can be appreci
ated at different levels :
-- imports as a uhole .
-- its sectorial content •
-- the industrial development it might generate .
-- the development strategy it represents .
From the imports point cf view and in international
terms , its coefficient uith respect to the oroduot is
already leu enough in some Latin American countries end
it keeps a tendency dounwards . The forecast of some
of these coefficients according to some recent studies,
leads to extremely lou indexes , equal or even lower
than the minimum coefficient obtained by the largest
end more developed nations of the world , However , the
tendencies for the long run represent a more intensive
substitution process than in recent years , whenever
we shut out wars or armed conflict periods , for Ar
gentina , Brasil and flexico ,
But on the contrary , such a process has been diminish
ed in the countries with more reduced domestic markets.
At the same time , by prolonging the internal extensive
industrialization without having a correlative way out
of such a transforming scheme , it would stress the
worsening of the foreign sector of the relevant national
economy further of generating a progressive receding
from the international standards of efficiency . Once

the imports of consumption goods reach high levels oT
substitution as uell as other import products uhose
manufacturing process requires relatively small-seized
plants f substitution must operate areas where the pro
duction can be achieved in terms of considerable eco
nomies of scale ; this is to say in areas such as those
related to intermediate and capital goods •
If we sum up the main features of the substitution pro
cess we might notice that all of them lead to a much
lesser foreign trade and consequently to much smaller
liner markets • These characteristics are as follows :
A
B
C
D

-

STRONG I^^TERMAL EXTENSIVE INDUSTRIALIZATION
LACK OF EXTERNAL COUNTERBALANCE
HIGH DEGREE OF If^lPORT SUBSTITUTION
STRONG TENDENCY TO DIVERSIFY THE SUBSTITUTION PROCESS

Item A , in terms of shipping , clearly states that by
industrializing a country or region and by producing
locally what before was imported , cargo tonnage to be
carried by sea will decidedly decrease end with it ,
the relevant liner market is likely to be either broken
down into several independent organizations or to keep
the same structure as the one existing before but with
a smaller magnitude , Although it is true that by
achieving internal industrialization targets , new im
port requirements come up and therefore an upward move
ment of the demand for shipping is expected , while new
demand reouirements are quite lower in relative terms
to what could have been imported without such a pro
cess . Therefore , even when there is a kind ef
compensation of cargo tonnage within the same segment
and represented by new import devices , the trade volume
is inevitably reduced and with it , south bound traffic
deeply damaged • Such a damage is allowed to occur

th?nks to the second phsnomenom I cell lack of external
counterbalance . As 'j'e have seen before , this is
nothing else than a shortage of cutouts uhic hare supposed
to keep a certain re'lationship with their inputs •
However , this relationship of continuity can not be
achieved due to several internal problems found during
the manufacturing process and also owing to the fact thafct
those inputs have never been oriented towards the joint
participation of both the still imported materials and
accesories , and the national factor endowments • In
addition to that , I should clear up that the national
policy was never to carry out substitution as a means
of earning foreign currency by exporting product units
containing a certain degree of manufacture but to deal
with fluctuations of hard currency income due to the
negative international market conditions given in the
short run ; which I personnaly consider a big mistake
since it clearly represents a lack of planning and
entrepreunerial undertaking ,
Anyway , this second item together with the first one ,
leads to an even more depressed liner market in its dif
ferent segments ^ and obviously becomes represented by
a downward tendency on the part of the south bound tra
ffic and a too sharp upward curve condemned to get stag
nated in the short run ,
Regarding items C and D , we might well affirm that by
raising the substitution degree and by spreading or di
versifying such a process y traffic recession is not
going to give up its decreasing treeds towards levels
at which an hypothesis or likelihood of free market
economy and gradual deregulation is quite unlikely to
take place , but rather it will tend to shut out any
private undertaking which could be encouraged by a
more free y or less central regulation owing to the
simple fact that the weaker . certain traffic is y

the more regulated it becomes uith the conseriuent effects
on liner innovation and market specialization ,
I believe it is important to point out that any advance
in the substitution process makes it possible to achieve
higher levels of development , but once such a process
is achieved , new import requirements u/ill have to be met
in order to not only keep the same development degree but
also to keep the economy growing at faster and higher
rates than before , In such a case liner shipping would '
not be so negatively affected except by the fact that ,
in real life , it is -not the real case-, ''Jew imoort
needs generally do not come up as they theoretically
should , and the liner market gets more and more
compressed day after day . The reasons for such a
phenomenom escape'-from the frame of this study , Slthouoh
I should say that it is caused by a kind of collateral
substitution that takes place immediately after the first
step of substitution of any segment of the industry ,
Of course , there are always new import needs and new
voices are constantly going to be opened in the relevant
traffic tariffs , but its actual volume is rather
unsignificant compared with the real volume' it should
have if it were done like a normal process with planned
structures •
If we have a look at what happened in South East Asia
with countries such as Thailand , Indonesia as well as
South Korea a little further to the north , one may
readily realize that those nations were and still are
strongly involved in substitution processes and without
having to deal with bottlenecks in their marine cargo
traffic • Then , including myself , one might wonder
why ; I would say the answer is very simple , but the
root of such a reply is not so simple ; the import sub
stitution processes of these countries were carefully
outwardly oriented , bearing in mind that the master

target of auch processes u.'as not only to bring about
the creation of Iscal industry with all the multiplier
effects comorised in it , but also to allocate between
the productive factors the necessary conditions as if
to make them into competitive elements in international
terms , caoable of generating worldwide exports with all
the expected advantages included , such as foreign
currency earnings , higher rates of employment , non
existence of liner traffic reduction and so forth .
Thereafter , the extent to which each nation develops
its merchant marine is a topic that depends entirely
on shipping policy , which I am not going to deal with
right now , But the most important aspect to underline
here , is that these countries , by carrying out such
a process of macroeconomic nature , did not engage
neither the financial standing of the liner shipping
sector nor the cargo-flows of their relevan-.t liner
trades • Obviously such a orocess was partially achieved
by Latin America as regards the local spreading of
industrial resources but almost completely void with
respect to export schemes and outbound cargoes by sea ,
with consenuent reductions of the liner market as a
whole , and thus creating different liner markets as
far as the concept of interdependency is concerned ,
and regarding segment shapes and structures .
What I am trying to demonstrate here
is simply that

,
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liner shipping has much deeper roots than it is supposed
to have or commonly accepted , and that is not , as
people say , only a derived demand of the foreign trade .
It is also the derived demand of other macroeconomic
strategies adopted within the framework of the national
and internal economy , which at first sight seems not
to have any direct relationship with shipping , when in
the daily practice each movement suffered from many
macro-variables which can be monitored throughout a
brief period of time in the management of a fleet or

*
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undertaking of a oroject , I consider the hehevior of
the national economy v/ariebles as the actual parameters
for measuring the feasibility of any liner market from
all points of uieu , and not the behavior of the foreign
trade of the country or region uhich in fact depends
largely on what goes on internally • This concept was
apparently understood by the nations before mentioned
and moreover by their governments and non-marine
authorities by adopting macro-policies oriented to
achieve national economic targets
but uithcut getting
the marine field damaged
but rather encouraging it
at the same time , Foreign trade forecast is of extreme
oriority for a liner company ; but unfortunately it can
only be foreseen , and uith certain limitations , through

f

out the short run but never beyond it in economies of
LDCs .
However , the actual variables to be picked up and
keot in mind as if to predict in reliable terms whet
is coming in the near future , are the ones belonging
to the internal macroeconomic policy . Those are the
only ones , in my personal opinion , that should be
taken into account for monitoring
analysing and
evaluating the liner market growth and development in
the long run •
Foreign trade gives a rough picture in the short run
and is unable of granting by itself ^ security of
continuity • Furthermore , since liner investment and
exploitation are based on long run expected earnings
owing mainly to its highly capitalistic character com
prised into permanent recessive cycles , it can not
trust the short run performance of the foreign trade
variables
but must go beyond them and rely , although
not totally , on the long run prospects made up of
internal variables coming out of both the primary and

,
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industrial sectors of the economy .
To fully understand this concept , it is enough to look

upon the Latin American macroeconomic policy throughout
the past fou.r decades , wherein all policies adopted
were done regardless of any collateral effect it could
possibly have on the shipping field • During these
decades , liner shipping in particular , was oscillating
according to many different policies and changing inter
national environments
such as a ship without final
destination and whose only objective is to keep herself
afloat and wait for better weather conditions •

,

^ . 3 - REGIONAL IflPORT SUBSTITUTIOM AND ITS EFFECTS ON
LINER SHIPPING
Like we have partially seen before , when the export sec
tor lost its dynamic character as an income generator ,
Latin American countries chose an accelerated process of
industrialization , Then , given such circumstances , it
appeared unlikely to start directly by setting up basic
and capital industries , as this was the reason whereby
the process focused primarily on those industries which ,
from the technological point of view , appeared to be of
relative easy undertaking . 'dhen such a process started
showing a certain weakness due to the factors already
explained , and the foreign sector of the economy began
I
once more to strangle the economic development of -^he
region , the internal logic of the process demanded to
keep on substituting , thus affecting even more the
several major liner markets with the consequent pricing
transference inward the domestic economies •
At that time , the expansion of industries such as steel
and iron , chemical plants , oil refineries and some
branches of mechanical industry could be noticed , In
these new activities the endowments of.capital and tech
nology used to be greater than those of the traditional
manufactures , and subsequently , problems of economies
of scale and market size started coming up claying a

restrictive rcle even more sharply then before ,
An important topic I want to point out at this stage is
the market size by saying that such a concept keeps an
unalterable relationship with liner market size and its
possibilities to grow up or become stagnated .
If we assume that any liner market is capable of develop
ing by its own-means under open market conditions
me
can set out that whatever the policy may be regarding
industrialization , such liner markets are going to have
considerable development gaos among them « If a process
of import substitution is carried out in such a way that'
countries , members of a -regional community are going to
spread the necessary links to coooerate with each other
and to go beyond the domestic markets to exploit neighbour
markets as if to reach economies of scale , and at the
same time to diversify their supply sources as a means of
cutting out ties of dependency ^ then ^ it seems easy to
conclude that liner shipping prospects are not very
encouraging , In this case , rail and road transport will
play a fundamental role in the carriage of goods among
most Latin American countries , although anyhow , there
will be a few specific maritime trades that will get a
kind of drive regarding cargo tonnage j and these countries
are those far located from the geographical center of the
region , beyond which , land transport operators will have
to deal with the economies of scale orinciples whenever
they want to get by • And it is at this point where liner
shipping can still get a better chance of improving and
getting rid of its overtonnage by filling the gap with
cargo , But still •, this trend would not be the master
tendency for all the liner trades but it would be an
isolated scheme and non-representative of the real effects
of regional substitution and regionalization of industries.
But in the case that throughout this import substitution
process , which could possibly take place beyond the do-

mestic

, some positive outcomes should occur

ss recerds exports of mcnufactures which cot through
the internal industrialization process | then , Ixner
markets would definitely be improved and strengthened
owing to new cargo flows
cither between the geogra—
ohical extremes of the region or with the industrial
centers . This would obviously lead to very different
political implications than in the first case , but
not for that less valid . A comparison between the USA
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and European countries reveals that the North American
market size is four times larger than the one in France,
Germany or UK . However , each of these countries has
a smaller market size than Latin America , but in a
small- magnitude . 'dhen the comparison is done between
said Eurooean countries and the three largest countries
of the region - Argentina , Brasil and Mexico - it can
be verified that its market size is again four times
smeller then that of the Europeens .
Evidently
what can be seen here is that both ,
Europeans and North Americans have elready oassed the
examination of imcorts substitution , industrialization,
diversification and cooperation by making use not only
of their domestic markets but also of their neighbour
ing markets , with the clear Duroose of reaching
economies of scale and high productivity • As a matter
of fact , liner shipping is dominated to a great,extent

,

by those nations as well , and this means nothing less
that shipping , and mainly the liner branch , which has
deep rootso buried into the domestic economy , deserves
a better understanding if it is expected to expand
and to be utilized as a useful tool to earn foreign
exchange •
A second kind of comparison refers only to one segment
of the domestic field which is represented by the de
mand of mechanical products , which can be well regarded

ES one of the crucial sectors within the industrializa
tion process . If ue comcare the international demand
cf mechanical products in one of the before stated Euro
pean countries with the total of Latin America , ue can
Observe that the Latin American demand is smaller than
the French one , the one from Germany or UK , and the
ratio between -the USA and the Latin American total is
aoproximately of 16 to 1 , Furthermore , if such a
comparison is made individually among those European
nations and Argentina , Brasil or I'lexico , such a ratio
comes close to 5 to 1 ,
These global figures clearly demonstrate that the Latin
American market is not very important if measured in
international terms and that moreover , industrialized
countries own market sizes that actually surpass the
internal ones due to the magnitude cf their exports
which in fact , is the weakest and most lim,iting point
in the expansion scheme of liner shipping of any LDC ,
Regardless of the country , either south or north bound,
liner market exploitation is based to a great extent on
the carriage of products with a given added value and
not of primary goods as several authors have considered,
which makes liner shipping a kind of head bridge in the
process of placing national goods on overaeas markets .
'i/e might say , at the risk of oversimplifying that any
liner service that pretends to get by in a competitive
environment such as the existing one nowadays , is bound
to look for an acceptable mix of both primary goods and
manufactured commodities ; but what is definitely im
possible to accept is the possibility of succesfully
competing in a market made up of a very low rate of
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industrial cargoes , which actually show the deadline
of variable costs as well as running costs ,
What comes out of all this , is that if Latin America
wishes to continue its economic development process ,

uihich ssGms to to full of constraints end draubccks
represented .by the inpossibility of increasing its
incones through exports and of carrying out succesfully the substitution process together uith the in
ternal and outgoing industrialization , what it has to
do , is to aim at becoming integrated from ell points
of view ss the only feasible way of achieving possitivel;y
the industrialization program and a suitable balance in
the regional industrial structure uith the incorporation
of basic industries •
By integrating Latin American nations , liner shipping
is not supposed to remain untouched but diminished in
terms of cargo volumes throughout the short run . But
thereafter , and provided that such an integration is
effectively realized by gathering different factor
endowments coming from several countries and from dif
ferent segments of the industry , the liner sector is
expected to grow up , This h?s the mein purpose of
reaching economies of scale and high productivity
capable of transforming the internal m.cnufacturing pro
cess in an export oriented economic organization. , as
in East Adia

,

Within this context , liner shipping structures belong
ing to the heterogeneous market segments are likely to
mix up technical knowledge and specialization together
with different growth and expansion rates in the long run
in other words the liner business is likely to increase
its space utilization rate and to, finally settle down
with the support coming from the internal industrial
ization outwards oriented as the main variable to
negotiate shares
and to combine in a much better way
the regional resources which are represented not only
by a combination of primary and industrial commodities
as far as liner transport is concerned , but also by

,

marine technology exchange amiong the existing members •

out for Latin America as a uhole , and also for liner
shipping provided such an integration program achieves
its external target of expanding its products and
services much beyond its frontiers .
4 . 4 -

OBJECTIVES OF A RZGIO’^jAL DEUELDPflENT POLICY :
ITS EFFECTS ON LINER T^ARKETS

The problems of the foreign sector regarding the growth
of developing countries are constantly discussed in
UNCTAD , where there is always a common understanding
of what policies should be adopted to overcome the
growth barriers :
) better treatment of traditional exports with resoect
to unit prices , quantities and continuity ,
B) promotion of new exports , specially manufactures ,
from LDCs to industrial nations .

a

C) better conditions and more suitable currents of for
eign capital from the industrial centers to the peri
phery ,
D) realization of regional agreements on economic inte
gration among LDCs .
These four aims are closely connected to each other and
have complementary targets , and although all of them
have a certain influence on liner shipping activities ,
I am going to focus the attention mainly on the inte
gration phenomenon , since I consider it is a quite
relevant topic in regional terms so as to expand and
interregionalize the liner trades end their different
segments in Latin America .
As we have already set out , economic development in
this area has so far been based on substitution policies
on one hand , but requiring on the other hand as well ,
an additional pillar made up by manufacture sales in

the international narkct . Then , economic integration
would mainly lead to keep the import substitution pro
cess alive
with the purpose of linking it with the
market enlargement as a result of such an integration .
Such an enlargement of the market would definitely mean
that the manufacturing process of some goods reaches
acceptable efficiency levels more quickly , since the
productive capacity of the new undertakings would be
utilized in a more complete way and the adopted pro>-cesses would incorporate economies of scale .
Normally , the necessary investment per unit of new
production , particularly the one reruiring the use of
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scarce currency , would be reduced , thus enlarging the
increment of the productive capacity that could be
obtained with the limited resources available • Thus ^
integration would accelerate the import substitution
process as well as it would make it more rational and
effective .
It has already been explained that the upkeep of a rythm
of a suitable imports substitution is quite unlikely to
be done , if it is only based on the national markets •
Obviously , most of the goods whose productions should
start , require large plants , quite considerable capi
tal investments and a very complex technology , so that
its production in small size markets might only be carried
out by sacrifying efficiency • In return , economic
integration would enable the creation of a substitution
program of these goods at a regional scale •
Now the questions are : What could be the role to be
played by liner shipping within this regional context ? ;
Are liner trades going to keep the same development
trend as before the integration ? ; If not , what are
the changes going to be and what is the timing factor
influence ? ; Is the Latin American liner segment pre
pared to face such a challenge of sharp shifts and
entrepreunerial innovations ? ; To what extent would

the linsr ehipeing incu'stry rctuelly bene^^it from regicnol policies ?
These ere just
feu questions arising out of the eco
nomic integration phenomenon , and to uhich I hove clear
ensuers , although not always of positive character •
First of ell , the existing targets of a regional import
substitution program have two different faces as far as
liner transport is involved ;

&

1 - To place the substituted commodities not only in the
domestic market but also into foreig-n rcrl-:sts , members
of the regional integration • In such a case , t*^e in
vestment required for building som*e specific capital
goods -nd intermediate commodities would find justifi
cation not only from the rcononies of scale point of
view , but also from, the social cost one • By having
several markets with di-^fcrent specialization degrees*
the scope for the demand gets opened as if it were a
domestic market ten * twenty or thirty times larger in
magnitude * and more promising regarding its possible
potentiality , Therefore , efficiency and quality
standards are likely to be achieved by opening the
national borders to'wards limiting countries or ccny
member nation to the regional integration scheme ,
2 - This process * when limited or restricted by either
partial lack of know-how or unsuitable manpower or any
sort of technical constraint coming out of the binding
complementary character of the process in itself * may
choose the alternative of shutting out the possibility
to carry out all the transformation process frontiers
inwards , and to look for a sort of combination of eco
nomic factors together with a certain ratio of complement
with regions located frontiers outwards , but of course
members to the area •
That is the way a project that is apparently unattainable

owing to scarce factor endounents or for instance to the
non-existence of one of them , may be perfectly accomplished
by means of "gathering the right factors in the right en
dowments '^rom the regional context •
Regarding the first topic and as far as liner markets are
inuolued , we could state without running any risk of
getting into pure theoretical arguments , that by enlarg
ing the national markets through the opening of frontiers
and legal-economic barriers , many projects are likely
to be undertaken and what I consider of top importance ,
are going to reach international standards of efficiency.
Naturally , such an efficiency standard will not come up
neither suddenly nor in the. short run but is going to
get gradually developed end to create oositive outcomes ,
very orobably after the short run has finished , Then ,
during the short run , and orouided that the regional
import substitution is properly accomplished , having
in mind the concept of multiplied markets , south bound
cargo flows are going to get gradually reduced till
reaching a level at which the remaining import subst
itution altern'^tives , being quite a few , indicate
what to expect or what not to expect in the coming
future regarding cargo tonnage alternatively available
in the liner markets , their potentialities and prospects,
their different segments of demand and so forth ,
However , something we should not overlook is the fact
that this regional substitution never occurs for all
the relevant goods at the same time , but thatt there
are normally several kinds of lags in undertaking such
a process , such as an implementation lag , analysis
lag , factors complementation lags and others « this
is to say that even though the south bound market is
going to be , although gradually , sharply compressed,
sooner or later but always within the short run , such
a market is going to receive a growing demand given by

the new import needs gencreted by the internal and re
gional program of industrializstion , since the main
target of substituting is to create industries , local
ly run and managed , and not to generate an import shut
down ,
However , the new import needs in terms of tonnage and
throughout the second half of the short run , are going
to be of quite lesser magnitude than in previous periods,
but will help liner shioping to overcome the short run
without having to apply to the lay-up tonnage market ,
or to any sort of strategy such as flagging out and
others •
GR^PH
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A : average of imports before the process
B : curve of new s/b cargo-flow during the process
X ; inflection point (curve B)

On this graph is clearly shou.'n an existing gap that will
never be filled during at least the first half of the
short run , owing to its own dynamic character of the
process end to the second main target of the process,
that is to decrease the import coefficient as a way of
saving foreign currency and cutting out dependency ties
from the industrial centers •
Standard or normal cargo inflows are likely to be
permanently reduced up to a level at which is supposed
to be close to the ending point of the first half of
the short run although it might also be somewhere close
to the starting point of the second half , Herefrom ,
the trend of the south bound cargo is going to suffer
from a shift by raising its volume as far as tonnage
is concerned , and by increasing its degree of diver
sification if we look upon the kind of commodities to
be imported ; but even though the trend changes towards
more positive or less negative figures , there will
always be a gap in the cargo volume between the new
import needs and the former import level before the
starting of the process , which actually is impossible
to be matched if we talk about number of tons carried
from the statistical point of view , But what very
probably is not going to be so sharply affected is
obviously the freight tons level that is what actually
matters to any shipowner , since and as we said before ,
any import substitution process involves an advance in
the goods to be brought in technological standards as well
as certain increase in tonnage depending on the way and
how far such a process is carried out •
Then , such a gap will always be there in volume terms
but probably not forever in value terms as far as freight
rates are concerned ,
The Z area shows the difference between the still non
sub stituted goods and the new import needs , which in
simple words means that the development trend of the new

imports curve in the finel stage of the short run has
begun , Uhat could oossibly happen during the following
stages is something rather dif^^icult to foresee althouoh
not impossible ; but anyhow such an analysis will depend
entirely on how the macro and micro variables behave to
gether with the joint participation of both the public
and private sectors of the economy ,
Uhat could possibly happen with the new import needs
curve throughout the medium and long run in different
situations expressed in terms of cargo volumes can be
appreciated on the graphs below ,

A : new import needs
B : non-substituted products
imports average before the process

We can assume that on the first graph

, once the

short run is finished , the curve of new import needs (A)
gets stagnated throughout the medium and long run owing
to any kind of mismanagement arising out of any of the
many program strategies that make up the master target
of import substitution ^ so long as the curve of non—
substituted products (B) will continue with variances
during the medium run and , consequently , with .a great
likelihood of rising during the long run as a consequence
of its own dynamic character , in the process which bears
in mind the G!\!P growth as well as the population increase
and similar items •
In this case , the reason whereby the process becomes
rigid and unadjustable can be found in the misplanning
of market enlargement as an attainable alternative with
in the context of import substitution and industriali
zation programs «
On the seconci graph we can assume that such an enlarge
ment with all its economic features is accomplished and
therefore , the new imports curve tends to go gradually

UD

from the v-.ry beginning of the second stare , as

long as the other curve tends to keep the same trend
during the medium run and to dscreese slowly durino
the final stage es e consecuence of new achievements
and developments in the process as a whole • In this
case and as uie have just seen , the traditional imports
will tend to be lower each year and the new import needs
will tend to increase not in volume but in value terms y
which simply means that although always existing , the
cargo volume gap is likely to be partially offset by
better and higher technological products paying better
freights am.ong other things •
On the third graph (4,1',A) we can assume a situation
whereby the 'whole process is partially carried out and
lus performance is of rather doubtful a.ccurscy , Then ,
what hapoens here is that everything is going to be
developed anyway but with certain delays coming out of
such partial misplanning , If we compere it with the
second graph , we can notice that the same
trend is
followed by the third one but in later terms ; this is
to say that the upward movement of curve A takes place
at a later stage during the medium run and suffers from
certain interruptions during its growing trajectory ,
thus producing several lags throughout its development
in the medium run , Such a tendency will continue during
the long run with the typical effects of the stop end
go policies ,
Curve B tends to decrease but also at a later stage ,
within which such a lag can take much more time than
the represented one on the graph , Then what comes out
of these three examples , is the fact that despite an
existing solid import substitution process , the gap
between curve A and the average of imports before the
process is going to be importantly reduced in quantity
and strongly overcome in value during the long run ,

Throughout the first end second stages , the gap is
going to remain , although not totally , quite im
mobile ; but at least the trends to be adopted will be
very useful to foresee what is coming in the long run .
Then , we can finally state that by involving the whole
area in an imports substitution program , liner shipping
and its markets will be bound to resist the same effects
of an economic recession during at least the first years
of the programme ; but once such a process gets an
acceptable speed-up and properly combines the available
resources on a regional basis by means of the enlarge
ment of industrial markets , liner trades will ex
periment rather drastic shifts in thsir structures and
in their different segments , specially when the medium
stage reaches its ending point ,
Regarding the second point , we should start its
analysis by accepting the fact that even when the pro
cess just mentioned , together with the market enlarge
ment strategy is a feasible way out so that it reacti
vates the regional economy without jeopardizing the
liner shipping structures too much during the first
years . Such a process can perfectly find barriers of
structural nature that in fact are quite difficult to
overcome , thus producing stop and go effects on the
basement of the process generally owing to the im
possibility of reaching high import substitution coef
ficients on their own , or in other words due to the
lack of complement regarding the factor endowments
within a regional context , This is to say that the
actual advantages of such a process can readily become
real drawbacks whenever the factor endowments mix does
not exist . But let us suppose for a while that^in
addition to the import substitution process , its
internal industrialization and the market enlargement ,
there is also the complementary character of the factors
among the regional nations . In this case , the whole

process , mede up of four clesrly identified steps ,
with its interns1 and external economic trends , is
going to heue several and different effects on liner
traffic in a region like Latin America .
In order to analyse the economic integration on a re
gional basis I consider it necessary to split the liner
traffic into four fundamental areas :
1 ) REGIONAL LINER flARKETS - IMPORTS OR

S/B TRAFFIC

2) OVERSEAS LINER MARKETS - IMPORTS OR,S/B TRAFFIC
3) REGIONAL LINER MARKETS - EXPORTS OR N/B TRAFFIC
OVERSEAS LINER MARKETS - EXPORTS OR N/B TRAFFIC
Regarding the first area , ue can start by saying that
u'ithin a regional context , what can not be logically
substituted can be done through the regional complement
system and technical assistance among the countries of
the integration cone , This is to say that any under
taking that runs out of any factor of production
can
be regionally complemented by other participating
country ns regards the scarce factor as a way of getting
lo'j'er standard costs and greater penetration indexes .
All this leads to larger regional markets in the liner
business as far as south bound cargo tonnage is concerned
due to the simple reason that by gathering regional re
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sources instead of only national ones
the cargo tonnage
to be moved uiithin the context of the regional complement
in terms of raw materials
capital goods
accessories
and spare parts will be much greater than before the re
gional strategy . Houever
I should clear up the point
that not all the cargo of complementary nature among the
member countries of the regional agreement is going to
be carried by sea , but by RAIL end ROAD , since the
geographical features of the continent do not shoiu

y
y
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neither archipielagos of considerable extent nor inac
cessible zones by land •

Then , treffic which will probrbly benefit from such a
process is the traffic that nowadays , is ruled under
the concept of bilateral agroer.onts
such as the
system existing between Argentina and Brasil , wherein
the distances between the industrial centers of both
countries indicate that the best alternative to carry
goods is represented by the setting-up of liner markets ,
without forgetting , of course , the relevant cost-benefit
ratios associated to those distances • Then , although not
totally , the new regional cargo will influence to a great
extent the develooment and expansion of the regional liner
segments from the very beginning such a complement cycle
starts
or at a later stage if such a cycle was not
adopted on the right time .
Regarding the second area and follo'j.’ing the same deductiv'o
■Procedure , it seems ruite easy to realize that the south
bound cargoes coming from the industrial centers will have
to bear a sharp reduction on its volume , due to the sim'^le
fact that the region is already engaged not only in an imrort substitution process locally run and planned but also
in a regional im.port substitution program with character
istics of complement and balancing among the member
nations . Then , the overssas segments of liner trades
in Latin America are logically expected to decrease in
tonnage y and consequently in.segment terms as well ,
which at first sight and individually considered would
seem to be very disappointing , although actually arises
as something quite oromising if considered as it really
is , this is to say as only one segment in the whole
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market ,
Continuing the analysis , if we spell out the third
area we can set out at the risk of oversimplifying that
like the first area , any regional import implicates a
regional export , thus producing a kind of cargo react
ivation based mainly on two pillars represented by the
ouflow of goods coming out of the com.plement strategy

?nd frctcrs balancing between the rrember nations , and
by the rrnrket cnlargenent within the rsyionrl frontiers
of the zone in egreement as a whole , and not only in
national scales •
Once again , as I said before regarding the first area,
not everything that is going to be exported will be done
by sea , but at least a substantial share of it will be
sent through the liner markets .
Eventually , the four area left as the most important if
we think in terms of liner fleet expansion and liner
market enlargement and diversification comprised into
the framework of regional economic integration .
'de can stats once more , that the immediate target of
a substitution policy is to spread internal industrializction as a way of developing technology , of generating
jobs , of gathering and utilizing more properly the eco
nomic factors and so on ; but after such an objective ,
comes up as a must , the chance of placing substituted
units abroad by means of what we already have seen :
domestic import substitution and regional import subs
titution programs •
The domestic process brings about several strategies
placed between itself end the regional substitution pro
cess with many different effects on liner shipping •
de can say that those strategies are ruito interrelated
between themselves as well as closely connected with the
liner-'shipping development , being all of them of positive
outcome in average • But even though the average shows
positive figures as far as liner growth is concerned ,
they are of very relative importance without the success
of the fourth strategy or area , since what comes
immediately after a regional substitution program is
nothing less than the way out for those products locally
produced and '-'known as production exceedings •
There is no regional economic integration in the world
that has been set up by looking only inwards the regional

contsxj: and without considering the hard currency inflow
it night get by looking outwards • In other words , such
a orocess starts internally oriented , to finish externally
spreaded by means of export strategies , wherein liner
shipping plays a supporting role from the economic point
of view , and a first line role regarding defense and
policy matters •
Coming back to the main topic , it can be said that the
nations members to the regional economic integration ,
by opening their economic borders and by gathering their
land , capital , labour and technology endowments in
complementary ratios in accordance with the real needs
and possibilities of the regibnal industry , are in a
much better position of reaching economies of scale with
quite attractive chances of transforming their infant
industries
in cost competitive activities working and
operating under all sorts of efficiency standards .
All this , ”hich appears to bo quite easy to achieve
i:then on the paper , is actually v/ary difficplt and mis
leading to carry out in a recessive environment .
Furthermore , it highlights the importance of the fourth
area and the dependency shipping gro'wth and expansion
keeps on it ,
Anyway , this process , externally oriented , can be
considered as the motive axis for liner shipping expansion
on all its segments and on both sides , the supply and de
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mand • Therefore,'we can take the north bound overseas
liner markets as the strongest beneficiary of the subst
itution program in regional terms •
Besides this I want to underline the fact that a complete
and promising integration cycle , with its subsequent
positive results related to liner trades
is by no means
a guarantee that such a cycle is going to last forever .
Such an integration orocess should bear in mind the four
fundamental steps for achieving positive outcomes from an
economic point of view , and for keeping the Jiner shipping
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supply untouchsble during the first periods , as uell as
for raising the space denand in a pomanent manner :
1 - nOf'IZSTiC IPOOPT

c UBSTITUTION

fND LOCAL INDUSTRIALIZATION

2 - FAARKET ENLARGEMENT IN REGIONAL TERMS
3 - REGIONAL IM'^ORT SUBSTITUTION AND COMPLEMENTARY CHARACTER
4 - OVERSEAS EXPORTS THROUGH ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND STANDARDS
OF EFFICIENCY
Whenever those postulates be resoected and coordinately
accomplished , economic reactivation is very likely to take
place , and together with it , liner shipping orouith and
development , Then , ue can finally say that on overage ,
and as is shown on the graph right below , liner shipping
can definitely get benefits from this process
but
always provided there are teams in charge of loolcing after
what is going on in subjects or areas such as economic
planning and foreign policy matters of the whole region ,
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LINER MARKET TRENDS IN
THE LONG RUN

REGIONAL LINER MARKETS
OVERSEAS LINER MARKETS

IMPORTS - S/B
+
-

EXPORTS - N/B
+
+

However , if we go a little beyond the positive liner
market trends arisen out of economic integration , and
if we analyze country by country in Latin America , we
can see that the integration strategy , as a dynamic pro
cess in itself , finds a very dark side to explore and to

tackle in many , although not all , Latin American na
tions .
Such a drawback is basedrupon the fact that before speak
ing of regional integration , a country should look upon
whether it is already nationally integrated and consolida
ted or not , since it is rather unlikely to talk in terms
of regional planning when not even the internal complement
ary character of factors is given in a minimum expression .
This is the case of the areas relatively less developed
within the same country ; for this puroose we can take
Peru , wherein there'are at least three kinds of economies
perfectly differenciated and with a very weak linkage betseen them :
A) the exoort economy , made up of products such as fish
meal , copper and other products , which have shown through
out the last decades a rather high degree of dynamism and a
higher technological level ;in relative terms .
B) the coastal economy , which produces for the domestic

,

market
some manufactures and services , can be consi
dered as relatively less developed and technically advanced
than the latter one . Furthermore , it does not get many
benefits from the dynamism of the first one , since greater
exDorts normally generate an income which is actually spent
in a very low share on manufactured goods internally oroduced .
C) the economy of the mountain , which operates at subsist
ence levels and with extremely primitive techniques ; so
that the developments of the previous economies affect it
on a very low scale , thus keeping it self-stagnated and
isolated throughout the time .
What I want to highlight with such a brief explanation ,
is that if economies of scale are to be reached by the
countries which are members to the regional agreement ,
and if mobilization of economic factors are to be planned
and utilized , national integration seems to be the first
and indispensable step whenever we think interms of eco-

ywherein liner shipping is included.
The areas of rny domestic economy rust be connected to
each other in such away to allouj a good starting of

nomic imorovement

the process as a uihole as well as of liner shipping as
a segment of it .

4 . 5 COK'CLUSlOrJ
According to what has been stated so far , ue can
readily observe that there is no way to succesfully
develop and imolement a liner shipping strategy within
the Latin American context without first looking upon
the ecorramic development of the region . This is due
to the simple fact that , on the one hand , the stag
nation level is so wide end rigid that it does not
allow to think of planning and undertaking strategies
of any sort regarding the liner trades , as long as
on the other hand , different monooolies as well as
oligopolies have taken over the existing markets
within a framework of even deeper recessive character
istics .
Such development must definitely be ^ased upon the
following basis :
A - Import substitution
3 - rOcrket enlargement
C - Regionalization
D - Exports
'jJe can say that the imports substitution program (A)
has already been accomplished on a national basis by
almost every nation in Latin America
although more
specifically in South America , As we saw earlier ,

,

such a process can no longer offer new alternatives
of domestic production as a way of diminishing the
outflow of foreign exchange and creating internal
industrialization .
Therefore , it would seem easy to predict that the
next step should be the market enlargement strategy
(B) as a way of combining all the available factors
of production with the purpose of reaching high
economies of scale and international standards of

efficiency . Then , immedietely after these stages ,
exports (d ) -ere likely to corr.e up es a result of the
ounctusl accomplishment of the previous stages .
All this , which has been so far briefly stated , is
supposed to show the way upon which the economic variables
can lead Latin America to reach e much better performance
and together with it , to get the chance of expanding and
professionalizing its liner fleet . Such development
as we said before , will not take place before the short
run is over and provided that the four stages of econom.ic
expansion be respected and carried out accordingly ,
The whole Latin American economy is submerged into grow
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ing stagnation cycles leading to diseconomies in every
possible segment ,
The international economy , specially that of developed
nations , tends to restrict the international trade by
means of the implementation of protectionist measures ,
growing subsidies and scarce opening degree of their
economies towards LOCs ,.ond even sometimes among them
selves .
The international capital markets seem to offer rates
of better financial performance than the IRR offered
by many development projects all around the world •
Foreign debt pressure constantly grows , and certainly
hinders the expansion of many industrial segments ,
which turns every time the economic recovery into some
thing more unlikely to achieve ■
The above mentioned are just a few reasons whereby I
personally think that the regionalization strategy in
Latin America
is more than a simple coherent answer
to the international situation • Furthermore , it
clearly demonstrates that any liner shipping offensive
undertaken by any Latin American government , can by
no means succeed in expanding and becoming professional
its liner merchant marine by underestimating the actual

,

economic roots of the crisis and by relying entirely on

its own cargo-flow , which by no means again , is
enough so as to develop and expand a liner fleet
aiming at becoming efficient •
Nowadays , the Latin American liner trades are ^ if not
totally , puite regulated and controlled by their governrr.ents . Such a control is obviously owing to the lack of
growth in their liner markets and consequently domestic
economies •
Then , the cause of the depression in the liner trades
can be identified as the reigning economic stagnation
with internal and external origins , as long as the
consequence is represented by the governmental control
through the setting up of bilateral agreements , pooling
agreements , cargo reservation laws , etc , etc •
Both the cause and the conseruence lead to even sharper
diseconomies from a liner shipping standpoint •
Therefore , at present
liner services can be reallocated
but never expanded if it tries to develop by itself •
Besides y Latin America cannot substantially share the
liner trades in the industrial centers , since in order
to receive cargo one must be prepared to give cargo ;
and actually there is nothing to grant in these liner
trades •
I can finish by saying that liner shipping must develop
together with the undertaking of regionalization policies.
Otherwise
what is going to occur is just a reallocation
of services and not a real expansionist trend ,

f

,

5

STRATEGIC AD'^I"ISTRATIOP.'

5 , 1 fTARKET REALITIES
According to what uie have already seen and discussed
throughout the preuious chapters , ue cen readily rea
lise that Latin America is going through an economic
situation uherein the values of the main variables o_f
economic growth and development are almost unsignif
icant and sometimes negatives , and where consequently,
shipping markets are compressed and limited , thus
leading to an excess of supply over the demand •
Regardless of the market we look upon in Latin America ,
UB can set out without any doubt that the liner shipping
trades were run in a pretty different way twenty years
ago than the way they are presently managed , simply
because the then existing market magnitudes and segment
ations , allowed at that time to keep an , although not
perfectly balanced , acceptable break even point af what
then were the liner markets and its several segments •
But even though nowadays all kind of negative variables
come up to clearly indicate that changes have to take
place in a trade where , such a structure or relation
ship is no longer kept , liner shipping companies are
run as if it were the same situation then before with
the sole exception that the level of cargo got a down
ward trend during the last decade • And if I say that
liner firms were run in a different way , is because the
cargo level , this is to-say the demand , was in a certain
counterpart relationship with the supply of tonnage and
consequently , the managerial style kept a certain re
lationship as well , regarding said level , On the
contrary , the reality shows us that each economic
situation deserves a soecific managerial current with
its own strategies and philosophy , so as to be capable

of successfully decling b’ith the c:srket strength end

a

its holders in
cuite different r^erket balance ,
as the existing one nci-odays in this side of the
world • Then , despite the fact that the present
magnitudes of the liner market are substantially
different than before , shipping comoanies are run
with the same managerial criterion than those in the
19BOs , Therefore , it is my pur.'^ose to draw a man
agerial style whereby a liner shipping company could
get a certain degree of innovation end specialization
within the framework cf strategic administration in
any market of Latin America , alusys bearing in .mine
the need of suffering from a structural shift , so
that such a style fullfils the neu repuirements of the
reZntionship cupply-dem.and ,
I should start by drauing a kind of comiOarative graph
between the traditional manegorial trends folloued by
liner companies throughout the last two decades , and
whet they should do in the immediate future so as to
earn specialization and get access into a m.pr!<et which
Lies -Iways led by conservative and traditional manager
ial currents ,
fJow , if we pay attention to the concepts included in
table 5,1 , we can start by spliting these ten items
into ten different explanations within the theory of
strategic administration ; but before continuing this
analysis , I should clarify what is the real meaning
of strategic administration within the liner shipping
context , Summarizing I might gather the main six
points which are going to draw the context into which
i>he concepts set out in the table 5,1 , are comprised ,
fIRST : the market with lineal growth rate during long
periods , will never come back again to Latin American
marl<ets ; it results totally unuseful therefore , to
figure out numbers regarding future expectations on

the basis of linear growth . Due to this fact , strategic
administration has an imoortant role to play in this game,
as we are going to see on the following pages .
SECOf'D : the management uhich is only based on the ex
perience coming from the executives and made up of organinational structures already worked out , is definitely
bound to fail before a restless competition that adppts
the new strategic attitude , that captures and uses the
experience by adding it innovation and creativity ,
THIRD : the concept of seoarate divisions or departments
I,

is no longer advisable in strategic administration , From
new , everybody must be on everything ,
FOURTH : the increase cf the market share of any liner
COmoany must be carried out by reallocating the existing
shares between the best operators • flerginal operators
are likely to be excluded unless they adopt strategic
management policies before being kicked out of the trade,
FIFTH : liner shioping companies will have to change its
attitudes toward shippers , in such a i;ay that liner
operators will have to contact shippers and to do their
best to pick up what can be picked up , Liner firms can
no longer wait for the business . It is bound to wake
up to reality and move faster than the market strength ,
SIXTH : the main topic of strategic administration as
far as liner business is concerned , is to foresee the
future through coordinated steps in this kind of m.anagement and within the context of short and long range
planning ,
Now , coming back to the table and according to the concepts
included in it we can set out the following statements :
1 — So far , Latin American shipping companies were
involved in ordinary planning , but in such a way that
they used to focus attention only on short-range basis
and without looking forward great shifts in the long-range

regarding the structure of the markets , cargo-sharing

,

trends
demand pressures and so forth •
But nowadays , it is of fundamental importance that any
liner company a!§ involved in long term strategic planning
as well , since the shipping environment , although in
recession , is still changing permanently and challenging
innovators . Long term planning may result almost im
possible to carry out in an accurate manner , as regards
cargo volume or space tonnage demand , since as it has
been spelt out before , the behaviour of the internatio
nal trade variables are very unlikely to follow a sort
of pre-determined pattern , so as to let them being
standarized in international terms .
iqBLE 5.1
TILL NO'ji WAS

BY

IN THE t^UTUBE '.'/ILL BE BY

1- ordinary planning

formal strategic planning

2- staff functions
3- internal environment

7- routine

linear participation
internal and external env,
comparative advantage rules
flexibility to adaptation
segmentation
innovation

8- static tools
9- short run
10- static management

dynamic tools
critical short run/long run
mobile management : int-ext

A- fix rules
5- economies of scale
B- the whole market

But long-range strategic planning actually goes much be
yond this topic to deal with concepts such as operating
plans , canvassing strategies
management performance
and capabilities
competition performance , corporate
image
product acceptance and miany others • Then , we
can set out that the scope that comes out of formal
strategic planning covers a much wider operational area,

,
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u'hich uncloubtsdly rrents ruite cloarer targets and sho'js
more clearly ss well , the rveilsble r.eens to achieve
these targets .
Strategic planning precises in a liner shipping company
are discussed at a later stage , as well as its advant
ages and drawbacks •
2— -Generally staff managers used to decide and to play
the major role in the decision making process • Such a
role , either well played or not , used to fall into
the category of invariable owing to the fact that even
when staff oeople mismanaged any topic of commercial
nature , the own gccdness of the last two decades ,
tended to quickly match any cep that could possibly
core up in such a situation of staff misjudgement •
At that tim.c °veryhody got his share and nobody L'’ss
really u’orried about what the com.petitors could do to
increase their shares • But the marl<et became gradually
wors-e amd "ith it , the gaps originated by wrong staff
decisions started being so wide that staff turnover
ratio started being very high as well .
Obvicusly , the ens„er can he found in the participation

,

enjoyed by lineal managers
since they are actually the
gays uho arc at the battle front receiving the bullets
end shooting back . As simple as that •
Ue can say that the greater the participation of the
lineal managers in the decision making process are, the
more the chances of pointing towards the right targets
are , an.d with the suitable means , specially when the
hold space oversupply represents the common factor of
all liner company , and whose diminishing .variables might
perfectly be the intuition of lineal managers .
3 —

This item speaks by itself , although anyway I

would like to mention that liner companies used to always
look inwards , and never ever outwards •

Domestic marfcets are important so as to set the m'^in ba
sis ■*^or liner ooerations , but by no means can be consi
dered as the only feature on uhich attention can be
focused . Together , the international and political eco
nomic frames must be spelt out and its conclusions inter
related with all the other planning devices , I'-hereby
externalities can no longer have surprising effects on
local traffic systems •
4 — This item is closely related to the latter on-. ,
since it reflects the lack of innovation and managerial
creativity by means of the so called fix rules .
If they were fixed , is because the market did not de
mand much more ; but neither the managers used to under
take actions related to the increase of participation ,
specialization , leadership strategies end so on .
Nouadays , any liner shipping company wishing to get by
from the existing fierce competition and discrimination,
must without any doubt , excloit to any possible extent
comparative advantages in all liner segments , including
those of uncertain profitability , as a way of anticipat
ing any segment transformation , and improving , anyway ,
the overall efficiency •
Comparative advantages in an open market with a conferencial system in it , can be reached by comeeting as an
outsider , by getting differenciated from the others
as regards canvassing means , by granting more extensive
shore facilities , by financing freight and demurrage
charges in better terns than competitors do , by capital
izing managerial professionalism and by many other means,
A static liner company is nowadays , a firm candidate to
be swallowed up by the other liner sharks , as long as
the one keeping moving its managerial teams and also aleirt,
loo'king for strategies , is the one able of getting by
and even probably without figures in red colour .

5-- In Litin Arrericcn 'crhets t sconorriss of scale be
long to the pest , if ’ucr existed
There is no ■onr er
;hink in operating
enough hold space d e a n d so es
ner businesses under such a conceot , and not awen as a
future investment strategy •
This is a concept , the north american flag ouners soern
not to properly understand , since from the very beginning,
all north american fla'^ vessels operating in South Americen trades were and still are suiming into subsidies
ouing to the inflexibility to adaptation that brought
about huge amounts of dead freight , as well as
ooerative problems of every n-ture . In other words ,
shipowners must be wise enough so as to include the con
cept of flexibility in any planning end menagerie 1 pro
cess .

Flexibility to adaptation may be recresented by the
right understanding of neu needs of f^o market at the
at the present situation , and by the right undertaking of
actions oriented towards the fulfilment of the neu recuirem.ents coming out of the markets '^ramed into critical
shortage cycles . Flexibility to adaptation must take
place mainly in tuo areas : technical and com.mcrcial .
The technical side should look for’not necessarily
investments in neu-buildings units but in reconverting
existing operative units into mors suitable vessels ,
aiming at providing a better balanced cost-benefit re
lationship service , as long as the commercial side
should look upon the canvassing force and the different uays
of giving more flexibility to the demand in business terms
without hindering the expansion of the present market
share •
5— Before , liner companies used to approach shippers
in order to get their cargoes , or uhat was more common ,
shippers used to contact shipping companies to get their
cargoes loaded , In such a procedure , the cargoes were

booked and conseruently loaded as soon as they come up
available to the canvassers ^ '^'ho usually were very
happy in bool^ing them , without having to hamper such
a shipper uith the possibility of rejecting his cargo ,
because it was a low-value one • Then , on average ,
most shipowners got the same net revenue trip after trip*
But once the markets turned round 180 degrees and showed
a totally different tendency * non-innovator liner firms
began loosing cargoes both in quantity and in value ,
thus fostering those innovators that instead of trusting
the traditional market variables behaviour , decided to
undertake segmentation strategies by studying hinterland
constraints of every segment , by adeauating its services
to the hinterland requisites , by adopting a certain rate
flexibility regarding some segments
by classifying car
goes in different degrees of priority , by spelling out
rate complementation for substitute segments and so on .
Then , uie could set out , that segmentation is indispen
sable to C'~rry out the right assesment of the present
and future potentiality of each segment , as well as

,

of grouped segments in similar FOB value *
7 —

Innovation automatically leads to new management

criterisnas well as new commercial tactics to be used
mainly by the sales force or canvassing people * Tech
nological innovations will not go beyond the reconversion
of existing units | since the degree of capital intensive
existing in new-buildings such as a full container or
multi-purpose unit , does not allow Latin American liner
operators to run them profitably
mainly due to the
existing imbalance between the supply and demand strength
But even so , in my opinion | moderate reconversion tasks
together with innovating commercial initiative , are
likely to be the main pillars to win specializ'ation and
then
differenciation • To get differenciated in the

f
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commercial field , only requires a bit of imagination
and cuite a lot of aggressiveness , as long as in the
technical one demands certain caoital endowments , whose
principal is likely to be reoaid in fact , quite faster
than any other traditional investment made in high-tech
ships by the same amount ,
8 —

Static tools such as administrative procedures or

intuitive managerial decisions were the most common and
still actually are the most popular methods to' adopt
policies , and draw short term strategies in many shipoing comoenies .
Wowadays , even when the demand has been drastically
reduced by both the internal and external environment ,
computers are of great help in the decision making pro
cess within the decision context of any traffic , Depart
ments or sections such as canvassing , sales
containers,
shiooing policy , conferences and others , definitely
need to work with computers whenever they want to achieve
acceptable decision-.timing ratios •
It can be said that a oroper use of computers grants the
facility of gathering kilometers of com.mercial informat
ion , and gives a certain degree of differenciation as
far as those departments or sections are concerned •
The key areas within the commercial management context
where computers can produce quick positive outcomes ,
are sales organization and canvassing task force ,
containers allocation and different operational features,
such as follow-up of units end demurrage charges monito
ring , commercial decision making .based on opportunity
and timing factors , traffic statistics organization
oriented towards an easy interpretation and a nitid
projection of the present and future threats and
ooportunities , as well as figures and trends of the
past and current performance •
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In my opinion , this is what Latin American liner com

as

panies orimarily need
to match in certain way the
existing gaps of managerial technics with the industrial
centers .
As everybody knows
computers can be adequated to al
most all the needs of shipping companies , but I think
that any computer utilization which goes beyond the
commercial or traffic management , is a waste of capital.
Such a capital could comparatively be allocated to other
areas , or simply saved • Technical utilization of these
equipment may not be necessary throughout the short run,

,

but perhaps at a later stage •
9 — This point deals entirely with m.anagerial attitudes
and leaves aside any technical consideration ,
The crisis is there and can be touched , so that is real
and perfectly tangible , managers need to be one step
ahead of what happens right now , Short run strategies
must be looked upon not as a way of adjusting the master
strategy , but as a way of seeking means in order to be
come specialized and differenciated at a moment that ,
it is dramatically basic and tactically demolishing ,
Basing my commients on working experience in critical
markets and not upon theoretical arguments , I feel
totally positive in saying that the deeper the stag
nation and recession are , the more appreciated the
efforts of reaching differenciation and specialization
are by shippers and public sector , Even I would say
that since crisis makes the skills sharper , sometimes
is better to deal with critical environments , with
the only purpose of developing managerial minds and
creativity , because I consider quite easy to reach
high innovation degrees , when behind one there'is an
army of banks and financial institutions willing to
lend money to carry out specialization projects , as
north amsrican companies usually do ,

/

!'"-nnaners hpue to have tboir minds oriented towards
critical short run tactics and of course , frcmsd into
a raster strategy leading to the long run , which in
real life is nothing else than a long-range guideline •
10 — With this item I want to 1eaue clearly understood
that by organizing a kind of mobile management , either
external or internal or even both of them , specializa
tion is likely to come up and press very fastly in the
liner circles • Line managers an.d canvassers are supposed
to be dynamic and persistent in their tasks , running 24
hours a day in the street if necessary , and bothering
as many executives as possible .
Static management can no longer survive in critical
trades unless it is protected by discriminatory res
olutions etc
whereby is not necessary to achieve in
novation , Commercial diversification and sales spread
ing is unlikely to occur whenever managers keen on
using old fashion managerial rules , as those comprised
in static tactics •
The only one who , in my opinion , could adopt static
management is the chairman of the company ; all the
others must behave like insects around the marmalade :
restless and frantically disordered • The market demands
it ; as simple as that .
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5 . 2 -

ADPIIMISTRATION BY OBJECTIV/ES

I start by defining what is the meaning of administration
by objectives (ABO) , and ti& delimit its frame or area
of utilization •
First of all I should highlight that the results coming
out of the use of an ABO system may differ markedly from
country to country , specially if we look upon developed
and LDCs . As we are going to see at a later stage in this

chapter , the elasticity of demend and the opening degree
of the liner market concerned , are the rein factors that
mark the difference between an industrial nation and a
LDC regarding positive , neutral or negative outcomes ,
Then , administration by objectives can be simply defined
as the managerial strategy whereby staff , lineal , and
operational oersonnel commit themselves before higher
management levels for achieving certain specific goals ,
throughout a limited period of time and by adopting their
own procedures under personal liability .
This system , in fact , is very unlikely to produce
positive outcomes in those markets l■'here the traditional
way of operating , leaves aside concepts or philosophies
such as free market economy or decentralization trends
and includes many and different means of restriction and
control over the normal functioning of these trades •
We can say that the efficiency of the ABO system will
probably vary in a proportional way , to the opening
degree in the relevant market •
From this stetement we can readily notice that the
closer or more familiar a given market is to its public
sector , the lesser the likelihood will be to achieve
positive outcomes out of the system .
A tyoical comoarison can be done between an open market
economy an a centrally planned economy , thus represent
ing the two existing extremes within this subject ,
Regarding the first case , an ABO system will certainly
find a wide range of possibilities of being exercised
in its different forms , while the latter represents
the maximum degree of public sector interference , since
everything as well as everybody , belongs to the state .
Obviously , in a free market economy like the United
States , the human creativity , pointing towards combetition and subsequently towards specialization and innova
tion , is very likely to take over the market philosophy

ss to rake run the trade under such e pattern , as
"long as in a oantrslly olannad acono,r,y , innovation and
Epscielizetlon through human creativity , if there is
any , is entirely guided by the central authority
Khere at , simply left to say that the countries uhich
hold out in the functioning of its markets under such
conditions are certainly condemned to be not only one ,
but several steps behind those nations enjoying uider
concepts of economic freedom .
We can also set out uithout any risk of being mistaken .
that in times of International economic recession aad
specifically , during stagnation periods in LilCs , the
human creativity through strategic administration pro
cedures and technics in its different shapes , is nouadays considared as the key point from a global poin
of via» , since uith it , the existing oversupply gaps ,
oroteetlonlst trends , regulation measures and retali
ation counteractions , freight market decreases and
many other constraints , ere looked upon to be o v e i c o m e
or at least offset in such s may that , those countries
and liner companies that kneui hou to net advantage from
it during recent periods of time , are going to enjoy
hioh degrees of specialization and innovation leading
to the attainment of oositive rates of fleet expansion
'ceptable marl<et growth indexes , as primary and
’H d
secondary effects respectively .
in other words , normally a well chosen managerial team
using the right administrative and managerial tactics ,
is much more likely to attain better outcomes than these
results coming from monetary investments in technological
devices , which contain a rather scarce participation of
management skills . But now . the point that wa oouW
raise right here is related to the category into which
both , the Latin American liner trades and its shipping
companies should be pieced , and consequently the chances

of adopting an adecuate AEO system without meaning to
fall into resources overlapping or , i;aste of time and
resources ,
First of all I should clarify that , although liner markets
in Latin America are framed into the liberal side of the
entrepreunerial philosophy , there still are different
degrees of mixture between the currents of free enterprise
and public interference ; therefore it would not be
accurate to look upon the whole Latin American market as
a single traffic .
There are several countries in this area with different
intervensionism degrees am.ong them , and even with diffe
rent internal policy orientations regarding its own trades.
This could perfectly be the case of Argentina , Brasil and
Mexico among others ; but let us take the example of Ar
gentina , wiherein the m.ain four trades enjoy different
structures or systems
and follow distinct regulations ,
which eventually leads to the need of implementing quite
different management strategies within the framework of
an ABO system .

,

Before going on with this enalysis I consider it necessary
to state the main advantages and characteristics the ABO
system enjoys , so that to leave for a later stage the
drawbacks and limitations such a scheme has to face in
partially liberalized economies •
This scheme simply consists in asking questions at the
relevant levels , such as :
-- What are your targets for the coming 90 days period ?

,

-- What are your projects
prosoects and expectations ?
-- What steps are you going to follow in order to achieve
these goals ?
-- In achieving these goals
how many standard and/or
extra working hours will you need ?
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The answers to these questions are supposed to be written
on a suitable sheet of paper with several copies to be

sent to the imnediete superior levels • In other uords
this is a kind of written commitment , whereby the per
son involved is morally as well as orofessionally hound
to attain those objectives on the right timing ,
His performance must be evaluated quarterly , and the
degrees of achievements discussed face to face with the
boss , This quarterly appraisal , has the only purpose
of making people feel responsible at all levels y and of
developing a kind of self-demanding behavior in their
attitudes • Furthermore , such an evaluation is quite
useful in the way that people involved in such a pro
cedure , are obliged net to forget the main goals of
the organization set out on the paper
as well as the
means to achieve them ,
This system of quarterly confrontation may seem to be
very simple y but whenever the degree of manacerial
pressure is well administrated , it works without waste,
I could say that it works acceptably well , mainly for
the following reasons :
1 - it lets the person involved in such a system y to

,

become his own boss end draw his own targets •
2 - it lets this person to be more efficient in what he
does } and it induces him to motivate himself by
means of his own initiative .
3 - it allows the original ideas to reach the higher
levels of the company , without any kind of major
interference •
4 - it helps to detect worthy people as well as to avoid
anonymous managers •
5 - it obliges to keep a periodical conversation between
the assessor and the subordinate , what leads to ^
avoid unnecessary tensions and resentments • Without
a periodical chat and discussion , is probable that
a manager who does not perform as he is expected to
in a specific matter , may develop or experiment
resentments against his supervisor . Or even he might

think thet his fsilure is due to the existing bed
relationship between them ,
Summing uo , whet a method of quarterly appraisal of
means and objectives does , is to stop intermediate
managers for a while , just to meke them think of the
development of the strategies adopted , how they behave , to set objectives and’define ways in order to
achieve them •
Another important point included in this system , is
that it does not allow oersonnel rotation inside the
company , since it considers that each function in
each department must be carried on by the best oeople ;
and the best people are not the best in all functions.
Therefore , the system prefers to fire a sub-standard
manager instead of training him in other deoartment
or division u’hen he was given the chance of choosing
his area , within which he 'j;as supposed to be the best
or at least outstanding ,
On the other hand , a transference to another sector
of the comoany would mean to run the risk of loosing
time in training and in getting him adapted to the
new job , without the real certainty that he is going
to be eventually , the best .
A shiooing comoany , as any other company , can not be
merciful in times of recession and neither can accept
dealing with the wrong oeople whenever it uiants to over
come such a recessive period •
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Mow
since we have the main advantages and characterist
ics briefly expressed , we can observe to what extent
an ABO system can succesfully be worked out in a given
liner trade • To this purpose , let us come back to the
four mainliner trades in Argentina :
1
2
3
4

- a r g e n t i m a /b r a s i l f r e i g h t c o m f e r e n c e
- eur o p e / argentima freight conference
- INTER-A|V|ERICAN FREIGHT CONFERENCE
- ARGENTIMA/MEDITERRAMEAM f r e i g h t COMFEREMCE

:
:
:
;

ABFC
EAFC
lAFC
AflFC

1 - ABFC : cpen

conference - close market

2 - EAFC : .open conference - open market
3 - IAFC : ooen conference - close market
A -AHFC : open conference - open market
1) The ABFC although is an open conference , it is run
on close market basis and under a bilateral treaty ;
this is to say that the only ones alloujed to join this
conferencial agreement under freight tariff ration
alization terms , are either Brazilian or Argentinean
owners exclusively
Then , wh-’t we can notice here , is that since govern
mental interference is maximized through the signing of
a bilateral agreement and the setting-up of equalized
freight rates , just very little left to exercise human
creativity within the frame of strategic administration.

,
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Both
the staff and lineal managers are bound to respect
and follow certain pre-established standards of perfor
mance as well as to focus the attention on the own
dynamic character of the bilateral process , Competition
does not exist , since share allocation end state leader
ship take over the market philosophy , and therefore
managerial attitudes find an extremely narrow path on
which ideas should develop ,
2) The EAFC , was and still is nowadays the strongest
liner market , principally the lines joining ports be
tween the River Plate and sections A , B , C , D (north
of Spain and France , Germany , Holland , Belgium etc) .
In this context
we can observe that this market
deserves to be classified as the most dynamic and
changing in economic terms
since owing to its own
characteristics of opening and freedom , an ABO sceme
could perfectly be implemented into it • Competition
does exist and therefore , both the staff and liNeal
managers can rely on results coming from the ABO stra-

,
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tegi2 s .
Th0 Conference is bound to frontelly ccrrpete uith the
so called ■'^reicht rates moderator and to induce its
managers to demand the people behind them , to accomp
lished their best under pressure conditions « The same
will occur on the outsider's side , where they will be
obliged to compete not only with the conference as a
single large company , but also among them , Then ,
either in conferaneed firms or not , different oerformance appraisals will be carried out (bimonthly ,
quarterly) , different managerial factors as regards
timing will be considered , distinct decrees of pre
ssure will be exercised in accordance with the real
opportunities or entry barriers that this market could
possibly hav/e , diverse canvassing strategies are like
ly to be adopted end so forth .
An open market not only allows , but that demands the
best to come up and take over the largest slice of the
cake , which on the other hand
will never be so large
so as to become in a beautiful monopoly by itself ,
since there will always be clever determined competitors
totally decided to challenge the best and to increase
its slice by all the available means ; this is to say
by operating either in a conference or as an outsider ,
or as a specialized owner in less costly triangulations
or whatever other alternative •
An open conference run in an open market , where out

,

siders are supposed to come up and compete , leads to
a sort of ideal experimental field regarding the im
plementation of strategic administration technics
specially in markets going through recession and stag
nation cycles and in those on their ways of getting rid
of them . In this case , the difference between under
taking and not undertaking managerial strategies , might
readily mean
success or collapse •
The experience shows that most developed liner markets

,

,

in the ucrld are governed and ruled in high percentages
by ABO schemes , and uithin a framework lacking of cuhlic
sector interference and traffic discrimination ,
For instance , the liner markets in the FRG , are manaoed
in the range of 80~90^ u,nder ABO rules ; the same per
centages for Belgium and Holland , about 80,'^ in France
and a little bit above 90^ in Scandinavian countries •
Of course | the USA and Canada as well , are highly
competitive in this regard , as long as other nations
not so industrialized , show anyhow a lofty figure ;
BO^ in Italy and Spain .
Then , summing up we might say that this managerial
scheme can perfectly be applicated in those markets
enjoying both basic features : no state interference /
no market opening limitations . The more liberalized
the market is , the more capable the trade will be in
contributing positive results coming from the ABO pro
grams •
3) The lAFC has been made up in such a way that the n/b
traffic is totally restricted tooutsiders under the pro
visions of the relevant bilateral agreement , as long as
the s/b traffic is open to the outsider competition ,
which is nothing else than a simple regulation without
any practical value , since obviously no outsider would
be willing to trade on a regular basis on only one leg
of the traffic * Then , here we have again an open
conference that in fact is not open to third flags ,
and operating in a close market • Then
as fear as the
management by objectives is concerned , its likelihood
of being implemented aiming at getting positive out
comes
is practically void •

j
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Once again , the organizational structures of shipping
companies are made up of interrelated commitments regard
ing cargo allotments , pooling rules and so on , Then ,
everything is controlled and governed by a central body

that makes impossible the development of managerial skills
as well as the increase of the overall efficiency •
4) The AP1FC has similar characteristics than those set
out in the EAFC ; this is to say that it works on open
market basis and under an open conference structure ,
Here $ once again ^ an ABO system can readily be adopted
and thus managerial pressure can be fully exercised ,
Such a pressure
either oriented to staff or lineal
personnel , must not be neither excessive nor too light,
but it must point toward reachable targets in a critical
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short run ,
Normally , the international success of this system is
due , to a great extent , to the exigency degree that
managers usually applicate on their operational oeople
but keeping a certain relationship with the real supply
and demand . Such a pressure can go a little beyond of
what the market can actually offer ; but pressure in
excess is a well known sort of mismanagement and does
not lead to anything fruitful , but to internal tensions

,

and resentments •
We have already set out the main characteristics and per
formance degrees an ABD system can have in different
organization structures ■ Then , what comes immediately
out of it , is that such a system might ideally be used
in open markets with open conferences operating therein •
But even though such a system should seem to fit into
open market structures , its results may vary according
to the organizational structure on which is applicated .
For instance , in an open market , two fundamental
structures can be found : CONFERENCIAL ORGANIZATION AND
OUTSIDER ORGANIZATION ,
As we know , every member to the conference is bound to
fulfil certain technical requirements and to follow a

given criteriii as regards share "llocetions and cargo
=!llotments , k'hereby , in spite of being operating in an
open Rerket , the field to develop rranagerial innovation
and creativity is not actually very large , although is
larger of course than the existing one in a close market,
restricted market or bilateral agreement •
In other words , since such a kind of traffic is oligopolized in one way by the conference that operates on
common freight rate tariff basis , managerial creativity
will only be groupel and focused to combat the existing
outsiders .
Competition among miembers of the conference can be oriented
toward services but not rates , uhich makes shippers
rather indifferent • Even so , some creativity and in
novation which can be followed by investment decisions
or not , is likely to come up ashore regarding both the
technical and commercial side •
But obviously , uith respect to outsider operators , ABO
yardsticks are of top importance , specially if we
consider that they do not belong to any cartel orga
nization nor similar structures . They compete against
conferences and among themselves , thus leaving aside
concepts such as share allocation , pooling agreements ,
etc , etc ,
Outsiders are more capable of negotiating with shippers
not only freight rates , but also the extra time of
containers , routings , delays of any kind and all other
sub-services related to this buisness , specially those
of operative nature .
Outsiders have to be flexible to negotiate successfully,
and together with such a flexibility , strategic administ
ration procedures in its different shapes must be adopted;
therefore , we can affirm that the more capable in getting
managerial innovation outsiders are through strategic
administration , the deeper the penetration in the traffic
will be , end conseouently the greater its abilities to

get positive outcomes from ABH strategies through flexible
policies , the tougher the task for the conferences will
be , leoding to e much better performance end overall
efficiency of the system . Then , an ABO system , which
in fact should be called a sub-system , originates a kind
of chain reaction , thus bringing about tactical changes
in the managerial field and rate adjustment in the pricing
forming process , or what in other words could be called
changes in the master system ,
So , what can be said right now , is that both the eco
nomic cartel and independent operators , can make good
use of an ABO system , although to different extents
and therefore with unlike results . But the one ignoring
the Dotentiality and the threat such a system coul mean ,
adopted and developed by any competitor , is very likely
to become marginal in the medium run unless it adoots in
time , managerial counter-measures throughout the critical
short run ,
tie can conclude by saying that strategic administration
provides the right tools for reaching certain managerial
creativity , but not only in the local or domestic traffic
but also in the international one , thus flushing the
existing quality gap between the local traffic end the
international one •
As we stated earlier , such a scheme is likely to strongly
supoort the rates moderator role that any outsider is
supposed to play , thus bringing about a positive chain
reaction as far as rate setting and managerial attitudes
are concerned ; but of course ^ the same system becomes
totally void when we talk about close markets , cargo
sharing , cargo allotments , cargo reservations and pool
agreements , like the ones existing in the lAFC or ABFC ,
as well as many other conferences in Argentina , and most
of the trades between Latin America and -the industrial
centers •
The next point aims at clarifying the actual role trade

restrictive rreasures just rrentioned ere presently

play

ing in Argentinean markets , from the overall efficiency
point of view , end to uihet extent such a trend could be
deviated touard a different market philosophy by using
strategic administration plans and by adopting a higher
opening degree in the maritime trades •
5 . 3 -

Llf'JER REGULATION

As I have just mentioned in the last point , there are
several methods whereby liner shipping can be restricted
or more closely controlled . These are : cargo sharing ,
cargo reservation , allotments and of course , different
uell known types of conferences .
In general terms we can say that , while freight confe
rences aim at limiting price competition , cargo sharing
and allotment policies point to limiting service compet
ition ,

,

By their nature
these agreements restrict competition ,
The degree of cooperation required by these agreements
can vary from a simple allocation of sailings , to re
venue pools specifying the shares of particular
commodities traded between particular ports to be allo
cated to eech party to the agreement , to space charter
agreements , joint service agreements , and , in the
extreme , outright mergers between lines ,
On the other hand , we have cargo reservation acts ^
whereby some specific cargoes are bound to be transported
on national flag vessels , which obviously lead to direct
intervention and market regulation on the part of the
State concerned .
Now , the question is , to what extent , a strategic
administration program would help in getting rid of
regulatory and discriminatory interference exercised
by the public sector . The answer woul lead to the

theory that advocates

agradual

cample Tientation of

market liberalization and strategic administration ;
this is to say that as soon as the regulation becomes
gradually less strict
strategic administration must
get quickly adapted to the new environment so as to
let liner companies prepare themselves , and thus to

,

compete in equal conditions than those foreign liners
that are already trained and accustomed to make good
use of such a system , Whenever regulation takes over
the functioning of the traffic , either through a
bilateral agreement or any kind of pooling agreement ,
the overall efficiency of such a market tends to get
drastically diminished in the long run , uhile the
critical short run finds both lineal and staff manaoers
unable of competing end developing their managerial
skills • Everything is controlled , shared , regulated
and monitored in such a way that the management quality
gap , between developing countries and the industrial
centers , tends to uiden regardless of the volume of
cargo available in such a market or uhat in other uiords
could be called , regardless of ujhat the trade demands
For example , recent studies of the impact of bilateral
cargo sharing agreemsnts concluded thct the protection
provided under these agreements resulted in the use of
older and often more obsolete ships than would be
employed in the trade if it were open to third-party
competition •
The conclusions reached
werettiat contain
erization was
not effectively employed and members of
the conferences covered by the bilateral agreement
generally used their older tonnage to serve the parti
cular trade « The same study also found a significantly
higher freight rate level , than should be expected in
the service
if it were open to some
degree of compet
ition , The reasons behind it are the
lackof effective
competition , the essential protection provided , the
high costs of the protected marginal operators , the

,

lack of rationalization of tonnage employed and schedule
of seruices provided , as uell as less than efficient use
of port infrastructure and suoport services •
Then , as ue can notice, the quality and terms of service
nearly always decline under non-competitive service
conditions , imposed even by cargo reservation •
Even on routes covered by closed conferences , there is
always^ the potential for non—conference operators to
offer services in competition with the conference •
This ever meant any danger to the conferencial system ,
but on the contrary usually provides a measure of serv
ice and freight regulation which assures the offering
of resonebly competitive terms .
Summing up and coming back to the question , strategic
administration is by no means capable , by itself , of
generating a new market philosophy toward higher open
ing degrees and progressive receding from regulatory
parameters • But what it does , is to prepare managers
and operational people to think and evaluate in strategic
terms , since as I said in previous chapters , the openir^
degree of the regulated markets will come up by itself ,
as soon as the import substitution process together with
its internal industrialization and subsequent internal
and external diversification take place and bringabout
the gradual traffic expansion , In such a case , any
market , regardless of its location and political flag
will have to get gradually open ; and that is exactly
the right moment for managers to compete so as to obtain
specialization in any field •
This is what presently happens in the EAFC , where
conference and outsiders are accustomed to freely
compete and to do their best to reach innovation
scales under whatever method they consider useful ;
but all of them , of course'..’, under pressure •
Strategic administration can also lead to rationalization

of services and therefore , it ujocld be eble to imo rove
the overall efficiency by minimizing costs ,,
f'ouj , if ue pay attention to one traffic in oarticuler
so as to reveal the actual causes end conseruences of^
a bilateral agreement , the real gaps as far as the
traffic effectiveness is concerned may be noticed •
The traffic chosen is the lAFC , and particularly the
existing line between Argentina and the United States.
East Coast , where as we said before , the market policy
follows the tendency drew by a bilateralism framed into
a close market . Such an agreement provides 50^ to each
party , thus remaining forbiden by law the outsider
competition ,
In this particular trade , ue can observe two different
technologies , which were developed and oriented to
compete in very different trades ; however , they are
competing each other and consequently , they are very
far from rationalization standards , . On the one hand
ue have North-American flag vessels , built with high
technology standards aiming at reaching high economies
of scale in a market where the concept of economies of
scale , end as I mentioned before , is very far from
what the market can actually offer • On the other hand
we have the Argentinean flag vessels , built with
medium standards of technology aiming at participating
in the trade and keeping its national interest up to
50^ , Neither the first nor the second one , has
properly planned such an agreement , since the United
States lacks of flexibility to adaptation while Argen
tina suffers from an axcess of state interference , that
comes represented by its own stater-ouned line •
While the United States keeps running vessels extremely
large and without the chance of reaching acceptable
loading factors , Argentina's national shipping line
finances its traffic liquid deficit by means of public
funds

This problem can be looked upon from two points of view
according to my understanding : the economic side end
the managerial aspect ,
The Argentinean flag vessels , although more suitably
designed for this traffic regarding sizes and capacities,
are by far more costly to run than the North-American
ships , and less efficient as regards round trip schedul
ing , port operations , container operations , folloiu-up
of units , and further operative issues • North-American
vessels , although too large in size , are less costly
to run then the Argentinean ships in terms of cost/tonnage ratios and cost/ton/mile indexes •
As I said before , these ships are strong in what its
competitors are not , this is to say in all the tech
nical operations of a typical liner company such as
scheduling , port operations , containers follow-up ,
timing factors and shore facilities to shippers • But
of course , they were designed with another view , in
fact totally different , of whet the South American mar
ket should have been , and therefore , instead of reach
ing economies of scale in a market deeply involved in
recessive cycles , they increase the amounts of dead
freight year after year • Then , from an economic point
of view , it is right here when the subsidies come up in
order to match the increasing dead freight gap , In this
context , the North-American shipping is the one receiving
great amounts of subsidies , while on the Argentinean
side , although in smaller amounts , subsidies are granted
as well •
Following this brief analysis with the managerial issue ,
we can notice that North-American companies , in spite of
being aware of the fact that they did not bring the most
suitable units into the traffic , encouraged its managers
to undertake innovative and agressive tasks related to
marketing , canvassing and cargo forecasts in oveseas

merkets , this is to say , in this case , particularly
Argentina
since they consider that the managerial
attitude of their personnel must be exactly the same than
the one they mould have to shou in the oun North-American
market , On the contrary , Argentinean managers usually
rely on cargo sharing provisions , thus leaving aside
any managerial undertaking , since sooner or later ,
their ships are going to be filled in the same quantity
trip after trip , but of course not in the same freight
ton value' •
So uhat ue can see here is that even though me speak in
terms of close conference and close markets , mould seem
that a olace is always lefting to reach specialization
and innovation accomplishments.
But anyhow , it seems to be the right moment to raise a
key point : what is the alternative may out to bring
about imorovements in the overall efficiency of this
Particular traffic , that may perfectly be the case of
any other Latin American country dealing with the USA ,
or any other industrial nation under bilateral parameters.
'Jiell , everybody knows and accepts that a bilateral
agreement tends to stop competition and to hinder the
internal efficiency of the traffic .
Also everybody knows that a bilateral agreement mill
necessary produce adverse effects on the countries
members to the agreement , particularly in the long run ,
Everybody knows that such unefficiency in the long and
medium run , is bound to be offset by either rising freight
rates or by granting state subsidies • But anyone involved
in liner business could reply that there is no market so
as to encourage and support liner operators to bring back
the overall efficiency that this trade ever had , But
also I wouldsay that not everything always depends on the
market , and that is the reason whereby I am completely
convinced that , in the case of a bilateral agreement
such as this one , there are several complementary ways

of recovennc the overall efficiency i-jithout breaking
doun euch e treaty into an open nar'-'et full of compet
itors ) since not alvcys the bilateral eorcements mean
unprofitable undertakings •
In my opinion there is one way whereby a bilateral treaty
could be modified without breaking it down into an
open market or a more liberal traffic . This rre-thod
consists in granting a certain decree of opening to
such agreement , but cnly in internal terms ; this
is to say that such an opening uill take place within
the context of the bilatercl treaty , but with a wider
scope with regard to liner compcnias •
Then , besidas hawing a conference under the control
of both parties , why not allow r'crth American and/or
Argentinean outsiders to concete ""gainst such a conf
erence , thus acting cs freight rates moderators among
other tonics , In this case , cargo sharing uill continue
being used between t^c two parties members of the agrccme
but the rest of the market would to shared without any
raculation among the several outsiders and regardless
of whether they are Argentinean flag vessels or forth
American ones •
Logically , some provisions should be laid down in order
to avoid an oversupply oh the pert of any of the two
Parties .
This could be one way of keeping most of the negotiated
shares for the corresponding belance of payments , and
of granting a certain dosis of competition leading to
the improvement of the overall efficiency of the trade
for both parties ^ and for all the liner companies
operating in such a trade , This Improvement should
come up throughout the medium run to be finally settled
in the long run ,
But as I have said before , this market , as well as many
others in Latin America , is submerged into a recessive
cycle , end then , any kind of marl<et opening would im
mediately lead to an oven sharper overtonnags coming

from these interested outsiders in exploiting the market
during the critical short run . Then , it seems very
easy to conclude that before a marl<3t cpening takes place,
an economic reactivation m.ust be generated in accordance
with ujhat I mentioned in previous chapters •

5 . 4 -
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Psfore starting the conclusion , ue should not forget
that the cause of the closing degree of most Latin
American liner markets as well as the emergence of
high levels of public interference , is given by the
existing recession and-econoric stagnation on this
side of the uorld , And subsequently , the consequence
can be regarded as a loss of relative efficiency in
these particular trades compared uith those trades
which in spite of everything , could enjoyed a bit
more of freedom •
Once more I feel secure in saying that ^ if Larin
America is on the way of becoming integrated by means
of the utilization of its own national and regional
resources so as to obtain internal industrialization
and external diversification , it should start
thinking of developing not only the econom.ic varia
bles , which ere totally essential | but also the
managerial skills and systems •
We' might l"e 11 affirm that even though a real aconcm.ic
growth together with a gradual opening tendency in the
liner trades should take place , the entire ■^rocess
Liculd ree its performance pretty diminished and hold
ing even negative effects in those cases where some
liner markets should run out of national operators due
to the unskilfulness of the managers in facing both the
regional and the international competition •
Such inability to deal with the new realities of the
market , is supposed to be gradually offset and event
ually erased at the same time the gradual opening pro
cess occurs ; since as I just said , the opening pro
cess in the liner trades as well as the new mianagement
style , are going to begin at the seme time and to
develop at the same speed
this is to ssy gradually .

,

As long cs a certain correlctior, is I'jell kept and
properly nonitored between the opening crocess and the
new fPcncOerial trend in the relevant liner trades ,
the negetive outcomes ere likely to be left out end
the overall efficiency is likely as well , to improve.
Then , management by objectives seems to be the most
suitable system in order to meet step by step , the
new reouirements of the environment , In this case ,
both the managers end the system in itself , are bound
to quickly change their attitudes since on the one
hand , there is a growing oressure of demand coming
from a olanned recicnal economic growth , and on the
other hand , there is a graduel market opening process.
Both facts are closely interrelated , but the extent
to which they can be developed may be drastically
limited whenever there is no change in the managerial
thought , Therefore , these three factors (regional
economic growth - .market opening - strctegic administ
ration ) will definitely lead the whole process to a
safe port , provided that first of all , its inter
relation is well set up end punctually followed up ,
and secondly , that there is a tangible economic ex
pansion
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B * 1 IG'TRDDUCTICM
I want to start this chapter by defining the context
into which strategic planning is going to be developed
an related to previous issues .
The idea is to define a strategic planning methodology
together with its advantages and drawbacks in order to ,
at the same time , relate them to two fundamental topics t
the close and open market philosophies •
As we have seen before , the main features of these trades
are , although not very different , of special consider
ation ; specially when we know that these traffic systems
bring about outcomes of very different nature and there
fore , of very different impact as well . The traffic
chosen will be once mors , for practical ends , the
River Plate liner market in Argentina , where liner ship
ping companies of several structures and sizes can be
found , and where the economic indicators do not shut out
the possibility of applicating the coming comments on
any Latin American liner trade .
'I'hat comes out of all this , is that a strategic planning
method may have many different ways of being elaborated ,
implemented and fed back according to the region and
market trend comprised in the analysis • And one of these
differences is given by the degree of opening that a given
market enjoys ; therefore , within this context we are
going to compare the weaknesses and strengths of the
strategic planning methodology in an open and close
market ,
Then , I think this is the right time so as to raise the
typical questions in this regard :
-- Is strategic planning a useful tool so as to increase
the overall efficiency of the market ?

--

Is it Dossible to imolement such a methodology into
constantly changing environments ?

-- To uhet extent a strategic planning system is cacable
of granting positive outcomes in close markets ?
-- Does it have the same productivity in open markets
than in close trades ?
-- Is it possible to plan in advance in those trades
where the public sector interference tends to an
everlasting growth ?
-- Can a strategic planning system be successfully used
by a Freight Conference ?
-- Does it really foster human creativity and imorove
management standards ?
These are just a feu ouestions ue are going to deal with
throughout this chapter , with the idea of soliting this
analysis into two main structures : open and close markets
Regarding the first one , us =>re going to include the
different forms of operating that such a market may have,
this is to say on the one hand the traditional freight
conference , either open or not , and on the other hand
the so called freight rates moderators or outsiders •
In the case of the close mar!'-ets , the analysis will
range from a very simole bilateral agreement to a very
complex regional undertaking .
B . 2 COiyiPARATIUE STRATEGIC PLANNING
I want to define strategic planning by saying that it
is the systematic and more or less formalized effort of
a company to establish basic company purposes , objectives
policies and strategies and to develop detailed plans to
implement policies and strategies to achieve objectives
and basic company purposes •
Strategic planning is not an attempt to make future

decisions . Strategic planning is not forecasting product
sales and then determining what should be done to assure
the fulfillment of the forecasts uith respect to such
things as material purchases , facilities , manpouer end
so on , Strategic planning goes beyond present forecasts
of current services and markets and asks much more fund
amental questions : Are ue in the right business ? 'dhat
are our basic objectives ? When uill our present services
became obsolete ?
Nou , let us have a look at the exhibit 6,2,1 and to
analyze it in accordance uith the different trade needs ,
de can start this enalisys by spelling out the content of
each box and by comparing its pe.rformances according to
the different environment uithin uhich they are goibg to
be looked uoon , The substantive planning premises are
shoun in the four stacked boxes , As usual , at the top
of the stacked boxes ue can notice the expectations of
major outside interests ,
For larger corporations it is important , in strategic
planning , to have an understanding of uhat interests
major constituents of the enterprise have and hou they
are expected to change , For a very small corporation
the focus can be almost wholly on stockholder interests
but for 8 large corporation other interests must'be re
cognized , Anyway , outside interests do not very very
much if we talk about liner companies which operate uith
in close or open markets , The only difference that could
be found is that in open markets , stockholders are
accustomed to be more flexible before a changing- environ
ment , and furthermore , both the suppliers and the
customers , are very much business-minded as far as
negotiations are concerned , In a close market , liner
shipping firm stockholders behave according to much more
rigid patterns , as long as customers and supoliers
usually follow ore-determined business standards that

L'ere oreviously set up by the members of the close merkei:,
in order to fulfill the re quire m.ents of rigidity end
stability regardless of the ectual situation . In other
words , the fundamental contrast is given by the exist
ing mobility of the strengths of supply and demand under
open market rules , end the unreal inflexibility of the
same strengths under close market rules •
fHanagers and employees of organizations have interests
that also must be appraised and addressed in the plan
ning process . Especially important are those of top
executives that derive from their value systems . They
are fundamental premises in any strategic planning
system .
Expectations of major inside interests normally vary
substantially from open to close markets
meinly due
to the feet that open market means competition , and
such a competition may take infinite shapes and adopt
innumerable strategies , based all upon managerial be
havior end Performance •
'\s we have seen in the previous chapter , open market
managers are bound to think end ret in term's of
competitive standards so as to reach what I consider
the three pillars of managerial criterion in liner

,

com.penies t
-- IM'vJO'JATION
-- SPECIALIZATION
-- RATIONALIZATION
If we look upon freight conferences

,these

three con

cepts are fully necessary and perfectly adaptable to
the actual needs of an open market , while in the case
of the outsiders , the concept of rationalization only
refers to the internal structures of each company •
It has previously set out that whenever competition

does not exist , 'jhich rrinht bo the case of

aclose

rrerket , nanacernent skill and overall productivity
tend to diminish fastly , thus leadinc to inefficiency
cycles that usually contain heavy burdens to be borne
not by the member liner firms but by its respective
domestic economies . In real life , suggestions and
expectations coming ffom management teams in close
markets , are very unlikely to produce a signifiesnt
change of direction as regards the policy-making pro
cess • If ue take the example of a bilateral agreement
such as the one bet.ueen Brazil end Argentina or the USA
and Argentina , where several notional flag vessels from
both sides c=’rry out their ore-determined tasks
ue can
see that the scope to improve end raise targets is , in
fact , extremely narrow , On the other hand we have the
yardstick of an open market made up of freight conferen
ces and outsiders which , for obvious reasons already
explained , ■f^ind a much more suitable field to develop
internal expectations oriented towards the achievement
cf the three main managerial pillars •
Included in the data base is information about past
performance , the current situation and the future .
This information is essential in helping those doing
the planning to identify alternative courses of action
and to evaluate them properly , Illustrative of types of
past information collected are the following : sales ,
profits , return on investment , m.arket share , employee

,

f

productivity , public relations
and service development
capability , Information about the current situation , in
addition,would include such matters as management
capabilities , employee skills , competition , corporate
image , social dem.ands on the company , interests of
major customers , and service acceptance . Data about
the future would , of course , include forecasts of
markets , sales , selected economic trends , competition,

technology , and other trends of particular concern to
the organization (e.g,, international turbulence , governrent regulction) ,
If ue bear in mind once more that ue are dealing uith
both open end close market structures , the results
coming out of the data base are destined to be again
yery different for one type of market than for the other;
but uhat certainly will be the same is the necessity of
having such an information flow at the right timing , so
as to deal better outfitted uith the critical short run
and the grouinc uncertainty of the long run .
'Regarding pact information , it can be gathered all
regardless of the market nhilosophy except uihen ue look
upon tbr concept of service development capability .
I'iithin this context and in the specific example of the
liner firms under close market rules , such developm.ent
'j’ill entirely depend on the rate at uhich the trade
grous , uhich at the cane time will depend upon the
economic strategies undertaken on a national or re
gional basis • In other words , the shipping service
development capability , by no means can achieve positive
rates of expansion by relying totally on the close market
rules ; this is to say that if there is any tonnage ex
pansion in such a market , will be more due to subsidies
and governmental procedures than to an actual trade
booming , uhich simply leads to the obtainm.ent of uncertain
information • On tha other hand , liner owners under open
trade rules , are likely to reflect what actually happened
through many indicators of very easy individualization ,
Service development capability will depend on the strate
gies previously adopted and aimed at achieving any of the
three managerial pillars before commented ,■
The information of the current situation comprises a lot
of aspects related to management behavior and oerformance.
Therefore , such an information will be rather static for

close merket operators

fas

long '’s it

result

considerably more realistic '^or open market liners •
Regarding the future , service acceotance is readily
identifiable as non-existent in regulated trades owing
to its own interventionist features . The regulation is
there and there is no other choice for the user •
Service acceptance can be regarded as a reliable ind
icator for open market operators •
The last box is sometimes called the 'dOTS UP analysis ,
an acronym for weaknesses , oportunities , threats and
strengths underlying planning , Since a cardinal purpose
of strategic planning is to discover future ooportunities
end threats so as to make plans to exoloit or avoid them,
as the case may be , this is a critical step in the plan
ning process • There is an enormous payoff to the skilled
probing of opportunities and threats in a comoany's
future and relating them in an unbiased study of. the

■Hr ^

company's strengths and weaknesses •
This is the area where the most significant differences
can be found , owing to the fact that not only the
environment is looked upon but also the own company ,
All this , obviously leads to different ways according
to the sort of liner firm and the traffic it operates •
Practical exoeriance shows that the liner operators that
are engaged in bilateral agreements or any other kind of
regulating scheme , normally consider competition as a
potential threat , capable of hindering the settlement
of a pool agreement and of negatively affecting the
normal performance of the particular conference • On the
contrary , and regardless of the degree of competition ,
an open market operator will probably keep his eyes on
the Pext steps the local government is going to adopt
regarding the existing maritime policy of the market ;
whether the state is going to take over a larger share
of the trade or not ; whether the outsider operations
are going to be restricted or not ; whether cargo

reservation ncasures ere going to he laid doujn , increased,
diminished or not ; whether subsidies are likely to be
granted or not , etc , etc •
’
iihat ue can see so far is that the threats can be of very
different nature in open markets , and practically of one
type in close markets • However , since the environment
is made up of an everlasting figure cf variables , would
not bo strange that a totally di'^ferent sort of threats
should come up in both open and close markets •
The opportunities are usually given by an increase of
the shares , larger participation , quicker returns and
so cn , hut in order to accomplish such opportunities ,
the liner companies will have to deal with at least one
of the three concepts before mentioned ; If"'!CyATIOH SPECTALIZATIOt' - RATinpALIZATIOH . Thorcfcrc , the way
these concepts are utilized , '•'ill define the penetrat
ion profile of the particular liner company or bilateral
member .
It goes without saying that in a bilateral egreement ,
the opportunities are rather monopolized , while in cn
open trade , they are spread among the existing
competitors ; 'v.'hich brings about very different menagerial technics between these tuc market structures , as
well as distinct standpoints as records the way of
interpreting all the available information and act
accordingly ,
Regarding the strengths and weaknesses , we could well
say that they differ from company to company according
to their own characteristics and to what is required by
the environment in itself .
The strengths in open market liner
the existing managerial skills and
very different levels , as long as
liner strengths may be represented
structure or a blleteral agreement

firms may be given by
human resources at
in close markets ,
by a close conference
whereby the ccmoet-

ition is left pside snd the crrgo shering is guarentesd .
The L’
-'ceknesses sen be directly related to the environnent
and linked to the organizational structure of the
participating firms in both market structures • I'Jeaknesses
have the same shape for most liner companies regardless of
the market structure , but with the only difference that
such weaknesses are usually not recognized and not e\/en
partially accepted by the members of a close structure ,
thus bringing about the implementation and granting of
various kinds of subsidies •
Then , what can be seen so far , is that whatever the
strategic planning method is , the close market liners
are bound to deal with a great constraint given by the
limitation self-imposed by themselves of shutting out
all kind of competition and human creativity on both the
technical and commercial management ,
In addition to that , these organizations do not join
properly , but at a later stage
the economic develop
ment that a certain domestic economy could work out ,
and as a conseguence of this , they are not what we
might coll useful entities , for the improvement of the
already existing traffic systems and the establishment
of promotional lines to non-tr?ditional markets •
On the other hand , the open liners would seem to find
the most important constraint in the fact of having to
face the daily matters ccmprised into the economic
development of the relevant markets according to which ,

,

they are expected to measure and aopraise their own
strengths and weaknesses •
Therefore
the information coming from the boxes of
this strategic planning model , is likely to cast datas
of very different nature and related to both types of
markets . Obviously , such ah information flow can by

,

no means be underestimated •
As shown in Exhibit 6,2.1 the master strategies are

defined as basic missions , purposes , objsctiues and
oolicies •
Program strategies concern the acquisition , use end
disDosition of resources for specific projects , such
as new technology for the exploitation of a promotional
trade , end things like that . In this part of planning
ue are concerned uith the most fundamental and important
ends sought by a comoany and the major approaches to
achieving them . This subject matter includes any type
of significant activity of concern to an enterprise profits , capital expenditure , market share , organiza
tion , pricing , marketing , technological capabilities ,
service improvement , research end development , and so
on ,
Wow
if we compare the master strategies of certain
liner companies operating in both cpen and regulated
markets , '.'e can readily notice that they are cuite
sim,ilar and even in some cases they are exactly the
same
for one structure than for the ether • But what
is actually different is the way the operational strat
egies are carried out to achieve those master strategies •
Normally , any kind of liner company and regardless of
the economic frame into which it operates , holds the
same master strategies than the rest of its competitors :
-- to obtain a larger share of the market .
-- to foster innovation and specialization ,
-- to invest in technological devices so as to get the
service differentiated .

f
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-- to hold a leading position in a Freight Conference •
-- .to start running a promotional traffic .
-- to train and develop ship-shore managers .
Even though many of these master strategies cannot really
be achieved in close markets owing to the rigidity of its
structural mechanisms , they are usually expressed as if
they were actually attainable , which clearly shows an
implied weakness in the system , as far as targets

accomplishment are concerned .
'de can define medium-range programming as the process
I'hareby specific function? 1 clans are prepared end inter
related to display the details of how strategies ere to
be carried out to achieve long-range objectives ^
company missions , and purposes •
Once operating plans are developed , they should , of
course , be implemented • The implementation process is
supposed to cover the entire range of managerial activit
ies
including such matters as motivation , compensation,
management appraisal , and control processes • After this,
the plans should be reviewed and evaluated .
In this context , not only shipping companies but any
kind of firm , usually goes through an annual cycle of
planning in which plans are reviewed and revised • In
turbulent markets such es the South American liner
trades , the evaluation and review process must be
carried out throughout shorter periods , in order to
give a better :^er''^orm?noe to the fead-h^ck system ,
Then , what we have seen so far , are the m-in character
istics that a traditional strategic planning model has
in the two trades here considered • Mow , let us suppose
that we should design a strategic planning yardstick
according to the reruisites of each market , Then , we
might have one model which could meet the needs of an
open market , and other model into which a close market
could probably fit •

,

One emphasizes management by strategy (exhibit 6,2.2) ,
and the other management by objectives (exhibit 5,2,3) .
One focuses on what is feasible and the other focuses on
what is desired ,
Obviously , the Exhibit 5.2,2 represents the sort of plan
ning carried out in liner firms under close market rules ,
as well as a gap clearly revealing the limited extent
held by the relevant strategies of the program ,
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Strategic Planning Model based on market strength and attroctiueness
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A close liner market , either biletersl or not , is eIweys
likely to face gep problems cjing to its own rigidity and
lack of structure flexibility before a changing environment
or turbulent trade .
The Exhibit 6,2.3 , has been designed to be used by liner
comoanies under open market rules • If a company can echieve
a certain dose of strength in attractive markets , it
would register a superior performance ; but such a per
formance can be positively carried out by means of the
utilization of dynamic elements lacking of control , In
this case , the coming up of a gap will be probably interoreted as a failure in the achievement of the goals of
the organization , and not as a common and daily matter
as it is considered in a close organization ,
We can set out the the Exhibit 6,2.2 is based upon static
elements 'while the second exhibit deals with dynamic tools.
Conclusions come up by themselves •
6 . 3 WORKING FIELD
One special characteristic that not only the Argentinean
liner markets have , but also the South American liner
trades is that normally , small and medium size liner
firms can be found ooerating in these trades , specially
those of smell size
as long as the large companies are
just a feu in number and most of them state-owned , This

,

means on the one hand , that most of the liner trades in
this region are exploited by a substantial number of
small-seized firms , and on the other hand that also these
trades are shared in different percentages by the state-owned large-seized companies .
Despite the fact that both the small and the large firms
are operating and competing each other , they count upon
different organizational structures and ways of operating
in the oarticular markets , mainly owing to their sizes

and consec^uently the leek of rationalization
■'\s u/e have seen before , e strategic nlanning system
ray differ quite e lot from an open to a close market
and such an oscillation can be readily found among large
and small organizations as well , particularly when ue
look upon the South American environm.ent uhich is
presently facing a growing cycle of economic stagnation
together with what is known as market turbulences •
So in order to stress even more the concept of oscil
lation just mentioned , we can have a quick look at
the .main existing differences among large and small
firms regarding their organization structures , in
order to bring about additional positive reasons for
implementing globally the strategic planning standards.
According to what can be noticed in the Exhibit 5,3.1
cn the next page , we can set out that the common
characteristics of a small comnany suggest much more
looseness , flexibility , and informality than typify
a large company . Also , the role in planning of the
chief executive obviously is considerably different
between the two . Important differences in planning
between the large and small firms can also be found in
the
goals are established and communicated , how

i,~y

the environment is aopraised and used in planning and
decision making , how subordinate mcinagers and staff
relcte to top management , and hou operational plans
are linked to strategic plans .
In small firms the planning system may be much simpler
solely because few people are involved and operations
are less complex than in large organizations , Chief
executives of small firms also may and often are so
hard pressed to deal with current problems that little
time is left to engage in strategic thinking , In larger
companies the availability of staff makes it oossible
for chief executives to spend more time and thought on
strategic questions .

LAHGE COMPA^JY

SMALL cnMPANY
1 ) Chief executiue is basically an cntreprcnuer.
2

) Most important decisions made at top •

3

) 'olorkers and top managers in frequent and

5

)

6)
7

)

8)

close contact .
Lines of authority end rnsponcihility
loosely defined . Titles moon little ,
Communications largely face to face ,
oral and unspecified •
Staff functions are weak and poorly
defined •
Top managers personally check employee
performance • Few statistical control ,
Operations not too complex ,

EXHIBIT 6.3,1

1) Chief executive is a team leader and
skilled at conflict resolution ,
2 ) Many important decisions made at lower
levels •
3 ) Middle managers no often bypassed by
workers and lower level managers •
a ) Generally , authority flows from title,
not personality , ' .
5 ) Standard procedures are followed .
B) Staff function expanded and expertise
respected «
7 ) Formal and impersonal statistical
controls established and used .
8) Very complex operations .

: structural characteristics of small and large companies

The vieys in ujhich large companies are organized uiill
influence olanning systems . A compcny that is centrally
organized and deals with s single business , such as an
insurance company or a public utility , uill have a
comparatively simpler system than a company with decentral
ized profit centers dealing in multiple , unrelated
businesses .
*de can also say that complexity of environment importantly
influences systems design , Companies faced uith a
comparatively stable environment in which competition is
weak will tend to do little olanning and if they do it
will tend to be formal and ritualistic , On the other
hand , an organization faced I'ith a turbulent environment
in ij'hich competition is severe will tend to have strategic
olanning but will design it to be flexible and more inf
ormal ,
Then , we might readily affirm , that since the Argentinean
trades ore exploited by a considerable num.ber of smell
liner firms which are already dealing with the typical
characteristics of the turbulent markets , there is no
reason to believe thet a strategic olanning, system would
not be a helpful element to improve the functioning of
both the macro and the micro-variables of these trades .
The implementation of such a system , properly combined
with a gradual opening of the particular markets , would
definitely lead to reach a better managerial performance ,
to improve the technological devices , to foster the
gradual growth and development of the ex-close trades ,
to settle a new positive trend as regards the interdepend
ency of markets , to promote managerial innovation and to
improve the overall efficiency of the trades concerned .
A planning method by no means can achieve all these goals
unless it is joined by a gradual ooening toward the
national , regional and international competition . lAost
companies are in a favorable position so as to develop a
nlanning method : they are small in size and fast in the

decision npking orocess . Such a structural shift uculd
oblige the large state-owned companies to revise
orocedures and policies in order to face the new
itive environment without having to ask for more
sidies , and with the only purpose to compete in
terms with smeller firms ,

their
compet
sub
equal

Anyway , we may well set out that , since a turbulent
market demands a quick planning and decision process ,
the small firms are far better outfitted to deal with
turbulent environments than the large firms ; therefore ,
3 strategic planning system could be of great help in
achieving mar';et goals in small firms , although not
that much in large liner companies .
''lost com.panies , as ue stated earlier , are small in
size while just a few are large organizations . There.fore , since a planning system could be readily adaptable
to a small firm not only because its organizational
structure requires it but also because the market demands
it , such a system could perfectly drive the growth and
devalooment of liner shipping trades whenever there is a
certain tendency toward the economic opening of the oresent close and regulated marine trades . Such an opening
trend together with a planning method , and provided that
3 certain economic reactivation has taken place under the
scope of the imports substitution program and the strategic
adm.inistration ^ is very likely to lead steadily to both
the improvement of the overall efficiency of the liner
trades and the reestablishment of the competition at
international standards •
Now , from the managerial standpoint there are a number
of points whereby we could reach the conclusion that any
kind of strategic planning , undertaken and adapted to the
real circumstances of the markets , would benefit the whole
process : starting with the economic issues set out through
out the first chapters , and ending with the managerial

themes .
To end this-chapter I would like to state the main
concepts whereby I consider this sort of planning of
top importance :
1) Strategic planning is indispensable to top management's
effectively discharging its responsibilities .
2 ) Planning can simulate the future on paper , a practice
that not only is comparatively inexpensive but als'o
permits a company to make better decisions about what
to do now about future opportunities and threats than
waiting until events just happen , Planning itself
clarifies the opportunities and threats th^t lie ahead
for a ccmocny ,
3

) Strategic planning is an effective way to look, at a
business as a system and thereby prevent suboptimiza
tion of the parts of the system at the exoense of the
whole orcenization ,

4

) Planning stimulates the development of appropriate
company aims , which in turn are powerful motivators
of neople ,

) Planning provides a basis for measuring the performance
of the entire conoany and its major parts .
S) Planning helps train managers as managers « It also
helps build a managerial and staff capability that

5

7

facilitate quick and proper response to new events •
) Strategic planning systems provide,;an opportunity for
people in organizations to contribute their talents to
the decision-making process , thereby giving employees
a sense of participation and satisfaction not otherwise
easily achieved .

These are just a few reasons whereby , from the managerial
standpoint , innovation and specialization goals are likely
to be achieved , provided that , as I said before , a change

of attitude occurs re oar o'inn not only the freedcm of
the liner trades but also the irneorts substitution and
intern.-I diversification programs . Such a change is
not supposed to reflect a shift in one of the sub-systems
of the entire program , but a change combined uith its
corresponding counterbalances on the part of the other
sub-systems .

5 . h

CD^iCLL'SICfi

'Je can state that strategic planning is the final
necessary element to ba addec' to the systein in order
to reach positive expansion rates of cargo-flouj end
liner trades ,
Such an exoansion is likely to be accomplished pro
vided that as I said in the previous chapter,, a
certain correlation is maintained among all the
variables of the process • One of this variables is
the strategic planning policy , which added to the
other elements in a nroper way , is very likely to
give the last necessary strike so as to ensure a
crad'uel turn toward levels of greater freedom and
stronger competition •
Not only in Argentina but also in meet Latin American
trades , t*^G liner marl'.ets are operated by small liner
firms under close maricet rules . Then , as soon as
a gradual opening of the nar!<et takes place together
with a regional econo'^ic reactivation , a strategic
planning rnethodolony must show up and start I'orking
jointly with said concepts and u'ithout overlooking its
relationship with the strategic administration basis •
The gradual opening of the liner markets will oblige
shipping companies , regardless of the size , to
undertake any sort of planning so cs to foresee in
one way or another what such an opening will bring
about ; and to

this purpose there is no doubt that

the smaller firms are better outfitted to deal with
it , at least throughout the critical short run •
Such a process must be joined fundamentally by a new
managerial current and by a general change of attitudes,
from the very low levels until the heads of the relevant
organizations .
If the strategic planning is not carried out according to
the behavior of the other variables and respecting the

inc ■^actors , the •’hole procpEo
po on but uith
th: difference that
h?t those rhioh are firr candidates to
omo marginals arc- sst of the Latin American operate:
her nationals or
sionals , and not a good
of both ragionals end foreigners , In this case , one of
the targets 'uould be accomplished (expansion of the liner
trades) , but in fact , the liouid benefits of such an
exoansion uill fly from the regional context to finish
on the hands of the foreign operators .
Euen though this case should materialize , thus meaning
anyuay a hard improvement as regards the overall efficiency,
the '.'.'hole process vjould be partially and not totally
achieved ,■ since the national and regional tonnage do
not participate on that expansion , Hence ue can say
that , strategic planning is definitely a strategic mean ,
and those ouners uhose strategies do not look forward the
utilization of this system by the time the market opening
takes place , are very likely to become marginals and to
be loft out of the market before reaching the long run ,
That is uhy the opening end the adaptation must be gradual
and not sudden ,

7 . - C3'''CLUSlDr.'S -.riD ^ECCr^r''’EN'~iATID\'S

'Je can start the ^inel conclusions by stating that a
liner shipping devalopnent in Lctin America , by no
means can be successfully carried out whenever it tries
to become expanded by relying only on its potentiality
and multiplier effects , as if it were a normal or stand
ard domestic industry •
Such a strategy must be based upon the economic reactivat
ion of the particular production units ; but in such a
way that such reactivation should gather all the available
variables or factors of nroduction cn a regional b-'^sis ,
and not only on a national basis .
can affirm that before thinking of expanding the liner

Ue

trades , what Larin America has to do is to mal<e such an
expansion physically attainable p-nd economically '^casiblc
by suitably combinig the regional resources , so as to
mcnufecturs with high econories of scale end'achieve grow
ing export levels •• This -must he done regionally and
should be regardsd es a useful future element as far as
international shipping negotiations are concerned , since
the mare liberal and larger a liner market is , the more
will the chances cf dealing successfully with other liner
trades be , in order to psrticipcte and share other
markc'ts far located from the regional context ,
It should not be forgotten that as we said earlier ,
international shipping is a derived demand of the inter
national trade . But such international trade , in the
case of Latin America , must be looked upon as a regional
trade which sooner or later , will enable regional liner
owners to feel the symptoms of pressure of demand , pro
vided that a well planned economic program seeking react
ivation and regional expansion has been undertaken ,
Then , by no means a Latin American country can be
singled out as capable of developing and becoming ex
panded , including its liner cargoes end fleet , by

trussing only its economic potential and b’ithcut holding
the essential support of a regional'economio program
coriing from a Lauin Amsrioan rocioncl joint v/anture •
It is clear as bell , that in order to get the liner
markets expanded , a gradual opening must come up so
as to let the regional ouners to compete each other
throughout a first stage , and to compete with foreign
owners at a later period ,
This means on the other hand , that as long as foreign
owners are allowed to come to the regional markets and
compete on egual conditions , also the regional owners
will be allowed to compete in foreign trades , thus
chancing the present organizational structures of the
liner systems in Latin America . In other words , in
order to share something abroad , Latin America must
be cr-parcd to share something at home . Dut evidently
nothing can bo c^'ared at home if there is no economic
id davelopmant , ‘therefore
in srdcr to
generate th^ rcoessary cargo flows , a regionalization
progr£:m reems to be t^e most suitable mean ; and in
order to rsaoh an unintarrupted rogicnal liner market
growth through the utilization of cargo flows , a
nei' entr:preneurial nhilosophy must jtake over the
prevciling'situ-tion so as to leave the floor to
concepts such as marl;et opening and interdependency,
regional and foreign competition , managerial flexibil
ity , strategic administration , strategic planning
and others •
Once the economic reactivation takes place within a
regional context , and together with it the cargo flows
start rising both in. volume and value , the opening pro
cess of the relevant markets must begin gradually so as
to allow the regional liner 'operators to get used and
prepare themselves to face the now market realities ,
which from the very beginning of the critical short run

ars E.'ip'actad
lead to tha ottoinrrpnt of on 5-npro\/ed
overall eff-icioncy ,
To let ths opening 'Process grov without mogor constro ints,
the cu'^lic sector interference must diminish crcportionelly
to the increase of the opening degree until a level et
which , such a participation can no longer be considered
es an interference but as helpful element to set up the
neu framework .
It should not be overlooked that the entire orocess could
be counterworked be pretty negative effects if the manegerial postulctss ore not properly understood and implemented.
As long as the opening process adva.nces , net only the
regional but also the foreign competition will show up ,
thus turning the whole rr.erket into a graduel but safe
comps'tition scheme..
During this process the regionel liner operators must
adopt new managerial technics such as strategic planning
and pdm.inietration , and start thinking of acquiring
better technology to compote better outfitted and avoid
becoming marginals , mainly owing to the presence of
foreign competitors •
Competition will bring about a fall in r-tes and the
liner firms will become gradually capitalized and much
better prepared from a managerial standpoint .
hut all this is possible just because tsn economic react
ivation occured together with an economic opening trend ,
end because changes in management attitudes were timely
adopted and strategically oriented •
I will end by saying thatthe two fundamental pillars in
order to make liner shipping take off in Latin America
are ;
-— a regional economic reactivation
-- a new economic and managerial trend towards liberalization
and competition •
I personally cannot imagine other way ,
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